MINEX Forum

Tag: China

  • China’s Mineral Export Curbs Could Shave Over $1 Billion from US GDP — Macquarie

    China’s Mineral Export Curbs Could Shave Over $1 Billion from US GDP — Macquarie

    China’s export restrictions on a handful of critical minerals could cost the United States more than $1 billion annually in GDP losses, according to new research by Macquarie Group.

    The analysis, led by chief economist Ric Deverell, modeled the potential impact of Beijing’s export controls on four rare earth elements — samarium, lutetium, terbium, and dysprosium — along with gallium, all of which appear on the US government’s updated list of 60 critical minerals, which now also includes copper and silver.

    While the direct trade exposure may appear limited, Macquarie’s study highlights how supply disruptions to these small but indispensable materials could ripple through the defense, semiconductor, and clean-tech sectors, amplifying the economic impact far beyond their raw import value.

    The Numbers Behind the Risk

    In 2024, the US mined $17.5 billion worth of minerals domestically but imported $65 billion, Macquarie reported. Although China accounted for just $2 billion, or 3% of total US mineral imports, the concentration of value-added processing and material specialization in China means even a limited export ban could have disproportionate effects.

    Macquarie found that the US was:

    • 100% import reliant on 12 critical minerals, and

    • over 50% dependent on imports for another 33.

    For rare earths, the dependency is especially acute. The US relies on imports for around 80% of its rare earth compounds and metals, and about 70% of that supply originates from China.

    While the nominal import value of these materials is small — around $170 million in 2024, with $120 million sourced from China — the knock-on effects of an export halt could dent US GDP by over $1 billion in a single year, Macquarie estimated.

    The report also flagged gallium — a key input in semiconductors, LEDs, and defense electronics — as another potential choke point.

    Strategic, Not Just Economic, Damage

    Beyond direct losses, Macquarie warned that the strategic cost of supply disruption would be significant. Rare earths and gallium underpin advanced manufacturing, defense systems, and energy technologies, sectors that are difficult to substitute or reshore quickly.

    “Even a temporary interruption in these supply chains would carry lasting industrial and strategic repercussions,” the report noted.

    Australia’s Emerging Role

    Macquarie analysts also pointed to Australia as a potential replacement source for US critical mineral imports currently coming from China.

    Australia, which recently signed a Critical Minerals Framework agreement with the US, holds over 15% of the world’s critical mineral reserves and already produces nearly half of the minerals on Washington’s critical list.

    Although Australian exports currently account for just 2% of US critical mineral imports, investment in the sector is accelerating. As of October 2024, more than $50 billion in new projects were in the pipeline, positioning Australia to play a much larger role in diversifying Western supply chains.

    “Over time, Australia could feasibly replace all Chinese-origin critical minerals in the US import mix,” Macquarie said.

  • Ukraine’s Titanium Comeback: A Strategic Blueprint for Rebuilding Europe’s Titanium Industry

    Ukraine’s Titanium Comeback: A Strategic Blueprint for Rebuilding Europe’s Titanium Industry

    For decades, titanium has been a cornerstone of aerospace, defense, and high-tech manufacturing — prized for its strength, lightness, and resistance to corrosion. Yet behind this strategic metal lies a highly concentrated global industry, where only a handful of nations control production of titanium sponge, the raw metallic form of the element.

    Among them, Ukraine once stood as a global leader, the industrial backbone of the Soviet titanium complex and one of the few countries that mastered the Kroll process — the key technology for sponge production. Ukraine uniquely combined chemical, metallurgical, and scientific expertise, hosting its own Institute of Titanium and advanced hydrometallurgical facilities capable of extracting not only titanium but also zirconium and hafnium.

    Today, that legacy stands disrupted. The Russian invasion has fractured Ukraine’s heavy industry and halted sponge production since 2021. But it also opened a potential path forward: the chance for Ukraine to reclaim a central role in Western titanium supply chains, as the world scrambles to reduce dependence on Russia and China.

