MINEX Forum

Tag: China

  • China Lithium Prices Surge After Yichun Plans to Revoke Mining Licences

    China Lithium Prices Surge After Yichun Plans to Revoke Mining Licences

    Lithium prices in China jumped sharply after authorities in the country’s main lithium-producing hub announced plans to revoke dozens of mining licences, triggering investor concerns about future supply.

    The most actively traded lithium carbonate contract on the Guangzhou Futures Exchange rose to 109860 yuan per metric ton on Wednesday, its highest level since June 2024, before closing up 7.61% at 108620 yuan.

    The Bureau of Natural Resources of Yichun, a major lithium center in Jiangxi province, said it intends to cancel 27 mining permits following a public consultation period that will end on January 22. The announcement was published on the bureau’s official website on Friday.

    According to the published list, all of the licences have already expired, with some dating back more than a decade. Most were originally issued for ceramic clay or limestone mining. One permit related to a lithium-bearing ceramic stone mine was held by Jiangxi Special Electric Motor, which said it has filed an objection with local authorities. The permit expired on September 15 2024.

    Analysts at Galaxy Futures said the licence revocations are unlikely to have a direct impact on current lithium supply, as none of the affected permits cover operating mines. Nevertheless, the announcement heightened market anxiety about longer-term availability, pushing lithium carbonate prices higher.

    The move is part of a broader clean-up of mining licences in Yichun that began in September. The bureau previously revoked six permits on November 27. Lithium prices have been rising since August, after CATL suspended mining at its Jianxiawo site following the expiry of its mining licence, with strong demand from the energy storage sector providing additional support.

  • China Lithium Prices Jump After Yichun Moves to Revoke Mining Licences

    China Lithium Prices Jump After Yichun Moves to Revoke Mining Licences

    Lithium prices in China rose sharply after authorities in the country’s main lithium-producing hub announced plans to revoke dozens of mining licences, fuelling investor concerns over future supply.

    The most actively traded lithium carbonate contract on the Guangzhou Futures Exchange climbed as high as 109860 yuan per metric ton on Wednesday, its highest level since June 2024, before closing up 7.61% at 108620 yuan.

    The Bureau of Natural Resources of Yichun, a key lithium centre in Jiangxi province, said it intends to cancel 27 mining permits following a public consultation period ending on January 22. The notice was published on the bureau’s official website last week.

    According to the published list, all of the licences have already expired, in some cases more than ten years ago. Most were originally issued for ceramic clay or limestone mining. One permit linked to a lithium-bearing ceramic stone mine was held by Jiangxi Special Electric Motor, which said it has lodged an objection with local authorities. The permit in question expired on September 15 2024.

    Analysts at Galaxy Futures noted that the cancellations are unlikely to have a direct impact on current lithium supply, as none of the revoked licences relate to operating mines. Nevertheless, the announcement heightened market anxiety over longer-term availability, pushing lithium carbonate prices higher.

    The latest move follows a broader clean-up of mining permits in Yichun that began in September. The bureau previously revoked six licences on November 27.

    Lithium carbonate prices have been trending upward since August, after mining at CATL’s Jianxiawo mine was suspended due to the expiry of its mining licence. Strong demand from the energy storage sector has provided additional support to the market.

  • Germany Reports “Constructive” Signals from China on Rare Earth Supplies

    Germany Reports “Constructive” Signals from China on Rare Earth Supplies

    German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul says China has shown willingness to cooperate on rare earth exports to Europe, offering a rare moment of optimism amid deepening geopolitical and trade tensions. Speaking during a two-day visit to Beijing, Wadephul said Chinese officials indicated they would work “constructively” with European importers seeking general licences to secure supplies of rare earths — metals critical to electronics, defence technologies and electric vehicles.

    The minister met with Commerce Minister Wang Wentao, Foreign Minister Wang Yi and Vice President Han Zheng, using the talks to address Beijing’s recent export restrictions on rare earths, as well as concerns over industrial overcapacity in China’s EV and steel sectors. In a message posted following the meetings, Wadephul said Germany and China remained committed to “balanced economic relations,” while acknowledging the need to confront “imbalances” such as market-access barriers and trade controls.

