Tag: European Union

  • EU Forms Emergency Task Force to Mitigate Risks of China Rare Earths Trade Disruption

    EU Forms Emergency Task Force to Mitigate Risks of China Rare Earths Trade Disruption

    The European Commission is establishing a cross-departmental emergency task force to prepare for potential disruptions in rare earths supply from China, as current export arrangements are set to expire in October. This proactive measure underscores the EU’s growing concern over strategic dependencies on critical materials essential for manufacturing, including rare earths, chips, and other industrial inputs. China dominates the global rare earths market, supplying 66% of mined and 88% of refined supply, leaving European industries highly vulnerable to any trade restrictions. The task force, which will bring together staff from departments covering industry, trade, financial services, development aid, and the economy, aims to improve the EU’s ability to identify problems early and respond swiftly. Its work will include finding alternative supply sources and potentially deploying EU funding to maintain access to critical materials. The first meeting is expected in September, coinciding with the Commission’s anticipated proposal on supply chain dependencies. This proposal may include an export tax on aluminium scrap to boost domestic recycling, measures to expand rare earth magnet recycling within the EU, and a diversification law requiring companies to reduce reliance on single suppliers for key inputs. The move comes amid broader trade tensions with China, as EU Trade Commissioner Maroš Šefčovič has warned Beijing that the bloc will act unless progress is made in reversing the EU’s €1 billion-a-day trade deficit. The EU’s dependence on Chinese suppliers extends beyond rare earths to semiconductors used in automotive and other sectors, with a recent chip supply squeeze forcing temporary sanctions adjustments. While officials remain hopeful that the current one-year truce on rare earth exports, agreed after a meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump, will be renewed, the licensing system imposed by China adds uncertainty. The task force represents a strategic shift toward greater resilience and self-sufficiency in critical mineral supply chains, aligning with broader EU efforts to decarbonize industry and secure raw material access.

  • Spain Accelerates Critical Minerals Strategy with €414 Million Investment

    Spain Accelerates Critical Minerals Strategy with €414 Million Investment

    Spain is strengthening its position in the European critical minerals supply chain through a new 2026-2030 Action Plan for the Sustainable Management of Mineral Raw Materials, backed by €414 million in public investment to support exploration, mining, processing and innovation.

    The initiative includes the launch of the National Mineral Exploration Program (PNEM), with €182 million allocated to mineral exploration aimed at unlocking the country’s resource potential and supporting exploration companies. The strategy also introduces 34 measures covering regulatory reform, institutional coordination, research, innovation and the development of the domestic mining value chain.

    The plan aligns with the EU Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), which seeks to increase domestic extraction, processing and recycling of strategic minerals to reduce Europe’s dependence on external suppliers.

    Tin project advances in Andalucía

    Among the projects expected to benefit is Elementos’ Oropesa Tin Project in the Andalucía region, Spain’s largest mining jurisdiction, which accounts for around 90% of the country’s metallic mining production.

    The project has been designated as being of “Overriding Public Interest” by the regional government and has been included in Andalucía’s Project Accelerator Unit, recognising its economic, environmental and social importance.

    Elementos believes Oropesa could eventually supply around 10% of the European Union’s tin demand, while a proposed domestic smelting facility would allow more than 10% of EU tin consumption to be processed within Spain. The company has signed an option agreement to acquire up to a 50% interest in the nearby Robledallano tin smelter, supporting downstream processing and reducing transport costs and emissions.

    The Oropesa project hosts an ore reserve of 15.9 million tonnes grading 0.36% tin and a mineral resource of 19.6 million tonnes at 0.39% tin, with a definitive feasibility study outlining a projected 12-year mine life.

    Tungsten production expands

    EQ Resources is also strengthening Spain’s strategic minerals sector through its Barruecopardo tungsten mine, one of the largest tungsten operations outside China, Russia and North Korea.

    The company produced approximately 1,680 tonnes of tungsten trioxide (WO₃) concentrate during FY2025 and aims to increase annual production to 3,000-3,500 tonnes across its operations in Spain and Australia.