    Global Titanium Landscape

    According to the US Geological Survey, global titanium sponge capacity reached 410,000 tons in 2024, with production steady at around 320,000 tons. The market is heavily consolidated:

    • China accounts for nearly 69% of global output, producing mainly industrial-grade sponge for domestic use.

    • Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Kazakhstan supply almost all of the aerospace-grade sponge imported by the United States and the European Union.

    • Russia remains integrated in its own defense value chain, but sanctions have eroded margins and logistics competitiveness.

    • Ukraine, a former key player, has recorded zero production since 2021.

    While China dominates the midstream segment with state-backed clusters, low-cost energy, and full integration, it lacks certification pathways to access Western aerospace markets. By contrast, Japan and Saudi Arabia occupy the high-quality premium segment, selling sponge at $11,000–13,000 per ton, compared with China’s $7,000 average price.

    The United States and EU remain the largest consumers and stockpilers, offering the most stable and profitable end markets — but they are also the most supply-constrained.

    Why Ukraine Matters

    Ukraine is the only European nation with both a high-grade mineral base and the industrial legacy to re-enter titanium sponge production. Its ilmenite and rutile deposits can support chloride-route Kroll processing, the same route used for aerospace-quality sponge.

    Even a 10,000–15,000 tpa facility could anchor a new Titanium Cluster serving Western markets. The cluster could later expand into VAR smelting (Vacuum Arc Remelting) to produce ingots and billets, especially for Ti-6Al-4V alloys used in aviation and defense.

    Strategically, this would fill a critical gap in the non-Chinese, non-Russian titanium segment, providing Europe with a certified domestic source of titanium metal for the first time in decades.

    Key Enablers and Investment Model

    Rebuilding Ukraine’s titanium metallurgy requires three foundational pillars:

    1. Energy Efficiency and Security:
      Titanium sponge production is power-intensive, with electricity costs accounting for 20–30% of total cash costs. Stable, affordable power — ideally renewable or nuclear — is crucial.

    2. Integrated Clustering:
      A vertically integrated industrial cluster combining mining, sponge, smelting, and by-product recovery (zirconium, hafnium, germanium) would minimize costs and maximize value retention.

    3. Strategic Financing:
      A $400–700 million CAPEX is needed for a 10,000–15,000 tpa sponge facility, with an additional $350–400 million for smelting capacity. Financing could come through long-term offtake contracts with Western aerospace and defense OEMs, supported by instruments such as the U.S.–Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund.

    Advanced payments and consortium-based equity could unlock broader project financing, while ensuring certification alignment with Western standards.

    Outlook and Feasibility

    Global titanium sponge output is forecast to reach 400,000–440,000 tons by 2035, driven by:

    • Rising aerospace demand (notably from Airbus A320 and Boeing 737 MAX programs).

    • Global rearmament and stockpiling.

    • Ongoing supply diversification efforts by Western governments.

    Within this framework, Ukraine and India are viewed as the two most promising re-entry markets. Ukraine could restore 5,000–10,000 tons per year of production by 2035, scaling to 15,000 tons under favorable conditions.

    Even modest early-stage output would offer strategic returns: it would anchor a European titanium hub, reduce Western supply risk, and cement Ukraine’s industrial role in the critical minerals value chain.

    Conclusion

    Ukraine possesses the minerals, know-how, and geographic advantage to rebuild a titanium industry that serves Europe’s long-term strategic interests.

    If paired with targeted investment, certification partnerships, and energy reforms, Ukraine could re-establish itself as a core supplier of aerospace-grade titanium, bridging the gap between resource-rich producers and high-tech Western consumers.

    Far from a nostalgic revival, this would mark a new strategic chapter — positioning Ukraine not just as a raw material exporter, but as Europe’s titanium powerhouse.

  • EU Sets Up “Special Channel” with China to Secure Rare Earth Supply

    EU Sets Up “Special Channel” with China to Secure Rare Earth Supply

    The European Union has established a special communication channel with Chinese authorities to ensure the continuous flow of rare earth materials essential for European industries, EU Trade Commissioner Maros Sefcovic said on Wednesday.