    China introduced new export restrictions on several rare earth products this year, forcing global manufacturers to confront their dependence on Chinese supply. Wadephul said Beijing reassured him that it had “no intention” of burdening German companies with additional hurdles and encouraged them to apply for general licences under China’s evolving export framework. Wang Wentao also emphasised that the licensing system was designed to keep supply chains “stable and smooth.”

    The discussions come at a time of heightened strain in German-Chinese relations. Chancellor Friedrich Merz has pledged a firmer stance toward Beijing, and Wadephul previously cancelled an earlier trip after criticising China’s activities around Taiwan. German officials have repeatedly warned that the country — long one of China’s closest European trading partners — is now highly exposed to Beijing’s leverage over critical raw materials.

    Last month, Finance Minister Lars Klingbeil left China with only informal assurances regarding rare earth supplies, highlighting the limits of European influence. The European Union is preparing to mobilise at least €3 billion over the next year to reduce its dependency on China for strategic raw materials, including through mining, processing and recycling initiatives.

    Wadephul also used the Beijing meetings to press China to exert pressure on Russia to engage in “serious negotiations” over its war against Ukraine. He said European expectations were clearly conveyed: “If there’s one country that has influence on Russia, it’s China.”

  • Boliden CEO Says EU Is a Decade Late on Rare Earths as Brussels Fast-Tracks €3 Billion Plan

    Boliden CEO Says EU Is a Decade Late on Rare Earths as Brussels Fast-Tracks €3 Billion Plan

    The head of Swedish mining group Boliden has warned that the European Union should have acted ten years ago to secure its access to rare earths, calling the bloc’s new €3-billion initiative a welcome but insufficient step given China’s dominance of the sector.

    The remarks follow the European Commission’s announcement that it will fast-track funding into 25 key mineral projects, part of a broader push to reduce dependence on Beijing, which processes more than 90% of the world’s rare earths. China has tightened export restrictions this year, further underscoring Europe’s vulnerability.

    Speaking to Reuters, Boliden CEO Mikael Staffas said Europe’s lack of self-sufficiency in critical raw materials has become a structural weakness and warned that progress will remain slow without sustained, decisive action.

    “The Critical Raw Materials Act was a small step,” he said. “The EU will need many more small steps if they want greater independence.” Staffas described the Commission’s latest effort as a sign of political intent, but stressed that “a lot more needs to be done.”

    Europe’s largest copper producer, Aurubis, echoed a similar sentiment this week, saying the CRMA has so far delivered little visible impact despite expectations of long-term benefits.

    Boliden Sees Little Benefit in New Rare Earths Push
    Although Boliden produces minerals on the EU’s priority list — including copper and nickel — none of its current projects fall within the rare-earth-heavy focus of the new initiative.

    “Everyone is talking about rare earths being super critical, and we do not have any projects there,” Staffas said. He added that even the full €3-billion package would amount to only two years of Boliden’s standard investment levels. The company forecast SEK 15 billion ($1.6 billion) in capital spending for 2026.

    Boliden’s Somincor mine extension in Portugal remains listed under the original CRMA strategic project roster, but none of its developments qualify under the new rare earths programme.

    Staffas’s comments underline a core challenge for the EU: while the bloc aims to diversify supply chains quickly, rare earth extraction and processing remain highly concentrated in China, and Europe’s existing mining pipeline is only partially aligned with the areas Brussels is prioritising.

  • Safran Taps UK Researchers to Lead Europe’s Push for Rare-Earth Alternatives Amid Fears of China’s Market Dominance

    Safran Taps UK Researchers to Lead Europe’s Push for Rare-Earth Alternatives Amid Fears of China’s Market Dominance

    French aerospace giant Safran, the world’s largest jet engine manufacturer, has chosen its Pitstone facility in Buckinghamshire to spearhead Europe’s search for alternatives to Chinese-controlled rare earths — critical materials essential for magnets used in electric motors, aircraft systems and green technologies.