    In June 2026, EQ Resources launched a 36-hole drilling programme at Barruecopardo to extend the mine’s life and evaluate deeper mineralisation. The project currently hosts a 22.9 million tonne resource grading 0.2% WO₃ with an estimated mine life of approximately nine years.

    With around 85% of global tungsten supply currently originating from China, Spain’s expanding production is expected to contribute to efforts to diversify global supply chains for this critical mineral.

    Spain’s new investment programme, together with ongoing permitting reforms and support for downstream processing, is expected to strengthen the country’s role as a strategic supplier of critical minerals within the European Union.

  • European Parliament Calls for EU Ban on Alumina Exports to Russia

    European Parliament Calls for EU Ban on Alumina Exports to Russia

    The European Parliament has adopted a non-binding resolution urging the European Commission to impose sanctions on alumina exports to Russia, increasing political pressure on Brussels to tighten restrictions on trade linked to Moscow’s metals industry.

    The motion follows an investigation by The Irish Times and the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), which found that Ireland’s Aughinish Alumina refinery has continued exporting substantial volumes of alumina to Russian smelters owned by Rusal. The resulting aluminium has reportedly been sold to Moscow-based trading company ASK, whose customer base includes more than 40 companies sanctioned by the European Union for their links to Russia’s defense sector.

    While investigators were unable to trace individual shipments of Irish alumina to specific military products because the material is blended during smelting, customs and trade data indicate that since 2023 more than half of Aughinish Alumina’s exports have been delivered to Russian smelters. Those facilities have subsequently sold more than $650 million worth of aluminium to ASK, which supplies companies associated with Russia’s military-industrial complex.

    The European Parliament’s resolution calls for stronger measures to limit Russia’s ability to finance its military operations in Ukraine. In addition to advocating a complete ban on alumina exports, lawmakers also supported proposals to blacklist Russian steel suppliers. Although the Parliament cannot impose sanctions itself, its position is expected to add pressure on the European Commission and EU member states, which must unanimously approve any new sanctions package.

    The Commission has so far refrained from restricting alumina exports because of Aughinish Alumina’s importance to European industrial supply chains. However, Irish Member of the European Parliament Barry Andrews argued that Irish alumina is highly likely to be contributing indirectly to Russia’s military production and called for immediate action if ongoing investigations confirm these links.

    The Irish government is completing its own investigation into Aughinish Alumina’s exports following the media reports. Prime Minister Micheál Martin said the findings will soon be submitted to the European Commission, while Enterprise Minister Peter Burke confirmed his department expects to finalize its report within days.

    Burke also rejected suggestions that Ireland had sought exemptions for Aughinish Alumina from EU sanctions, stating that the government has never lobbied on the company’s behalf and has not opposed any sanctions affecting its operations.

    The European Commission is expected to review the findings as it prepares its next package of sanctions against Russia.

  • Kazakh Exporters Face Rising Costs Under EU Carbon Border Mechanism

    Kazakh Exporters Face Rising Costs Under EU Carbon Border Mechanism

    The European Union’s Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which came into force in 2026, is creating new compliance challenges for Kazakh металлургical exporters supplying the European market.

    CBAM is designed to account for carbon dioxide emissions generated during the production of imported goods and serves as an environmental standard for both European and foreign manufacturers. Kazakh exporters are now required to maintain detailed carbon reporting in order to preserve access to EU markets.

    More than half of Kazakhstan’s aluminum exports are destined for the European Union. In addition to the aluminum sector, the new rules also apply to ferrous metallurgy products.

    Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Trade and Integration, the International Trade Centre (ITC) and QazTrade conducted an assessment of CBAM’s impact on local businesses and prepared practical recommendations for metallurgical companies adapting to the new framework.

    According to the study, exporters of raw aluminum, ferrochrome, steel bars and rods could face annual CBAM-related costs of around €114 million if export volumes remain at 2025 levels.

    QazTrade Deputy Chairman Nurlan Kulbatyrov said Kazakh industrial exporters have already begun adapting to the new EU requirements. Support measures are being introduced to help companies reduce financial pressure and maintain the competitiveness of Kazakh products in the European market.