    The move comes after China imposed export controls on rare earths earlier this year, triggering alarm in Europe over possible disruptions to the supply of critical materials used in electric vehicles, wind turbines, and permanent magnets — key components for clean energy and high-tech manufacturing.

    Speaking at the 2025 GCC–EU Business Forum in Kuwait, Sefcovic told Reuters that he had held multiple discussions with Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao, emphasizing that bureaucratic delays in export procedures could have a “very negative impact on production and manufacturing in the EU.”

    Fast-Track Cooperation Mechanism

    Brussels and Beijing have agreed to prioritize export permit applications from European companies. Through the newly established channel, EU and Chinese officials are jointly reviewing and fast-tracking export approvals for rare earth shipments.

    According to Sefcovic, European companies have submitted about 2,000 applications since the controls were introduced, with just over half already approved. He said the EU was urging China to accelerate the remaining cases while pursuing broader supply chain diversification.

    “We continue to press for faster processing,” Sefcovic said, adding that Europe is simultaneously developing alternative rare earth sources, including new mining and magnet production projects in Estonia.

    Wider Context

    The announcement follows months of tension between Europe and Beijing after China’s export restrictions on rare earths and related technologies. Although subsequent deals with the EU and the United States helped ease the immediate supply squeeze, both regions have intensified efforts to reduce dependence on Chinese critical materials.

    On Tuesday, the European Commission confirmed that EU and Chinese officials discussed introducing general export licenses to simplify rare earth shipments — similar to arrangements reportedly secured by the United States.

  • Putin Orders Roadmap for Russia’s Rare-Earth Extraction as Global Competition Intensifies

    Putin Orders Roadmap for Russia’s Rare-Earth Extraction as Global Competition Intensifies

    Russian President Vladimir Putin has instructed his cabinet to develop a national roadmap for rare-earth mineral extraction by December 1, as global competition for critical raw materials intensifies and countries seek to reduce dependence on China’s near-monopoly in the sector.

    The directive, published Tuesday on the Kremlin’s website, also calls for the expansion of transport and logistics infrastructure at Russia’s borders with China and North Korea, including multimodal hubs and new railway links.

    Rare-earth elements—vital for smartphones, electric vehicles, wind turbines, and advanced weapons systems—have become a major point of strategic rivalry between the world’s largest economies.

    In April, U.S. President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy signed an agreement granting the United States preferential access to Ukraine’s mineral resources and supporting U.S. investment in reconstruction projects. Moscow has since said it is also open to cooperation with the U.S. on rare-earth projects, though political and diplomatic tensions stemming from Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine have stalled progress.

    Earlier this year, Kirill Dmitriev, Putin’s investment envoy, said U.S. firms had shown interest in Russian rare-earth ventures, but talks remain at an exploratory stage.

    Meanwhile, China, which dominates the global rare-earth supply chain, has tightened export controls in retaliation against Western tariffs, pushing Washington and its allies to accelerate domestic and alternative sources of supply.

    Putin’s order stems from discussions at the Far Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok in September, where he emphasized the strategic importance of developing Russia’s Far East as a resource and transport hub connecting Asia and Europe.

    According to the U.S. Geological Survey (USGS), Russia’s known rare-earth reserves total about 3.8 million tonnes, though Moscow claims much higher figures. The Russian Natural Resources Ministry estimates 28.7 million tonnes of reserves across 15 different rare-earth metals as of January 2023. Even by Moscow’s count, however, Russia’s share remains relatively small compared to China’s dominant position.

    Putin also ordered the construction of new multimodal transport and logistics centers along the country’s borders with China and North Korea, including upgrades to two existing railway bridges and the completion of a new bridge to North Korea by 2026.

    Both China and North Korea have deepened economic cooperation with Russia amid Western sanctions, making regional integration and resource development key components of Moscow’s broader pivot to Asia strategy.

