MINEX Forum

Tag: EU

  • Cyprus echoes mining industry shift, Venus Minerals chairman says

    Cyprus echoes mining industry shift, Venus Minerals chairman says

    Among the discussions surrounding the Act’s pivotal role, the event emphasised its implications for Eastern and South-Eastern Europe’s sustainable development and security.

    Key stakeholders, including major raw materials producers from Greece and Regional Innovation Scheme (RIS) countries, deliberated on the EU’s investment potential in raw materials industries and the critical objective of decarbonization.

    At the heart of these discussions lies the Critical Raw Materials Act, a legislative initiative designed to address strategic dependencies on vital raw materials.

    Having secured passage in the European Parliament in September 2023, the Act is currently under negotiation between the Parliament, member states, and the European Commission.

    The Act seeks to fortify the entire value chain of critical raw materials within Europe, diversify imports to reduce strategic dependencies, enhance the EU’s ability to monitor and mitigate risks of supply disruptions, and promote circularity and sustainability.

    Moreover, it also sets targets to boost domestic capacity for mineral extraction, processing, and recycling.

    Mark Rachovides, Chairman of Venus Minerals, representing Euromines, the voice of the European metals and minerals mining industry, highlighted the Act’s significance and the path toward its adoption by member states.

    Rachovides expressed optimism about forthcoming discussions shaping the planning and regulation of mining activities, the recognition of by-products’ strategic importance, and the Act’s integration into broader EU legislation.

    He stressed the potential for regulatory shifts to influence behaviour, advocating for essential trade-offs in the EU’s transition to a greener economy.

    “There’s a notable change in perspective, with a growing political momentum favouring mining, and downstream users acknowledging the value of an EU-based mining industry,” Rachovides noted.

    This shift in perspective is echoed in Cyprus, where Venus Minerals eyes the development of local resources, aiming to position the island as a primary supplier of raw materials to the EU.

  • Council and Parliament strike provisional deal to reinforce the supply of critical raw materials

    Council and Parliament strike provisional deal to reinforce the supply of critical raw materials

    The political agreement reached today keeps the overall objectives of the original proposal but strengthens several elements. It includes aluminium in the list of strategic and critical materials, reinforces the benchmark of recycling, clarifies the permitting procedure for strategic projects, and requires relevant companies to perform a supply-chain risk assessment on their sourcing of strategic raw materials.

    Ensuring the supply of raw materials locally and globally

    The Commission’s proposed regulation establishes a list of 34 critical raw materials (including 16 strategic ones) and sets targets to increase the EU contribution of these substances (10% for the extraction; 40% for the processing and 15% for the recycling). To achieve this, the proposal called for a quick and simplified permit procedure for strategic extracting projects, to be dealt by a single national contact point. It also called for risk analysis of possible dependencies, member states’ exploration plans, higher investment in research, innovation and skills; and protection of the environment by promoting the circularity and sustainability of raw materials.

    On the global stage, the regulation identified measures to diversify imports of critical raw materials ensuring that not more than 65% of the Union’s consumption of each strategic raw material comes from a single third country.

    Main elements of the agreement

    The provisional agreement adds one critical raw material (aluminium) to the list of strategic raw materials (hence, 34 critical raw materials and 17 strategic raw materials). The compromise text also considers that in addition to the natural graphite (which already in the list) the synthetic graphite will also be a strategic raw material during a period of three years, until the Commission makes the first revision of the list.

    Furthermore, the agreement allows that projects able to produce innovative raw materials that substitute strategic raw materials in relevant technologies can be candidates to become strategic projects

    Member states will have the possibility to object on whether a project will be developed on their territories.

    Realistic benchmarks

    The provisional agreement keeps the benchmarks of 10% for extraction of raw materials and 40% for processing but increases the benchmark for recycling to at least 25% of EU’s annual consumption of raw materials. In addition, there should be substantial increase on the recovery of raw materials present in waste.

    Promoting technologies to moderate consumption

    The co-legislators propose that 18 months after the entry into force of the regulation, the Commission shall present a report on the estimated consumption of each critical raw material for the next three decades.

    Points of single contact

    According to the different administrative systems of each country, member states will be able to designate one or several single contact points, at the level they decide (local, regional or national) and the different stages of the value chain (mining, processing, recycling). Promoters of strategic projects will have a “relevant administrative unit” in these points of single contact who will facilitate the permit granting process for the project.