    The decision comes as Western governments and companies intensify efforts to reduce dependence on China, which controls roughly 90% of global rare-earth supply and has increasingly used export controls as geopolitical leverage. Beijing’s tightening restrictions — temporarily suspended under a one-year truce brokered between Donald Trump and Xi Jinping — have heightened fears that China could disrupt supply chains for future Airbus and Boeing aircraft, while strengthening its domestic aerospace challenger, Comac.

    Safran chief executive Olivier Andriès said the Pitstone site was selected after developing the world’s first electric motor certified for aviation. The UK team will now focus on identifying substitutes for rare earths such as samarium, a key component of samarium-cobalt magnets used in high-temperature aerospace environments.

    “Electrical motors need magnets and magnets need rare earths, and most of these are coming from China,” Andriès said. “The target we’ve given the team is to find alternative sources of these materials — or even imagine rare-earth-free magnets. We don’t yet know the answer.”

    Andriès emphasised that rare-earth access has become an urgent strategic concern as the aerospace industry advances hybrid propulsion systems for next-generation airliners. Safran already relies on export licences from China to obtain the materials it needs and has built emergency stockpiles, but Andriès warned this is only a temporary buffer.

    “The supply chain has been weaponised — it’s an instrument of power,” he said. “The key point is to find alternative sources in the short term and, in the long term, find ways to deliver the same capabilities without using rare earths.”

    As part of its strategy, Safran will designate the UK as its first research and technology centre outside France, reinforcing the country’s role in the company’s global operations. Safran employs 5,500 people across 14 UK sites, producing components ranging from landing gear and helicopter engines to flight controls and engine casings. Pitstone will also host a new electric-motor assembly line.

    The renewed focus follows a surge in geopolitical competition for critical minerals. In October, the US signed an $8.5bn mining and processing agreement with Australia to expand Western rare-earth capabilities amid fears that China could cut off exports once the temporary truce expires.

    Andriès warned that while China has not yet deployed its dominance as a coercive tool, the risk remains significant: “Today, if China is willing to, they can interrupt the supply of most of the rare earths needed for automotive or aerospace applications.”

  • EU Unveils Multi-Billion-Euro Plan to Curb Dependence on China for Rare Earths Amid Rising Geopolitical Tensions

    EU Unveils Multi-Billion-Euro Plan to Curb Dependence on China for Rare Earths Amid Rising Geopolitical Tensions

    The European Union on Wednesday announced a sweeping multi-billion-euro initiative to reduce the bloc’s reliance on China for rare earths and other critical materials, as Beijing’s dominance and recent export restrictions continue to threaten European industry. China — the world’s largest producer of rare earths — unsettled global markets in October when it imposed new limits on rare earth exports used in electric vehicles, electronics, and defence technologies. Although Beijing later suspended the curbs for one year, the episode underscored the EU’s vulnerability.

    EU industry chief Stéphane Séjourné said the new measures respond to a “new global geopolitical reality,” describing China’s grip on the market as a raw-materials “racket.” The European Commission plans to mobilise nearly €3 billion to support strategic mining, refining and recycling projects across Europe and in partner countries, aiming to diversify supply and strengthen domestic production capacity.

    A key feature of the plan is the creation of a European Centre for Critical Raw Materials, modelled on Japan’s state-run metals agency. The centre will act as the EU’s supply hub, tasked with monitoring material needs, coordinating joint purchasing for member states, and managing stockpiles and emergency deliveries to industry.

    Brussels is also moving to restrict exports of permanent-magnet scrap and waste — materials that contain rare earths — beginning next year, in an effort to boost recycling and retain valuable feedstock within the EU. Targeted curbs on aluminium waste exports are also planned, with copper potentially to follow.

