Kazatomprom will not abandon its longstanding strategy of prioritising value over production volumes despite a surge in global nuclear demand driven by artificial intelligence power consumption, reactor construction in China and energy security concerns across Western markets, the company’s chief executive has said.
Meirzhan Yussupov told MINING.COM that the world’s largest uranium producer remains committed to a disciplined approach to supply management. “We have our ‘value over volume’ strategy, which we adopted many years ago. We don’t want to flood the market with cheap uranium. That’s how we create value for our stakeholders, for the next generations, and for our country,” he said.
The comments come as utilities focus increasingly on supply security rather than spot market pricing, and as China, India and Middle Eastern nations expand ambitious nuclear programmes. China alone is targeting more than 100 reactors by 2030 and as many as 200 by 2040 — a trajectory that could make it the world’s largest nuclear power market. Yussupov argued that nuclear power is becoming increasingly essential to grid reliability as renewable generation scales and AI-related electricity demand accelerates, creating structural tailwinds for uranium demand that are likely to persist for decades.
On downstream ambitions, Yussupov said Kazatomprom’s long-term goal is to host a complete nuclear fuel cycle within Kazakhstan, including conversion and enrichment capabilities, though he acknowledged that geopolitical and technology-transfer barriers remain significant. Conversion projects are receiving closer commercial scrutiny as market conditions improve and margins strengthen, with any investment decision subject to commercial returns and shareholder value considerations.
The company has also expanded use of the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor for deliveries to Western customers, with as much as 65% of uranium shipped to Western markets in some recent years travelling through this route — providing an alternative to Russian transit corridors while preserving customer flexibility.
Yussupov positioned Kazatomprom as a broader ambassador for Kazakhstan’s investment credentials, noting the company’s seven-fold share price increase since its public listing and its role in demonstrating the country’s attractiveness to international capital. Kazakhstan’s stable regulatory framework, adherence to international non-proliferation standards and partnership with the International Atomic Energy Agency have been central to building trust with customers and shareholders, he said.
Something significant has shifted. In the span of eighteen months, Central Asia has moved from a footnote in Washington and Brussels policy documents to a headline. The Caspian Policy Center’s new report — ‘Central Asia and the New Critical Minerals Frontier: Progress in Reshaping Global Supply Chains’ — is the latest in a wave of think-tank, government, and investor analyses arriving at the same conclusion: the region’s critical mineral resources are strategically indispensable.
This analysis cuts through the optimism to ask the harder questions. What has actually changed on the ground? Which players are genuinely committed versus which are signing MoUs for photo opportunities? And by 2030, what will Central Asia’s real role be in the global supply of critical raw materials?
This analysis draws on the CPC report, the EU Institute for Security Studies’ Chaillot Paper on China’s critical raw material weapon, the C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue in Astana on 10 June 2026, the Carnegie Endowment’s analysis of the Middle Corridor, the CFR’s report on leapfrogging China’s dominance, and the Forum’s accumulated perspective from running MINEX Asia, MINEX Europe, and MINEX Eurasia.
1. The Geopolitical Wake-Up: Real, But Overdue
The CPC report is unambiguous: critical mineral supply chains are no longer an economic issue — they are a national security and geopolitical issue. China controls approximately 90% of global rare earth refining, 60% of lithium processing, and over 70% of cobalt refining. By 2022, China controlled 100% of global graphite processing. These are not numbers that have crept up on policymakers. They have been visible for years. What has changed is the willingness to act — and the nature of Beijing’s own use of this leverage.
The EUISS Chaillot Paper published in May 2026 makes for sober reading. Beijing’s sharp reduction of critical raw material exports in 2025 — covering germanium, gallium, antimony, bismuth, and rare earths — was not a one-off retaliation against US semiconductor restrictions. It evolved into a systematic geo-economic weapon. The paper documents how China used its export licensing regime to extract information about Western defence-industrial networks, coerce EU trade policy on electric vehicle tariffs, and deter Japan from strengthening its defence posture on Taiwan.