    Permitting procedure

    The provisional compromise also unifies the timings of the permit procedure. The total duration of the permit granting process should not exceed 27 months for extraction projects and 15 months for processing and recycling projects. While the first step of the environmental impact assessment (the production of the report, which must be conducted by the project promoter) will be not included in the time-line for the project approval, the public consultation needed for an environmental impact assessment will be part of the total duration of the permit process.

    Company risk preparedness

    Large companies exposed to shortages of strategic raw materials in strategic technologies (i.e. battery manufacturers, hydrogen producers, renewable energy generators, data transmission and storage, or aircraft production) will have to regularly carry out a risk assessment of their supply chain of strategic raw materials, which they may present to their board of directors, mapping where the materials come from, what can affect their supply and what are the vulnerabilities to supply disruptions.

    Background

    The Critical Raw Material Act, together with the Net Zero Industry Act and the Reform of the electricity market design is one of the flagship legislative initiatives of the Green Deal Industrial Plan that the Commission presented on 1st February 2023. The three were presented as a package on 16th March. The Council adopted the negotiation mandate on 30th of June.

  • EU agrees mineral supply targets to cut reliance on China

    EU agrees mineral supply targets to cut reliance on China

    The European Commission proposed the Critical Raw Materials Act in March, a centrepiece of EU strategy to allow it to compete with the United States and China in making clean tech products.

    The proposal said the European Union should extract 10%, recycle 15% and process 40% of its annual needs by 2030 for 16 “strategic raw materials”.

    The European Parliament and the Council, the grouping of EU governments, needed to agree on a common text. They did this on Monday, parties from both sides said, paving the way for the law to enter force in early 2024.

    Negotiators upgraded the recycling target to at least 25%. Parliament negotiators also said the European Commission would pass a related act in 2027 that set a recycling target related to annual waste collected, rather than consumption.

    The negotiators also agreed to add aluminium to the list of strategic raw materials as well as synthetic graphite. Natural graphite was already in the list.

    The latter inclusion reflects China’s plan to tighten export controls for graphite. China refines over 90% of the world’s graphite into material that is used in almost all electric vehicle anodes, the negatively charged portion of the battery.

    The EU is also heavily reliant on China for rare earths and lithium, other vital materials for its green transition.

    The act’s aim is that no third country should provide more than 65% of any strategic raw material, which also includes cobalt, copper, magnesium and titanium.

    The act sets time limits on granting permits for strategic mining, recycling and processing projects, and requires large companies needing strategic materials in key technologies to do regular risk assessments of their supply chains.

    It also has provisions designed to moderate consumption.

    EU industry chief Thierry Breton said in a statement that, without action, Europe risked shortages and unwanted dependencies, and that the law would ensure high environmental and social standards.

    The bloc will work with EU members to identify strategic projects that will benefit from shorter and more efficient permitting procedures and easier access to finance, he added.

  • Resilience Can’t be Imported: European Steel Makes the EU Stronger

    Resilience Can’t be Imported: European Steel Makes the EU Stronger

    Policymakers know that the stakes are high at this moment of transition in Europe. Will they realise how important it will be for that growth to ‘come from within’? Prioritising European-made steel will help ensure resilient EU clean tech value chains.

    Axel Eggert is the Director General of the European Steel Association (EUROFER).

    In a local shop the other day, I saw one of those decorative quote boards. It read, “Resilience comes from within”. While I most definitely was not in the market for such an object, the word ‘resilience’ caught my eye because recently we’ve been hearing that term a lot around Brussels. Resilient and secure EU clean tech value chains are key to cutting CO2 emissions and achieving carbon neutrality.

    But the conversation also must focus on what it will take to build a clean energy supply chain for the EU. Steel is, quite literally, the foundation of Europe. To ensure that the EU meets its ambitious Green Deal climate goals and remains prosperous and autonomous, the steel that builds the backbone of Europe’s growth must ‘come from within’ – and be made in Europe.

    As they consider impending policies, European policymakers need to know what’s at stake. Simply put, prioritising European-made steel will make the EU clean tech value chains more resilient.

    With more than 60 decarbonisation projects underway, and with its first breakthrough technologies to implemented at industrial scale already in 2025 and 2026, the European steel industry is paving the way for a truly net-zero emissions economy. If implemented successfully in Europe, these projects will deliver dual benefits: 1) they will create demand for clean hydrogen and electricity, and 2) they will supply the green steel that is needed to build windmills, electrical vehicles, modern buildings and  infrastructure.