    The policy push comes just two years after the bloc adopted the Critical Raw Materials Act, but officials say the geopolitical landscape has changed rapidly. The EU now finds itself squeezed between China’s tightening resource controls and an increasingly assertive United States under President Donald Trump, which is aggressively pursuing bilateral deals to secure its own critical mineral supplies.

    A new survey from the EU Chamber of Commerce in China found 60% of member companies expect supply disruptions due to Chinese restrictions, while 13% warn they may have to slow or halt production altogether.

    The Commission also updated its economic security strategy, acknowledging that supply chains are being weaponised globally. EU trade chief Maroš Šefčovič said the bloc must respond to a world in which “strategic choke points are turning economic dependency into political pressure.”

    The revised doctrine calls for more assertive use of existing tools — including foreign investment screening, export controls and supplier diversification — and for developing new measures where needed.

    “Europe will continue to champion open trade and global investment, but our openness must be backed by security,” Šefčovič said, emphasising a stronger EU capacity for economic intelligence and coordinated action across member states.

  • Europe Scrambles for Rare Earth Alternatives as China Tightens Grip and Global Geopolitics Shift

    Europe Scrambles for Rare Earth Alternatives as China Tightens Grip and Global Geopolitics Shift

    Rare earth elements, once rarely discussed outside technical circles, have become central to geopolitical tensions as China continues to dominate both extraction and refining, as well as the manufacturing of rare earth magnets. Beijing’s decision on 8 October to intensify export controls—issued in response to tightened U.S. restrictions on AI chips—sent shockwaves across global industries that rely on these materials for electric vehicles, turbines, aircraft, semiconductors and advanced weaponry.

    Although the United States has some leverage in the rare earth space, given China’s dependence on imports of high-value American compounds, Washington ultimately agreed to Beijing’s terms during the first Trump–Xi bilateral meeting in Busan on 30 October. The deal secured a one-year truce under which China will continue supplying rare earths. In return, the U.S. will reduce tariffs on Chinese imports and lift export controls on AI chips.

    Europe, by contrast, finds itself with almost no bargaining power. As a heavy net importer with minimal domestic supply of valuable rare-earth compounds, the EU remains acutely vulnerable. Major employers such as Airbus, Vestas, Volkswagen and Europe’s EV manufacturers could face severe disruptions. The same applies to the continent’s re-emerging defence industry. Although Brussels secured the same one-year truce as Washington, European officials acknowledge that the underlying vulnerability remains unchanged.

    Meanwhile, the U.S. has aggressively accelerated efforts to diversify supply. The Trump administration is finalizing agreements with Australia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Brazil and Ukraine, while signing long-term contracts with Solvay’s La Rochelle plant in France — the world’s only refinery capable of producing all 17 rare earths at industrial scale.

    The EU’s progress has been far slower. The 2024 Critical Raw Materials Act set clear targets for 2030 — 10% domestic extraction, 40% domestic processing and 15% recycling — but these goals are widely considered unrealistic without significant investment. Funding remains scarce, and fast-track permitting systems for mining projects have yet to be established. Partnership agreements with Canada, Namibia and Chile exist only on paper, while domestic initiatives such as Sweden’s Norra Kärr, Portugal’s Mina do Barroso and German recycling efforts face regulatory delays and environmental hurdles.

    Japan’s experience offers a cautionary precedent. After China abruptly halted supplies in 2010, Tokyo invested heavily in diversification, striking deals with Australia, Vietnam and Kazakhstan, enhancing recycling and building strategic reserves. Despite this, Japan still imports 62% of its rare earths from China.

    Analysts warn that the EU cannot afford to let the one-year truce lapse without making rapid progress in reducing dependence on Beijing. One promising path lies in deeper cooperation with Japan, which is actively seeking partners to expand the scale of its emerging rare earth production and magnet manufacturing ecosystem. The EU could help by providing stable demand, even at prices higher than Chinese supply, in exchange for access to Japanese technologies and industrial know-how.

    Experts argue that only through joint development of production chains, shared R&D, and coordinated demand can Europe hope to build a viable rare earth ecosystem. Leveraging corporate capabilities on both sides may be essential for Europe to achieve supply resilience in one of the world’s most strategically important material sectors.