  • EU Sounds Alarm Over China’s Rare Earth Export Controls, Prepares New ReSourceEU Plan

    EU Sounds Alarm Over China’s Rare Earth Export Controls, Prepares New ReSourceEU Plan

    Brussels and Washington have been put on high alert following China’s announcement of new restrictions on rare earth exports and related technologies — a move that threatens to disrupt the global supply of critical raw materials essential for clean energy and advanced industries. Although a recent tariff deal between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping reportedly delayed the implementation of those restrictions by a year, European leaders are bracing for potential economic shockwaves.

    Speaking at the Berlin Global Dialogue on October 25, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen warned that the EU “is ready to use all of the instruments in our toolbox to respond if needed.” The Commission’s immediate priority remains finding “solutions with our Chinese counterparts,” she said, but von der Leyen made clear that Brussels will not hesitate to take coercive countermeasures if Europe’s industrial security is threatened.

    Von der Leyen compared Beijing’s export restrictions to Moscow’s former energy leverage, describing China’s dominance in rare earth supply chains as a “significant risk” and a “threat to the stability of global industries.” More than 90% of Europe’s consumption of rare earth magnets — critical for sectors from automotive and defense to AI and aerospace — comes from China.

    To defend against possible coercion, the EU may invoke its so-called anti-coercion instrument, dubbed the European “bazooka,” which came into force in December 2023 but has yet to be used. The mechanism would allow Brussels to impose retaliatory tariffs, restrict trade in services and intellectual property, and limit access to European investment and procurement markets in response to deliberate economic pressure from foreign powers.

    At the same time, the European Commission is finalizing a new initiative — ReSourceEU — modeled on the 2022 RePowerEU energy plan. Its goal is to secure stable access to critical raw materials in the short, medium, and long term by boosting recycling, promoting collective purchasing, creating strategic reserves, and developing new partnerships with resource-rich countries including Ukraine, Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Chile, and Greenland.

    Just a day earlier, the EU signed an enhanced partnership agreement with Uzbekistan, expanding cooperation on resource security and trade.

    Meanwhile, European Council President Antonio Costa raised the issue directly with Chinese Premier Li Qiang during a bilateral meeting at the ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur. Costa stressed “the importance of constructive and stable relations with China” while expressing “strong concern” over Beijing’s export controls. He urged China to “restore smooth, reliable, and predictable supply chains as soon as possible.”

    The escalating tensions underscore Europe’s growing vulnerability in the global competition for raw materials — and the delicate balancing act Brussels must perform between economic pragmatism and strategic autonomy.

  • EU to Establish Critical Raw Materials Center for Joint Purchasing and Stockpiling Amid Rising Supply Risks

    EU to Establish Critical Raw Materials Center for Joint Purchasing and Stockpiling Amid Rising Supply Risks

    The European Union will set up a Critical Raw Materials Center to coordinate the joint purchasing and stockpiling of key minerals vital to industries such as defense, automotive manufacturing, and clean energy, under a new 2026 work plan unveiled by the European Commission on Tuesday.

    The initiative, described as part of Europe’s quest for “industrial sovereignty,” seeks to safeguard supplies of critical minerals and metals amid intensifying global competition and geopolitical uncertainty.

    “Our regional and global order is being redrawn. And Europe must fight for its place in a world where some major powers are either ambivalent or hostile to us,” said European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in an address to the European Parliament.

    The planned Critical Raw Materials Center will monitor market flows, coordinate collective EU purchases, and maintain strategic reserves of essential resources — including rare earths, lithium, cobalt, and nickel — ensuring supply stability for strategic industries.

    The plan follows China’s announcement earlier this month of expanded export controls on rare-earth magnets and raw materials, citing national security concerns. Those restrictions have triggered alarm across global supply chains and prompted urgent discussions between EU trade chief Maroš Šefčovič and his Chinese counterpart to seek a path forward.

    The move also builds on the EU’s 2023 Critical Raw Materials Act, which laid the foundation for diversifying mineral imports away from China and expanding domestic extraction, refining, and recycling capacity.