    During a June 3 seminar, representatives of business, government and international organizations discussed methods for monitoring and verifying emissions, as well as opportunities linked to greener industrial production.

    One of the report’s authors, ITC expert Joost Pauwelyn, noted that Kazakhstan exports more than €600 million worth of steel and aluminum products to the EU annually. He warned that European greenhouse gas regulations could increase annual costs for Kazakh exporters by more than €100 million. Approximately 90% of the additional burden is expected to fall on steel bars and rods. In some cases, CBAM-related expenses could exceed the value of the exported product itself.

    Pauwelyn outlined several measures that could significantly reduce the financial impact on producers, including:

    • Monitoring and declaring actual emissions rather than relying on default values
    • Accrediting Kazakh verification bodies
    • Reducing greenhouse gas emissions at production facilities
    • Developing domestic carbon pricing mechanisms in Kazakhstan
  • EU Warns Critical Raw Materials Race Is Becoming a Global Power Struggle

    EU Warns Critical Raw Materials Race Is Becoming a Global Power Struggle

    The global competition for critical raw materials is increasingly becoming a geopolitical battle for economic and industrial power, a senior European Commission official warned on Wednesday, as the European Union seeks to reduce its heavy dependence on China.

    Speaking at the EIT RawMaterials Summit in Brussels, Koen Doens, head of the European Commission’s department for international partnerships, said control over critical minerals now extends far beyond mining and includes refining, processing, transport, financing, and industrial manufacturing capacity.

    Doens argued that minerals such as lithium, cobalt, graphite, and rare earth elements now hold the same strategic importance that oil and gas carried during the 20th century. He described investment in secure supply chains as essential to Europe’s long-term economic resilience and strategic autonomy.

    The comments come as the EU continues efforts to diversify supplies of critical raw materials needed for clean technologies including batteries, solar panels, and wind turbines. Recent warnings from EU auditors suggested the bloc’s energy transition could be jeopardised by its continued dependence on China for key materials and processing capacity.

    Under legislation adopted in 2024, the EU set targets to meet 10% of its extraction, 40% of refining, and 15% of recycling needs domestically by 2030. However, the bloc still relies heavily on foreign partners for access to many strategic minerals, particularly rare earth elements not available within Europe.

    To reduce vulnerabilities, the EU has signed 16 international partnerships with countries including the Democratic Republic of Congo, South Africa, Zambia, and the United States through its Global Gateway initiative, which aims to strengthen Europe’s global infrastructure and resource ties while competing with China’s Belt and Road Initiative.

    Doens warned that Europe can no longer rely solely on market forces to guarantee secure access to raw materials and stressed that the bloc must also develop refining, processing, and manufacturing capabilities rather than focusing only on extraction.

    China currently dominates the global critical raw materials supply chain, accounting for around 60% of production and approximately 90% of refining capacity worldwide. According to European Parliament research, the EU depends on China for roughly 90% of its raw materials supply and 98% of its rare-earth magnets. Beijing has repeatedly imposed restrictions on rare earth exports in recent years, including in 2025.

    A recent paper by the European Union Institute for Security Studies proposed forming an “allied industrial bloc” with non-rival countries such as Malaysia, Brazil, Indonesia, India, and the Democratic Republic of Congo to reduce exposure to Chinese leverage. The study also called for major investment in European refining infrastructure and strategic mineral reserves similar to emergency oil stockpiles.

    The debate has intensified around proposals to speed up mining and processing approvals within Europe. The European Commission recently suggested reopening parts of the EU Water Framework Directive as part of a broader strategy to accelerate critical raw materials projects and reduce supply risks.

    The move triggered criticism from environmental groups and lawmakers concerned that weakening water protections could worsen water stress, environmental degradation, and climate-related risks. In a letter to Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, 27 lawmakers warned that reopening core environmental legislation could undermine public confidence and legal certainty.

    Despite the criticism, the Commission signalled it intends to continue simplifying regulations to boost industrial competitiveness and accelerate strategic projects across the bloc.