  • Rare-Earth Metals Move to the Center of Global Tech Competition as Kazakhstan Emerges as a Major Future Player

    Rare-Earth Metals Move to the Center of Global Tech Competition as Kazakhstan Emerges as a Major Future Player

    Rare-earth metals, long overshadowed by more familiar raw materials, have become the backbone of the global technological race, according to BAQ.KZ citing Energyprom. These 17 elements, found in nature in dispersed form, are essential to modern economic resilience. They are critical for manufacturing microchips, lasers, batteries, electric vehicle magnets, and key components of military electronics.

    Surging demand—driven by the rapid expansion of electric mobility, the growth of renewable energy, and increasing defense budgets—has turned rare-earth elements into one of the world’s most strained and politically sensitive commodity markets. Supply growth continues to lag behind demand, intensifying geopolitical tensions especially given that China controls over 70% of global mining and nearly 90% of processing.

    Over the past two decades, the industry has undergone several drastic shifts, ranging from declining output in the early 2010s to a strong production boom between 2018 and 2023. Global output rose from 101.5 thousand tonnes in 2004 to 379.9 thousand tonnes in 2024—nearly a fourfold increase. China remains the dominant producer with 270 thousand tonnes annually, followed by the United States with 45 thousand tonnes, Australia and Thailand with 13 thousand tonnes each, and Russia with just 2.5 thousand tonnes.

    Beijing continues to leverage its vast production capacity and near-total processing dominance as both an economic and geopolitical tool. In recent months, China has expanded export controls on multiple rare-earth elements. The U.S. has accused China of market manipulation and exerting “economic pressure.” While a recent meeting between leaders of the two nations helped temporarily reduce tensions—China agreed to delay some restrictions and the U.S. softened select tariffs—the underlying rivalry persists.

    China’s share of global production has fluctuated sharply. It dropped from 85.7% in 2014 to 57.3% by 2020, before rebounding to 71.1% in 2024. Despite global efforts to diversify, China remains the central pillar of the supply chain.

    Global rare-earth reserves are estimated at 90–91 million tonnes. China holds roughly half—44 million tonnes—followed by Brazil (21 million), India (6.9 million), Australia (5.7 million), and Russia (3.8 million). In comparison, the U.S., Madagascar, and Thailand possess only minor reserves.

    A new major player, however, is rapidly emerging. Kazakhstan, according to the State Committee on Geology, holds an estimated 28.2 million tonnes of rare-earth reserves, placing it second in the world behind only China. Experts emphasize that true competitiveness depends not just on resources but on processing capacity. While Brazil has vast reserves, it produces only about 20 tonnes per year due to limited processing capabilities. China, in contrast, combines large reserves with unmatched technological strength.

    Recognizing the sector’s strategic importance, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has ordered the launch of at least three rare-earth processing and deep-refining enterprises within the next three years. At the same time, Kazakhstan is actively expanding international partnerships, including signing a Memorandum of Understanding with the United States on critical minerals. This move may play a key role in diversifying global supply chains and strengthening Kazakhstan’s position in the emerging resource architecture of the future.

  • Uzbekistan Eyes Kazakh Tungsten as Global Powers Compete for Strategic Metal

    Uzbekistan Eyes Kazakh Tungsten as Global Powers Compete for Strategic Metal

    Uzbekistan is plotting a tighter grip on critical minerals by seeking to purchase tungsten concentrate from Kazakhstan, as Uzbekistan’s government-led Uzbek Metal Processing Plant (TMK) prepares to ramp up production. Metin Alemder, TMK’s technical adviser, told inbusiness.kz at the China Mining summit in Tianjin that TMK is in talks with Kazakh colleagues to secure tungsten concentrate, signaling a strategic push to source raw materials locally for its expanding operations.