    Von der Leyen said the bloc must ensure autonomy not only in raw materials but also in “critical technologies that will shape the economy of tomorrow”, citing batteries, cloud computing, artificial intelligence, and advanced materials.

    As part of the broader 2026 European Work Plan, the Commission outlined six strategic pillars:

    Sustainable prosperity and competitiveness

    Defense and security

    Social model and innovation

    Quality of life

    Democracy and rule of law

    Global engagement

    Other measures include a new “European Product Act”, updates to public procurement rules, taxation and energy deregulation, and a European anti-corruption initiative. A new action plan against cyberbullying will also be introduced.

    In parallel, the EU announced plans to withdraw 25 stalled legislative proposals in 2026 to reduce bureaucratic burdens and respond to business pressure for faster, more flexible regulatory frameworks.

    Context: China’s Dominance and Europe’s Strategic Response
    China currently controls the majority of global refining capacity for rare earths and other critical minerals. The new export restrictions — and the risk of further escalation — have pushed Europe to accelerate diversification efforts through partnerships with countries such as Kazakhstan, Canada, and Australia.

    By pooling resources and centralizing strategic oversight, Brussels hopes to shield European industries from supply shocks while strengthening its negotiating position in a more fragmented global economy.

  • U.S.–China Trade Escalation Puts Spotlight on Kazakhstan’s Rare Earth Potential

    U.S.–China Trade Escalation Puts Spotlight on Kazakhstan’s Rare Earth Potential

    Global markets endured one of their most volatile days since the early stages of the U.S.–China trade war, after China expanded export controls on rare earth elements and U.S. President Donald J. Trump announced sweeping new tariffs and export restrictions in response.

    In a series of social media posts, Trump first suggested there was “no reason” to meet Chinese President Xi Jinping at the upcoming APEC Summit, before declaring that China would impose “large-scale export controls” on nearly all its products starting November 1. The White House later confirmed that the U.S. would respond with 100% tariffs on Chinese imports and new export restrictions on critical software “on or before November 1.”

    The escalation has injected new urgency into the global scramble for rare-earth supply chains, pushing attention beyond East Asia to Central Asia, particularly Kazakhstan — one of the few countries outside China with verified rare-earth reserves and a functioning mining sector.

    Kazakhstan’s Rising Role in Supply Diversification
    Kazakhstan’s mineral wealth is rooted in Soviet-era geological mapping, with modern surveys confirming vast deposits of neodymium, praseodymium, dysprosium, terbium, and samarium — all essential for electric vehicles, wind turbines, and advanced defense systems. The Zhana Kazakhstan deposit in the Karagandy region could become one of the largest rare-earth reserves globally, pending validation of resource estimates.

    According to U.S. defense classifications, these are “critical defense materials.” Both the Pentagon and the Defense Logistics Agency have begun building stockpiles and identifying non-Chinese refining partners, but the challenge lies not in geology — Kazakhstan’s resources are proven — but in processing and commercialization.

    Existing facilities such as the Stepnogorsk Chemical Plant and Ulba Metallurgical Plant could be adapted for rare-earth processing, while the SARECO joint venture has already demonstrated the recovery of magnet-critical elements from uranium residues. The Kuirektykol deposit, rich in neodymium and dysprosium, further strengthens Kazakhstan’s feedstock base. However, infrastructure remains tailored to uranium and base metals, not the precise requirements of rare-earth refining.

    Legal Reforms and Foreign Partnerships
    Kazakhstan’s Unified Code on Subsoil Use (2018) has made the country more attractive to Western investors by clarifying ownership and capital entry rules. Since then, over $40 billion in new foreign mining investment has entered the sector. European and Japanese firms are now exploring partnerships in refining, metallurgy, and supply-chain development.

    The government’s focus is shifting from raw extraction toward value-added production, aligning with global efforts to reduce dependence on Chinese processing. Still, sustained investment will depend on policy consistency, financing mechanisms, and export infrastructure.