  • Europe Warned of New “China Shock” as Industrial Dependence Deepens

    Europe Warned of New “China Shock” as Industrial Dependence Deepens

    Europe is facing growing concerns over a new “China shock” that analysts warn could accelerate deindustrialisation across the continent, threaten local manufacturing, and deepen dependence on Chinese imports.

    Trade experts and industry representatives say the combination of heavily subsidised Chinese production, low-cost exports, and currency imbalances is placing severe pressure on European factories and supply chains. The concerns echo the original “China shock” experienced in the United States after China joined the World Trade Organization, a period linked to the loss of millions of industrial jobs due to rising imports.

    Jens Eskelund, president of the European Chamber of Commerce in Beijing, warned that the issue extends far beyond finished goods such as electric vehicles. According to Eskelund, Europe is becoming increasingly dependent on Chinese-made industrial components embedded throughout the continent’s manufacturing sector.

    The growing reliance on Chinese suppliers has prompted fresh discussions within the European Union over industrial resilience and supply chain security. European commissioners are expected to hold urgent talks later this month on possible measures to reduce strategic dependence, including proposals requiring companies to source critical components from multiple suppliers.

    Industry groups argue that Chinese state subsidies and exchange rate distortions are allowing Chinese products to undercut European competitors. German economist Jürgen Matthes suggested that the yuan may be significantly undervalued against the euro, making Chinese imports dramatically cheaper for European buyers.

    Oliver Richtberg, head of foreign trade at the European machinery and equipment manufacturing association VDMA, said European companies are increasingly choosing Chinese suppliers because they offer products at lower prices while approaching European quality standards. He warned that the trend is already damaging Europe’s industrial base and contributing to substantial job losses.

    Recent data cited by trade analysts highlights Europe’s growing dependence on Chinese chemical and industrial products. In sectors such as amino acids and polyhydric alcohols, Chinese imports account for the overwhelming majority of EU supply volumes, raising concerns that domestic production may eventually become economically unviable.

    Trade figures also show China’s surplus with the European Union continuing to expand. Analysts argue that tariffs imposed by the EU on Chinese electric vehicles in 2024 have been largely offset by exchange rate shifts and continued Chinese export growth.

    Germany has been particularly affected, with estimates suggesting that around 250,000 industrial jobs have disappeared since 2019. The automotive sector has experienced some of the sharpest declines, while China recently overtook the United States as Germany’s largest trading partner.

    Andrew Small, director of the Asia programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations, said existing EU measures are insufficient to address the scale of imports and industrial pressure facing Europe. He noted that while Brussels is preparing legislation such as the Industrial Accelerator Act and updates to cybersecurity rules aimed at limiting strategic dependence, most of the measures are unlikely to take effect before 2027.

    Analysts say the EU now faces mounting pressure to introduce faster support mechanisms for European industry while balancing concerns over trade retaliation from Beijing. Environmental, industrial, and geopolitical debates surrounding Europe’s economic relationship with China are expected to intensify in the coming months.

  • EU Faces Criticism Over Plans to Fast-Track Industrial and Energy Projects

    EU Faces Criticism Over Plans to Fast-Track Industrial and Energy Projects

    The European Commission is facing growing criticism after a new report by watchdog Corporate Europe Observatory (CEO) accused Brussels of weakening environmental protections in order to accelerate industrial and energy projects across Europe.

    Published on Tuesday, the report claims the EU is using the ongoing energy crisis to justify deregulation measures that could benefit fossil fuel companies, mining firms, hydrogen developers, and major technology corporations. According to CEO, proposed legislation would speed up approval processes for projects labelled as “strategic” or of “overriding public interest,” potentially allowing them to bypass environmental assessments and reducing opportunities for public scrutiny.

    The debate comes amid broader discussions in Brussels over balancing Europe’s industrial competitiveness and green transition goals with environmental safeguards and democratic oversight. The issue has gained further attention following the EU executive’s recent decision to increase free pollution allowances for energy-intensive industries under the bloc’s carbon market by nearly €4 billion.

    CEO researcher and campaigner Pascoe Sabido argued that while the energy crisis initially pushed Europe toward reducing dependence on fossil fuels, industry lobbying has transformed fast-track measures into tools for expanding polluting infrastructure.