    However, this successful transition cannot – and should not – be taken for granted. Production costs for EU steel companies are increasingly uncompetitive compared to those in third countries, where energy costs are 2-4 times lower than in the EU. Global overcapacities, often fuelled by state subsidies, result in unfair trade practices that undermine the economic sustainability required for the decarbonisation investments.

    In the last decade alone, Europe has lost 26 million tonnes of steel production capacity and a quarter of its workforce. Thus the EU has become a net importer of cheaper and highly carbon-intensive steel from China and other countries. In fact, imports into the EU have reached a historical record of 28% market share.

    This time things are different. As other strategic clean tech sectors, such as wind and electric vehicles, start experiencing the same vicious circle, there is a growing understanding that the EU must change course.

    We face two game-changing factors. First, the geopolitical and economic system we have relied on since the end of the Second World War is now under question. Second, Europe is losing its competitive edge to the US, China and other countries. Commenting recently on the EU’s eroding global competitiveness, former president of the European Central Bank and former Italian prime minister Mario Draghi said the EU should be very worried about competitiveness, and cited high energy costs as a key issue to be addressed.

    If the global race for clean technologies is now the new engine of Europe’s prosperity, we must lead it. We need to thrive, not just survive. The EU can no longer rely on systemic dependencies, whether they are with friends, frenemies or rivals.

    Today, open strategic autonomy lies at the heart of the clean tech value chain. What does this mean in practice? As European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen rightly stated in her 2023 State of the Union Address, ‘from wind to steel, from batteries to electric vehicles, our ambition is crystal clear: the future of our clean tech industry has to be made in Europe.’ Without a clean tech value chain in Europe – that is, without windmills, solar panels, electrolysers, batteries, and electric vehicles – we risk losing our prosperity and our autonomy.

    And each one of those technologies, and so many more, are forged with steel. Steel forms the backbone of the entire clean tech value chain, and the material has underpinned the EU’s economy since the Schuman Declaration in 1950. Today, nearly 75 years later, steel accounts for 2.5 million jobs (direct, indirect and induced) and generates €143 billion in Gross Value Added annually across sectors. Steel and other industries that are essential for clean tech value chains must be at the top of the EU agenda today and after the 2024 elections.

    So, how to put von der Leyen’s words into practice and ensure the transition to a sustainable European steel industry? EU policymakers should focus on five priority areas, as outlined in the Manifesto of the European Steel Industry:

    • Industrial policy: streamline a joint green industrial policy across all policy areas to spur investments and create lead markets for green products, under the coordination of a Commission Executive Vice-President.
    • Energy: urgently deliver internationally competitive energy prices for the industry, while accelerating the production of clean electricity and hydrogen as well as prioritising its use in sectors with the highest CO2 abatement potential.
    • Trade: establish an effective EU-US Global Arrangement on Sustainable Steel to tackle global emissions and address excess capacity, while enforcing a robust trade policy as well as implementing an effective Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM).
    • Raw materials: ensure access to both primary and secondary raw materials including steel scrap, which are essential for the green transition, while saving natural resources and emissions.
    • Skills: attract young talent to support the sector’s transition, and upskill and reskill the workforce to ensure a just transition.

    Resilience is key, and it comes from within our borders. Europe’s future can only be stronger with European steel.

  • New EU power market, same old problems for metals sector

    New EU power market, same old problems for metals sector

    The proposed changes to the EU’s “electricity market design” are a response to the spike in European power prices following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022.

    They will, according to Spain’s Energy Minister Teresa Ribera, mean that “consumers across the EU will be able to benefit from much more stable prices of energy, less dependency on the price of fossil fuels and better protection from future crises”.

    But will it be enough to save Europe’s struggling industrial metals production sector?

    The brutal reality is that half of the region’s primary aluminum and zinc capacity and almost a third of its silicon capacity is currently offline due to high power prices.

    The immediate impact comes with potential future impact as well.

    Producers are reluctant to invest in the new metals capacity needed to achieve Europe’s self-sufficiency goals because they can’t model power prices over the time-frame to build a new mine or smelter.

    “We need bold action to get out of a dead-end street,” was the stark warning from Bernard Respaut, head of the European Copper Institute (ECI), speaking at a debate on Europe’s power crisis jointly hosted with industry association Eurometaux.

    Light-tough reform

    European power prices have fallen a long way from their 2022 peaks, when the region was still reeling from the reduction in Russian gas supplies.