    Strategic Context: Central Asia’s Balancing Act
    Kazakhstan’s push to develop its rare-earth potential reflects a regional strategy to manage interdependence with China while courting Western partnerships. While China remains a dominant trading partner, Kazakhstan’s access to the Caspian Sea and international capital markets gives it greater flexibility than most of its neighbors.

    Recent trade volatility and increased Chinese port fees have added pressure to diversify trade routes, not by abandoning China, but by building redundant corridors and risk-mitigated financing.

    The United States, meanwhile, views Kazakhstan not as a substitute for China but as a strategic component in a diversified supply network. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) is assessing refining feasibility studies under strict governance and environmental standards.

    At the C5+1 meeting in Dushanbe on September 4, U.S. and Central Asian officials discussed rare-earth cooperation as part of broader economic diversification efforts — signaling a shift from diplomatic rhetoric to working-level engagement.

    Outlook
    As export controls and tariffs deepen supply chain instability, Kazakhstan is emerging as a key analytical focus for policymakers and investors seeking long-term alternatives. Its rare-earth deposits and industrial base give it potential leverage in the global realignment of strategic materials — but realizing that potential will depend on its ability to scale processing, secure investment, and build reliable transport routes.

    Rather than serving as a replacement for China, Kazakhstan illustrates how mid-sized economies are positioning themselves as essential nodes in a fragmented, multipolar supply chain system.

  • Pensana Scraps £250m Rare Earth Refinery in Hull, Shifts Operations to the US

    Pensana Scraps £250m Rare Earth Refinery in Hull, Shifts Operations to the US

    Britain’s ambitions to become a critical minerals powerhouse have suffered a major setback after Pensana Plc abandoned its £250 million rare earth refinery project near Hull, opting instead to relocate operations to the United States, Sky News reported.

    The proposed refinery at Saltend Chemicals Park was intended to process rare earth elements for use in electric vehicle motors and wind turbine magnets, creating 126 jobs and serving as the centerpiece of the UK’s 2022 Critical Minerals Strategy. The project had been promised millions in government funding — funding that was never disbursed as construction failed to begin.

    Pensana’s chairman, Paul Atherley, said the move was driven by the Trump administration’s decision to guarantee purchases of rare earths from the US Mountain Pass mine at fixed prices — a level of state support he said Europe and the UK have failed to match.

    “That’s repriced the market — and Washington is looking to do more of these deals, moving at an absolute rate of knots,” Atherley said. “Europe and the UK have been talking about critical minerals for ages. But when the Americans do it, they go big and hard, and make it happen. We don’t; we mostly just talk about it.”

    The decision comes amid heightened geopolitical tensions and growing global competition for rare earth supply chains, as China — which produces about 90% of the world’s refined rare earth metals — tightens export restrictions. The announcement follows Beijing’s latest export curbs, which prompted President Donald Trump to threaten 100% tariffs on Chinese goods.

    The Hull refinery was once touted as a flagship project for the UK’s green industrial transition. During the project’s 2022 groundbreaking, then–Business Secretary Kwasi Kwarteng described it as “the only facility of its kind in Europe,” promising it would “secure Britain’s supply resilience.”

    However, Atherley said rare earth processing remains too complex, energy-intensive, and costly to be commercially viable in the UK, citing record-high industrial energy prices as a key obstacle.

    Pensana continues to pursue lithium refining plans in Teesside through its related venture Tees Valley Lithium, which Atherley described as more feasible given current economics.

    The move deals another blow to Britain’s chemicals and materials sector, already struggling with high energy costs and recent shutdowns, including the closure of Vivergo, a biofuels refinery located in the same industrial park.

    A Department for Business and Trade spokesperson called the decision “disappointing” but acknowledged it was a commercial matter for Pensana.

    “We will publish a new Critical Minerals Strategy soon to help secure our supply chains for the long term, and we’re reducing industrial electricity costs as part of our modern Industrial Strategy,” the department said.