    Kazakhstan has been developing tungsten at the Boguty mine in the Almaty region near the Charyn Canyon. The project is led by Zhetyсу Wolfram LLC, in which Chinese-backed Jiaxin International Resources Investment Limited is a major shareholder. Boguty is regarded as one of the world’s larger tungsten deposits, with a mining licence valid through 2040. Early projections estimated an annual processing capacity of 3.3 million tonnes of ore to produce about 10,000 tonnes of 65% tungsten oxide concentrate, primarily destined for China. The site also contains molybdenum, bismuth, and beryllium, with plans to raise tungsten extraction to nearly 5 million tonnes of ore by 2027.

    Other Kazakh tungsten prospects include Aksoran at the SCO-Akmola border, as well as Northern Katpar and Verkhnee Kairakty in Karaganda. Notably, the last two are set to be developed via a joint venture in which Cove Capital (70%) partners with state mining firm Tau-Ken Samruk (30%) in a project budget of about $1.1 billion, with production expected to start in roughly 3.5 years. Cove Capital also has interests in Uzbekistan.

    Alemder notes that China already controls more than 80% of global tungsten production and leads fundamental research in this strategic metal, which Czech-like knowledge in Uzbekistan could help leverage. Tungsten is not a rare earth metal, but it remains a critical material due to its unique properties and supply concentration.

    TMK currently relies largely on local tungsten concentrates, with Uzbekistan able to produce tungsten using both hydrometallurgical and pyrometallurgical methods. The company’s plant in Chirchik is expanding capabilities, and a new hydrometallurgical workshop in Samarkand is slated to begin in 2027, targeting 5,000 tonnes of tungsten oxide annually. By 2030, production is expected to reach 15,000 tonnes per year, requiring growing external ore supplies. In the interim, the plant utilises residual tailings from an older deposit.

    In addition to tungsten, TMK is expanding molybdenum production from tailings from the Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Complex and is developing tellurium and osmium. A sulfuric acid plant with a capacity of 500,000 tonnes annually is under construction, feeding consumables for the chemical sector, fertiliser production, and uranium mining via in-situ leaching, using sulfur supplied by Uzbekneftegaz and local gas-processing facilities.

  • Pipelines and Rare Elements: How Central Asia Became America’s New Geo-economic Frontier

    Pipelines and Rare Elements: How Central Asia Became America’s New Geo-economic Frontier

    The C5+1 summit held in Washington on November 6, 2025, marks a new chapter in U.S.–Central Asia relations, shifting the focus from energy pipelines to strategic mineral resources. Rare earth elements are now central to Washington’s strategy against China, which dominates mining and processing globally.

    Recent agreements—highlighted by substantial investments in Kazakhstan’s tungsten mines and commitments to Uzbekistan—illustrate a strategy that blends economic aims with national security, defense modernization, and leadership in green technologies. By partnering with Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, the U.S. seeks to counter China’s and Russia’s longstanding influence, establishing a “new resource-centered” framework for engagement. Rare earths are becoming tools of strategic power, supplanting traditional energy diplomacy and strengthening supply chains for renewable energy.

    This shift extends beyond resource access; mining investments are shaping political, economic, and diplomatic orientations across Central Asia, challenging China’s Belt and Road Initiative through economic means. The U.S. approach converts energy diplomacy into “mining diplomacy,” turning Central Asia into a global geo-economic crossroads.

    America’s renewed focus reflects a broader repositioning—building “strategic balancing” structures rather than pursuing mere economic or military dominance. The C5+1 format has become the central mechanism for promoting a model of regional integration that excludes Russia and China, offering a “third way” rooted in soft power, sustainable development, and technological partnerships.

    Strengthening transport routes like the Trans-Caspian corridor aims to liberate Central Asia from Russia’s logistical grip and curtail China’s influence over the Middle Corridor. Moscow and Beijing view these moves as containment strategies, intensifying geopolitical competition while granting Central Asian states greater autonomy through multilateral diplomacy.

    Ultimately, America’s strategy is about establishing a new Eurasian power architecture. Its success will depend on delivering sustainable investments and on Central Asian states maintaining independent balancing acts amid great-power competition.