    However, they are by no means back to levels trading before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and that isn’t going to change any time soon.

    Wholesale pricing will continue to be determined on a pay-as-clear model, where bidding goes from the cheapest to the most expensive source, which tends to be gas. It’s just that it’s now LNG rather than Russian gas that sets the price.

    EU member states were deeply split on proposals for more fundamental reform of Europe’s power market to allow for a complete break of the gas-power price linkage.

    The hard-won compromise keeps the existing market mechanism, which its supporters claim is more efficient than other models in a liberalized electricity market.

    Rather, the focus will be on longer-term price stabilizers such as power purchase agreements (PPA) between generators and users and two-way contracts for difference (CFD) for investment in new green generation.

    The PPA problem

    US aluminum producer Alcoa is a poster child for Europe’s PPA model, using it to help secure the long-term future of its San Ciprian smelter in Spain.

    The company has PPAs with local power suppliers Endesa and Greenalia covering around 75% of the smelter’s base load power when it returns from care and maintenance next year.

    Alcoa has the advantage of being in Spain, which has been aggressively building out renewable energy capacity and has Europe’s most developed PPA market.

    The country is Europe’s third highest renewable energy generator, much of it solar, and has by far the highest PPA contract capacity at a current 4.2 gigawatts, according to the European Commission. (“The development of renewable energy in the electricity market”, June 2023).

    Others are not so fortunate.

    “We can’t buy a PPA because it’s not available on the market,” Mats Gustavsson, head of energy at Swedish base metals producer Boliden, told the Eurometaux meeting.

    With limited forward liquidity in the company’s local Nordpool power market, “no-one’s willing to take the risk on a fixed-term PPA”, he said.

    Even if the local market structure allows for PPAs, many smaller companies struggle to pass the credit tests needed to sign what can be as long as a 10-year contract.

    Moreover, many power suppliers will only offer PPAs on a pay-as-produced basis rather than the base-load structure that metal producers would prefer.

    The EU reform package is intended to iron out some of these problems by, for example, mandating member states to ensure guarantee schemes for smaller companies looking to enter PPAs.

    But it offers neither short-term relief for Europe’s many mothballed production facilities nor the levels of certainty needed to build the next generation of mines and processing plants.

    Strategic dialogue

    Europe’s focus on the longer-term solution, pivoting towards cheaper renewable energy, leaves untouched the immediate problem of tying spot power pricing to a volatile gas market.

    The bloc’s power prices have historically been twice those of the US, but are now three or four times higher.

    Metals producers are not only having to adjust to currently high electricity costs, but face even higher costs as they seek their own pathway to net zero.

    The danger is that the cost of going green “is going to kill us”, Gustavsson said. Boliden, it’s worth noting, has just shuttered its Tara zinc-lead mine in Ireland at least partly due to high energy costs.

    The answer, according to the ECI’s Respaut, is to take a more comprehensive approach to Europe’s industrial base and connect the disparate dots of critical metals production, renewable energy and power pricing.

    Europe has to decide which strategic sectors it wants to keep and what it needs to do to help them not just survive but thrive.

    And it needs to do so sooner rather than later.

    As Respaut concluded: “We need to get to action, because time is running.”

     

  • Mining for minerals is not a European business

    Mining for minerals is not a European business

    The EU wants to revive mining in Europe. One stumbling block: it does not have the money to give its ambitions the foundations they need. Banks shy away from what they see as risky trades, while the sector is controlled by non-European actors.

    Gathered in the Berlaymont hotel in late January, a short walk from the EU offices and Belgium’s national car and military history museums, executives from Europe’s leading banks were called to action. “I want you to invest,” European Commissioner Thierry Breton told the financiers, “in operations in the critical raw materials value chain.”

    Two months later, the European Commission presented its draft Critical Raw Materials Act. The CRMA, which could be among the fastest EU laws ever adopted by early 2024, wants to guarantee Europe’s supply of nickel, lithium, magnesium and other materials essential for the green transition and strategic industries. They are vital for electric cars and renewable energy, military equipment and aerospace systems, as well as laptops and mobile phones.

    The Commission wants new mines to open across Europe, reducing the bloc’s dependency on China, but there is a problem. One which Thierry Breton’s hotel gathering reflected: the Commission has no specific fund to finance its CRMA ambitions.