  • Japan, Spain and South Korea Warn of Unsustainable Copper Market as Smelting Fees Collapse

    Japan, Spain and South Korea Warn of Unsustainable Copper Market as Smelting Fees Collapse

    Japan, Spain, and South Korea have issued a rare joint statement voicing alarm over the steep decline in copper treatment and refining charges (TC/RCs), warning that the current market conditions threaten the sustainability of both smelters and miners.

    The statement — released following an online meeting of the three countries’ industry ministries — comes amid mounting pressure on global copper smelters, who face shrinking profit margins due to tight concentrate supplies and growing smelting capacity in China.

    In June, several Chinese smelters agreed to process copper concentrate for Chilean miner Antofagasta at no charge, underscoring the severity of the downturn.

    “We are deeply concerned that this deterioration in TC/RCs is prompting a reassessment of copper smelting operations worldwide, with several companies already indicating intentions to scale down or withdraw from copper concentrate smelting,” the ministries said.

    TC/RCs — fees paid by miners to smelters for processing copper concentrate into refined metal — have traditionally been a key revenue stream for smelters. However, in some spot deals this year, TC/RCs have turned negative, forcing smelters to pay miners to secure feedstock.

    The ministries warned that this imbalance undermines the sustainable coexistence of smelting and mining industries and increases dependency on a narrow group of supplier countries, a scenario they described as “undesirable” for both producers and consumers.

    “We hope TC/RCs will return to sustainable levels for copper concentrate trading,” the statement said, adding that the three countries would continue engaging with stakeholders to establish a resilient and sustainable copper supply chain.

    Naoki Kobayashi, deputy director of Japan’s Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), said the issue will be raised during LME Week in London, one of the global metals industry’s key gatherings.

    Japan’s leading copper smelters, including JX Advanced Metals and Mitsubishi Materials, have already announced plans to scale back concentrate processing due to eroding margins, reflecting a broader trend of contraction across the global smelting sector.

  • Rio Tinto Targets Strong Q4 Finish to Meet Iron Ore Shipment Goals Amid China Demand Surge

    Rio Tinto Targets Strong Q4 Finish to Meet Iron Ore Shipment Goals Amid China Demand Surge

    Rio Tinto said on Tuesday that it will need a robust fourth-quarter performance to hit its 2025 iron ore shipment target, as Chinese demand strengthens on the back of infrastructure-driven stimulus and front-loaded global investment ahead of potential new tariffs.

    The world’s largest iron ore miner reported 84.3 million tonnes of iron ore shipped from its Western Australia operations during the third quarter, slightly below the Visible Alpha consensus estimate of 85.5 million tonnes. Despite the shortfall, iron ore prices have climbed to their highest levels since February, fuelled by Beijing’s targeted infrastructure programs that have spurred steel production.

    China’s iron ore imports reached a record high in September, according to Rio, reflecting renewed industrial momentum despite ongoing economic challenges such as deflation, weak manufacturing, slow exports, and persistent property market struggles.

    Rio reaffirmed its annual shipment guidance of 323–338 million tonnes, but noted that four cyclones earlier this year disrupted output, meaning results are likely to fall near the lower end of the range.

    “A strong Q4 performance is required as the system remains tightly balanced and has limited ability to mitigate further losses,” the company said.

    Shares of Rio Tinto (ASX: RIO) jumped 3.6% in early trading to their highest since late September, tracking gains across major iron ore producers. BHP and Fortescue Metals Group also rose more than 2% each.

    Under its new CEO Simon Trott, who restructured Rio into three main divisions — iron ore, aluminium and lithium, and copper — the company continues to focus on safety and diversification. Rio confirmed that shipments from its Simandou project in Guinea remain on track to begin before year-end, despite a recent fatality at the site.

    Beyond iron ore, Rio reported record copper production at Oyu Tolgoi in Mongolia, forecasting a more than 50% increase in copper output this year as demand surges for energy transition metals. The miner also logged a second consecutive record quarter for bauxite production, prompting an upward revision of its full-year forecast to 59–61 million tonnes, supported by strong performance at the Amrun mine in northern Australia.