    The report warns that the proposed reforms could weaken protections for local communities by limiting their ability to challenge projects affecting health, land, and livelihoods. Hydrogen transport systems, carbon dioxide pipelines, and large-scale data centres were identified as projects that could undermine environmental and social standards.

    Specific concerns were raised over mining developments in Sweden linked to critical raw materials for the energy transition, which campaigners say threaten Indigenous Sámi communities and local water systems. In Ireland, rapidly expanding data centres are reportedly placing additional pressure on the national electricity grid and increasing reliance on fossil fuel power generation.

    The report also highlights concerns over carbon dioxide transport pipelines associated with fossil gas infrastructure. CEO pointed to incidents in Yazoo County in the United States as evidence of potential health risks linked to pipeline leaks, including asphyxiation and long-term health impacts.

    According to the analysis, industry lobbying has influenced several upcoming EU legislative initiatives, including the Environmental Omnibus, the Grids Package, and the Industrial Accelerator Act. Campaigners argue these proposals could reduce environmental impact assessments, expand automatic permit approvals, and restrict access to legal appeals.

    Danish MEP Niels Fuglsang defended accelerated permitting procedures for renewable energy and grid projects, arguing that Europe must speed up clean energy deployment to strengthen energy independence, competitiveness, and the green transition. He also supported exemptions from certain EU water regulations for grid infrastructure projects, calling current procedures excessively time-consuming.

    The European Commission has defended its broader simplification agenda as necessary to accelerate the energy transition, improve industrial competitiveness, and reduce dependence on imported fossil fuels. Environmental groups, however, warn that easing restrictions for polluting infrastructure could lock Europe into long-term fossil fuel dependence rather than prioritising cleaner energy alternatives.

  • The Mineral Security Trap: Why Europe’s Green Ambitions Are a Geopolitical Minefield

    The Mineral Security Trap: Why Europe’s Green Ambitions Are a Geopolitical Minefield

    In the early 1990s, while the West was celebrating the “End of History” and the triumph of globalized trade, Deng Xiaoping issued a quiet prophecy: “The Middle East has oil; China has rare earths.”

    For three decades, that statement was treated as an industrial footnote. Today, it has become the defining thesis of a new, colder era of geopolitics. In the latest episode of the Raw Matters podcast, hosts Peter Tom Jones and Julia Poliscanova sat down with Albéric Mongrenier, Executive Director of the European Initiative for Energy Security (EIES), to peel back the layers of Europe’s strategic “naivety.”

    The verdict? Europe’s transition to clean energy isn’t just an environmental project—it is a massive transfer of strategic dependency that could, if left unmanaged, leave the continent’s power grids and military hardware under the remote control of Beijing.


    The Cyber Trojan Horse in the Power Grid

    The conversation begins with a startling reality check regarding the hardware of the energy transition. We often talk about “critical minerals” as raw commodities—lithium, cobalt, copper. But Mongrenier points to a more immediate, digital threat: the inverter.

    Every solar panel, wind turbine, and EV charger requires an inverter to convert DC power to AC. Today, approximately 80% of new solar installations in Europe use Chinese inverters, with a massive share provided by a single company: Huawei.

    “These devices are connected to the internet,” Mongrenier warns. “They are entry doors for cyberattacks.” This creates two distinct levels of vulnerability:

    1. Intelligence Harvesting: By controlling the inverters, external actors can map Europe’s energy consumption and grid behavior with more granularity than European governments themselves.

    2. The “Kill Switch”: Mongrenier references reports from the US and UK regarding hidden “kill switches” discovered in Chinese-made components. In a conflict scenario, the theoretical ability to remotely disable Europe’s energy system—shutting down wind farms and solar arrays at the click of a button—is no longer science fiction.


    Dual-Use: The F-35 and the Wind Turbine

    One of the most persistent myths of the “Green Deal” is that critical minerals are purely “clean tech” materials. In reality, the minerals powering the energy transition are the exact same materials required for modern warfare.