  • Including Western Balkans in the EU Value Chain Partnership aligned with Critical Raw Materials strategy

    Including Western Balkans in the EU Value Chain Partnership aligned with Critical Raw Materials strategy

    Nine years after the launching of Berlin Process in August 2014, the Heads of Government of Albania, Bosnia and Hercegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, as well as the Heads of State or Government or representatives of Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Slovenia and the United Kingdom, Spain, Hungary, Romania and the Netherlands, the representatives of the European Union (EU), and of regional and international organizations and financial institutions met in person in Tirana on 16 October 2023 for the Summit Meeting of the Berlin Process.

    The participants acknowledged that with the current geopolitical situation, a Value Chain Partnership between the EU and the Western Balkans should be explored. They acknowledged the strategic importance of the Western Balkans region in the context of Critical Raw Materials and batteries, and its role in the EU Value Chain and industries. With the increasing global demand for these materials, the Western Balkans hold a significant potential that must be harnessed effectively to contribute to the EU’s security of supply.

     

  • Kazakhstan and the European Union are expanding opportunities for the development of the critical raw minerals sector

    Kazakhstan and the European Union are expanding opportunities for the development of the critical raw minerals sector

    From October 25 to 26, 2023, Vice Minister of Industry and Construction of the Republic of Kazakhstan Iran Sharkhan and Chairman of the National Geological Survey JSC Erlan Galiyev took part in the Global Gateway forum in Brussels (Belgium).

    The event, which focused on green energy, education and research, critical raw materials, transport corridors, healthcare manufacturing and digital infrastructure, was opened by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen.

    During the visit, the Kazakh delegation took part in a panel session dedicated to the problem of rare earth metals and discussed issues of joint cooperation with the parties. Also, I. Sharkhan and E. Galiyev held a number of bilateral meetings with the heads of European organizations.

  • How a junior mining company is bringing critical materials supply back to Europe

    How a junior mining company is bringing critical materials supply back to Europe

    Historically, the European Union (EU) has relied on countries like China for its supply of critical raw materials, but companies like Leading Edge Materials are moving to shift the focus back on its own soil.

    Case in point, the EU proposed the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) in March 2023, which aims to boost supply of strategic raw materials that are crucial in advancing the EU’s move towards a sustainable, digital and sovereign future.

    This comes as a move to shift supply away from China, which currently processes almost all rare earth elements. It is estimated that the country currently produces roughly 70 per cent of global production of rare earth elements, however there are three facilities in Europe that are and will be able to produce the materials – in Sweden, France and Estonia – which will effectively reduce China’s overwhelming grip on the permanent magnet industry

  • Can Poland dismantle the EU Green Deal with legal challenges?

    Can Poland dismantle the EU Green Deal with legal challenges?

    For years, Poland’s right-wing government has been threatening to legally challenge the EU’s climate policy, and this summer it delivered on that threat. Climate and Environment Minister Anna Moskwa announced on 8 August the country has petitioned the European Court of Justice to strike down the recent revision to the EU’s Emissions Trading System (ETS) and the Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), which is set to start levying a fee on climate-unfriendly imports on 1 October. Both are key components of the Fit for 55 package, the legislative toolbox designed to deliver on the goals of European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen’s Green Deal.

    “The introduction of CBAM fees will translate into an increase in the cost of imported products and electricity, as well as products manufactured in Poland for the end user,” Moskwa said in a statement. Regarding the ETS, Moskwa said Poland objects to the increase in allowances that will keep the price of carbon high, which “may reduce the level of energy security” of EU countries at a time when that security is being threatened by Russia.

    The substance of the laws was decided by majority votes of EU countries earlier this year, in which opposition by Poland and Hungary was overcome. Poland is not only challenging the substance of the laws based on their effects, but also the way the laws were adopted. Because the laws will affect the economy, they are “primarily of a fiscal nature”, Moskwa said, and therefore the ordinary voting system should not have been used but rather a special legislative procedure which requires unanimous approval by all EU member states. Were the EU’s high court to agree, the laws could be invalidated and sent back to the Council for another vote, at which time Poland and Hungary would veto them.

    Poland already challenged four other pillars of Fit for 55 earlier this summer: the ban on combustion engine car sales by 2035; the reduction of free allowances in the ETS; increased EU forest management; and the overall increase of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions reduction target. Poland’s heavy use of coal and energy security concerns have made it the chief opponent of EU climate policy for two decades. They have tried and failed in the past to challenge EU climate policy with the high court. In 2016 they took the European Council and European Parliament to court for passing a law establishing a market stability reserve in the ETS to raise the price of carbon, which was drastically too low to be effective. They used the same argument – that the law needed to be decided by unanimity. This argument was rejected by the European Court of Justice.