What is less widely understood is how the apparent ‘détente’ of late 2025 conceals a structural tightening. The October 2025 rare earth export controls were suspended for one year as part of the Xi–Trump Busan summit deal — they are due to re-activate in November 2026. Critically, the April 2025 controls remain fully in force; only the October tranche was suspended. More consequentially, China’s export licensing architecture now includes extraterritorial provisions that allow Beijing to restrict re-exports of products containing Chinese-origin rare earth content even between third countries. The détente is not a resolution. It is a one-year suppression of symptoms while the structural disease remains untreated.
China does not merely hold rocks in the ground. It holds the refinery, the processing plant, the magnet manufacturer, and the pricing mechanism. Owning a deposit in Central Asia without access to non-Chinese processing is like owning an oil field with no pipeline.
This is the fundamental reality that too many Western policy documents still dance around. The CPC report is admirably direct about the midstream gap — the fact that even where Western investors enter Central Asian mining, the ore typically still travels east for processing. Closing that gap requires not just exploration investment but decades of patient capital in refining and processing infrastructure. That capital has not yet materialised at the required scale.
2. The MoU Inflation Problem
What should concern anyone serious about this sector is the following. The United States, the EU, Japan, South Korea, and Türkiye are all engaged in what the Forum terms ‘MoU inflation’ with Central Asian governments. The CPC report catalogues a remarkable number of bilateral frameworks, memoranda of understanding, and strategic partnerships signed since 2025. The C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue in Astana on 10 June produced more of the same.
These instruments are not worthless — they establish political will and create frameworks for future action. Kazakhstan’s Minister of Industry, Yersayin Nagaspayev, rightly highlighted that Kazakhstan has adopted a new Subsoil and Subsoil Use Code, implemented a ‘first come, first served’ licensing principle, launched a unified digital subsoil platform, and fully adopted CRIRSCO international reporting standards since 2024. Investment in geological exploration has tripled since 2018, exceeding one billion dollars. Western majors including BHP (via its Xplor programme), First Quantum Minerals, Ivanhoe Mines, Teck Resources, Fortescue, and US-based Cove Capital have entered the Kazakh market. Chinese companies are moving faster and at greater scale: Zijin Mining completed a $1.2 billion acquisition of Kazakhstan’s Raygorodok gold mine in October 2025, adding to its existing operations at the Taldybulak Levoberezhny mine in Kyrgyzstan and the Jilau and Taror gold mines in Tajikistan — a three-country “Gold Triangle” across Central Asia. East Hope Group — one of China’s largest private industrial conglomerates and a top-ten global aluminium producer — is advancing a $12.6 billion fully integrated aluminium cluster in Kazakhstan’s Kostanay and Aktobe regions: bauxite mining, a two million tonne per year alumina refinery, a one million tonne per year primary aluminium smelter, and a captive one-gigawatt power plant. The project framework was signed with the Kazakh government in February 2025 and geological exploration of eleven deposits is already under way. If delivered, it would be one of the largest single foreign direct investment projects in Kazakhstan’s industrial history. China National Gold Group has signed an MoU with Uzbekistan covering geological exploration and technology transfer. These are real signals of intent — though the Western and Chinese signals point in very different directions.
But the gap between MoU and mine is measured not in months but in decades. The CPC report states this plainly: developing a major mining project from inception to production can take twenty or more years. Processing and refining require additional capital beyond the mine gate. Political cycles — in Washington, in Brussels, and in Central Asian capitals — run on four-to-five-year horizons. China’s BRI financing runs on twenty-year horizons. This asymmetry is not a detail. It is the central challenge of Western engagement with Central Asia’s mineral sector.
The question is not whether Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, or Tajikistan have the minerals. They do. The question is whether Western partners have the institutional patience, the risk appetite, and the financing instruments to compete with a counterparty that thinks in decades, not electoral cycles.
The US International Development Finance Corporation’s recent approval of USD 2.5 billion in strategic investments and the C5+1 roadmap for geological exploration, mining and processing, and global value chain integration are positive steps. But the gap between announced capital and deployed capital in this region remains historically wide. The Forum has documented this cycle repeatedly: enthusiasm peaks around major geopolitical events, and then the deals stall in permitting, due diligence, or financing committees.
3. Where the Real Business Opportunities Are
The following sets out where genuine commercial opportunities are opening up, rather than where the diplomatic activity is concentrated.