    “NATO came up with its own list of 12 defense-critical minerals late in 2024,” Mongrenier notes. The overlap is nearly total:

    • Rare Earths: Essential for the permanent magnets in EV motors, but also for the guidance systems of missiles and the engines of F-35 fighter jets.

    • Graphite: Used in battery anodes, but also vital for the hulls of submarines.

    • Titanium & Cobalt: The bread and butter of both high-performance turbines and military superalloys.

    This dual-use nature has created a “Mineral Security Trap.” If Europe cannot secure its own supply of these minerals, it loses more than just its ability to hit climate targets—it loses the industrial base required to defend itself.


    A Tale of Two Strategies: The US Stick vs. The EU Paper

    The podcast highlights a widening gap between how Washington and Brussels are reacting to the Chinese monopoly.

    The American “All-of-Government” Blitz

    Under both the Biden and now the Trump administrations, the US has moved with aggressive speed. The US has set a hard deadline: January 2027. By then, defense contractors must purge Chinese rare earths, titanium, and tantalum from their supply chains.

    “The US uses a big stick,” says Mongrenier. They aren’t just asking for change; they are mandating it while simultaneously throwing tens of billions of dollars in subsidies and equity stakes at domestic projects like MP Materials.

    The European “Silo” Problem

    In contrast, Europe’s response remains “timid.” Poliscanova points out that Europe is still hampered by siloed decision-making. While the US treats mineral security as a singular mission across all departments, the EU is split between various Directorates-General (DGs) that often fail to communicate.

    Furthermore, Europe remains obsessed with the “business case.” “Strategic infrastructure does not always have a business case,” Poliscanova argues. “Sometimes you just invest because it’s a critical asset. We need to forget about the short-term profit and think about resilience.”


    The Axis of Minerals: Russia, Iran, and China

    The discussion takes a darker turn when addressing the current conflict in the Middle East. Mongrenier points out that the “axis” of Russia, Iran, and China is not a loose association—it is a functional industrial alliance.

    Take the drones currently saturating battlefields in Ukraine and the Middle East. Whether they are Iranian Shahed drones or Russian variants, their supply chains lead back to China. “90% of these drones are battery-powered,” Mongrenier says. “If we build a ‘European Drone Wall’ for our own defense, but the batteries and minerals come from China, have we actually improved our security?”


    The Path Forward: Ending the Naivety

    As the episode concludes, the hosts and guest outline a roadmap for a more resilient Europe:

    1. Aggregating Demand: Europe must connect the car industry and the defense sector to send a massive, unified “demand signal” to miners and refiners outside of China.

    2. The “Carrot and the Stick”: Europe needs to provide the financial “carrots” (subsidies and public procurement) while wielding the “stick” (vetting components for cyber risks and mandating non-Chinese supply chains for critical defense hardware).

    3. Industrial Sovereignty: 2026 and 2027 are viewed as the “midterm” years for European leadership to finally treat energy and mineral security as the same issue.

    The message is clear: Europe’s “naivety” has been a luxury of a more stable world. In 2026, as missiles fly and megawatts become the new currency of power, that luxury has officially run out. To save its climate, Europe must first secure its minerals—and to secure its minerals, it must finally learn to play the game of “Realpolitik.”

  • EU Industrial Accelerator Act Seen as Key to Reviving Metals Production

    EU Industrial Accelerator Act Seen as Key to Reviving Metals Production

    The proposed Industrial Accelerator Act (IAA) is being positioned as a pivotal opportunity to strengthen Europe’s industrial base, with the non-ferrous metals sector highlighting its critical role in achieving the European Union’s climate, digital and security objectives.

    Industry stakeholders argue that the IAA must prioritise restoring a viable business case for producing metals within Europe, which has been undermined in recent years by persistently high energy prices and rising operational costs. They stress that without targeted measures to address energy affordability, the credibility of the IAA as an industrial policy tool could be compromised.

    Among the key proposals is the development of “lead markets” to support demand for low-carbon materials. However, industry representatives warn that such mechanisms must remain realistic, flexible and aligned with sector-specific conditions. They emphasise the need for accompanying incentives, including VAT reductions and public procurement criteria, to prevent European producers from being undercut by cheaper imports.