    Uphill battle

    Legal experts say Poland’s chance of success at the European Court of Justice this time around is also not high – but there is a big question mark hovering over the CBAM legislation. “Such a justification, i.e. the protection of state interests presented as in the Polish government’s complaints, will not work – as confirmed by the court’s well-established previous jurisprudence in similar cases,” says Robert Grzeszczak, a professor of European law at the University of Warsaw.

    “Besides, it’s a double-edged weapon. If Poland managed to challenge EU law on the grounds of its state interests, so could any other state challenge any other arbitrary act, precisely on the grounds of protecting national interests. This is not sufficient on its own, specific infringements must be demonstrated which would cause the act to be annulled by the court.” He adds that Poland’s argument that the wrong voting method was used is also unlikely to hold water with the court since it is specifically taxation that needs unanimity votes, not all fiscal policy.

     

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    This is precisely why the Commission has been so insistent on not calling the levy a “carbon border tax” and rather using the cumbersome formulation of CBAM. A “tax” would have required unanimous approval, and the EU executive likely expected Poland to veto the proposal. That is what makes CBAM perhaps the most vulnerable of all the pieces of legislation challenged. If the high court were to rule it is in fact a tax and not an “adjustment mechanism”, it would be sent back to the Council, where Poland would kill it. Given that companies are already preparing for the start of the mechanism on 1 October, this could cause major disruption – especially if the court makes a ruling after CBAM has taken effect. A ruling before 1 October, or even by the end of the year, is unlikely.

    “Based on similar actions, it can take two years or more for a judgment to be rendered and the contested rules are generally not suspended during that period,” consultancy Ernst & Young said in a note to clients. “The action could have significant impact on CBAM and the EU’s Green Deal in the medium-term. Withdrawal of the CBAM Regulation, in full or part, could jeopardise the EU Commission’s plans for the EU economic zone’s competitiveness among industries that are subject to ETS regulations.”

    “Given the fast-approaching 31 January 2024 deadline for submitting the first CBAM report covering Q4 2023, businesses need to continue their efforts to prepare for their CBAM compliance obligations,” it added.

    Climate of hostility

    Although they do not believe Poland’s legal challenge will be successful, NGOs are warning that were the court to rule in Warsaw’s favour on CBAM, or the other pieces of legislation, it could cause the overall framework of the EU’s climate efforts to collapse. They say Poland is playing a dangerous political game.

    “Warsaw’s blanket opposition towards major Fit for 55 regulations should be mainly understood in the context of the quickly approaching parliamentary elections [in Poland],” says Michał Smoleń, head of the energy and climate programme at the NGO Instrat. “Hostility towards more ambitious EU climate policies have unfortunately become just another topic for the competition between different right-wing factions, both inside and outside the ruling coalition.”

     

    Read more from this author: Dave Keating

     

    This exploitation of anti-climate-laws sentiment is not limited to Poland’s far-right government. Europe’s centre-right has also been flirting with such populist messages ahead of the EU and UK elections next year. And this comes while the EU this week lost its green champion, Executive Vice President Frans Timmermans. On Tuesday, Timmermans officially resigned his post to run to become prime minister of the Netherlands in the upcoming Dutch election. He will be replaced by Maroš Šefčovič, the EU commissioner from Slovakia.

    Šefčovič, in charge of interinstitutional relations, has been a master at the art of compromise – the opposite of Timmermans’ sometimes hard-headed approach. Timmermans has been loathed by the Polish and Hungarian governments, and their domestic media, because of his actions against them for rule of law violations during the previous commission term of 2015–2019.

    The more compromise-minded Šefčovič, a neighbour of Poland and Hungary, could find a way to defuse the situation and convince Poland to drop its legal challenges – perhaps after the Polish election is over. But some worry that, with Timmermans gone and President von der Leyen looking ahead to her prospects of re-appointment next year, the Commission is now more likely to back down and weaken the remaining elements of the Fit for 55 package amid pressure from Europe’s right.

    It may be that Poland can succeed in at least partially dismantling the EU’s Green Deal without winning any of its legal challenges, simply by intimidating the EU executive against proposing and further ambitious legislation. Either way, these legal moves could have a major effect on the future of EU energy policy.