    The introduction of local content requirements is also seen as a strategic priority to reduce reliance on critical raw materials from third countries and to support a “Made in EU” approach. At the same time, stakeholders caution that these measures must be carefully calibrated to avoid increasing production costs excessively or disrupting global supply chains. Flexibility is recommended, particularly in recognising partnerships with allied countries such as the UK, Canada, Australia and Japan.

    Green public procurement is identified as another key lever, with calls for minimum EU-wide standards based on life-cycle sustainability criteria. Industry groups argue that procurement frameworks should prioritise material efficiency, recyclability and end-of-life recovery, while remaining achievable and aligned with existing regulatory frameworks.

    Permitting reform is also highlighted as a major requirement. Current processes for obtaining environmental approvals can take years, delaying investment and project development. Stakeholders propose the introduction of EU-wide time limits for permitting decisions, alongside measures to streamline administrative procedures and improve regulatory predictability.

    Access to finance remains a central concern, particularly given the high capital and operating costs associated with decarbonisation. The IAA is expected to support both CAPEX and OPEX through long-term, predictable funding mechanisms, including carbon contracts for difference and dedicated instruments to mitigate energy price volatility.

    In addition, stakeholders advocate for a more coordinated approach to critical raw materials, including tailored stockpiling strategies to enhance short-term supply security. However, they emphasise that long-term resilience will depend on increasing domestic extraction, processing and recycling capacity within Europe.

    Overall, industry representatives stress that the success of the IAA will depend on its ability to balance climate ambition with industrial competitiveness. Without addressing structural cost disadvantages and regulatory barriers, they warn that Europe risks further erosion of its metals production base in an increasingly competitive global market.

  • EU Divided as 10 Countries Push to Reform Carbon Market Ahead of Summit

    EU Divided as 10 Countries Push to Reform Carbon Market Ahead of Summit

    A growing rift has emerged within the European Union over climate policy, as ten member states call for urgent reforms to the bloc’s Emissions Trading System (ETS), warning that current rules risk undermining industrial competitiveness.

    In a joint letter addressed to the European Commission ahead of a key European Council summit in Brussels, leaders from Austria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania and Slovakia argued that the existing ETS framework poses an “existential risk” to strategic industries. The countries are urging a slower and more flexible transition to balance climate ambitions with economic stability.

    The ETS, the EU’s flagship carbon market, requires companies to pay for their emissions but currently provides a limited number of free allowances to ease the burden on industry. The signatories are calling for these free allowances to be extended beyond 2034 and for the planned phase-out, set to begin in 2028, to be slowed.

    They argue that rising energy prices, persistent inflation and the high cost of decarbonisation technologies are placing heavy strain on energy-intensive sectors such as steel, chemicals and manufacturing. Without adjustments, they warn, European industries could struggle to remain competitive globally.

    The letter also calls for measures to reduce volatility in carbon prices, enabling businesses to better plan long-term investments, and for action to prevent excessive electricity costs, which are increasingly linked to natural gas prices.

    The appeal comes at a politically sensitive moment, as EU leaders prepare to discuss energy security challenges exacerbated by geopolitical tensions, including the conflict in the Middle East. The debate highlights a broader struggle within the bloc to reconcile climate targets with economic resilience.

    European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has defended the ETS, describing it as a cornerstone of the EU’s climate strategy and a key mechanism for driving investment into clean technologies. However, she acknowledged the complexity of reforming the system, noting that electricity pricing is influenced by multiple factors, including national taxes, grid costs and energy market structures.

    The push for reform is not universally supported. A separate group of countries, including Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden, has called for the ETS to remain unchanged, arguing that it has been effective in reducing emissions, supporting cross-border electricity trade and generating significant economic benefits.

    With competing positions emerging, EU policymakers face mounting pressure to deliver a compromise. The ten countries have urged the Commission to accelerate its review of the ETS and present concrete proposals within weeks, rather than waiting until the scheduled review later in the year.

    The outcome of the upcoming summit is expected to shape the future direction of Europe’s climate policy and its impact on industrial competitiveness.