3.1 Midstream Processing — The Untapped Prize
The CPC report’s section on closing the midstream gap is the most commercially important part of the document. Central Asia produces raw ore and exports it, largely to China, which captures the value-added margin in processing and refining. The governments in the region know this and want to change it. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have explicitly stated they want to develop industrial clusters that capture more of the value chain domestically.
For investors and mining companies, this creates a specific opportunity: joint ventures in processing and refining that give Central Asian governments the industrial development they want and give Western offtake partners the supply chain security they need. This is not easy — it requires technology transfer, long-term offtake agreements, and patient capital — but it is where the alignment of interests is strongest. Companies with refining technology and Western governments with DFI instruments should be looking at this window seriously.
3.2 The Middle Corridor — A Structural Shift in Logistics, With a Named Weak Link
Freight along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route has increased fivefold in seven years, reaching 4.1 million tonnes across the Caspian in 2024 alone. The war in Ukraine has accelerated this, but the trend is structural. For critical minerals, the Middle Corridor offers an alternative to Chinese-controlled logistics networks. Kazakhstan’s commitment to developing this route is serious, and the Hormuz blockade in place since February 2026 — with oil above $110 a barrel at the time of writing — is providing a live demonstration of exactly why overland alternatives to maritime choke points matter.
But the optimism around the corridor needs to be tempered by a specific and underreported vulnerability. Georgia is currently the corridor’s only gateway to Europe. Until the TRIPP route via Armenia and Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave becomes operational, Tbilisi is structurally irreplaceable. Yet the Georgian government has just cut funding for the Anaklia deep-sea port — identified by both the World Bank and the EU’s Trans-European Transport Network as the corridor’s central infrastructure priority — from 150 million lari to 50 million lari. Georgia’s existing port capacity is already nearing exhaustion.
The explanation for this decision is contested, but one strand is disturbing: after a Western-led consortium lost the Anaklia contract in 2020, the Georgian government selected as its preferred contractor a Chinese-Singaporean firm currently under US sanctions. There is a credible case that Beijing, which benefits from the Northern (Russian) Corridor and has no strategic interest in the Middle Corridor displacing it, is quietly applying pressure on Tbilisi to limit the western terminus’s capacity.
Kazakhstan’s position in this corridor is more structural than is commonly appreciated: approximately 80% of all rail cargo travelling between China and Europe already passes through Kazakhstan, making it not an emerging alternative route but the existing backbone of Eurasian overland trade. The commercial opportunity in the corridor’s logistics and infrastructure layer is real — port capacity at Aktau and Kuryk, rail and intermodal connectivity through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Türkiye — but companies positioning in this space need to price in the Georgia risk. Türkiye’s role as the corridor’s westernmost reliable node therefore becomes more, not less, strategically significant if Georgia continues to under-invest.
3.3 Uranium — The Quiet Giant
Central Asia produces approximately 50% of global uranium. Kazakhstan alone, through Kazatomprom, dominates global supply. The US Geological Survey has added uranium to its updated list of critical minerals. As the energy security debate in Europe and the US re-centres on nuclear power as a baseload complement to renewables, and as advanced reactor programmes (SMRs in particular) gather momentum, uranium supply security from non-Russian, non-Chinese sources becomes a premium.
The investment thesis for uranium in Kazakhstan is arguably more mature and more deliverable than for rare earths, precisely because the infrastructure already exists. The opportunity is in midstream — converting, enriching, and fabricating fuel outside of Russian-controlled supply chains — and in ensuring Western utilities have long-term offtake agreements with Kazakh producers.
3.3a Titanium — The Overlooked Aerospace Play
Titanium rarely features in critical minerals analysis focused on Central Asia, yet Kazakhstan accounts for approximately 20% of the global aerospace-grade titanium market — a concrete, active commercial relationship, not a geological aspiration. This matters because aerospace titanium supply has been severely disrupted by the Russia sanctions regime: VSMPO-AVISMA, previously the dominant Western supplier accounting for roughly 30% of global aerospace titanium, became inaccessible to Western manufacturers after 2022. Boeing, Airbus, and their tier-one suppliers have been seeking alternative sources ever since. Kazakhstan’s existing market position fills part of that gap and has been doing so quietly while the policy debate concentrates on rare earths and lithium. Titanium is now on both the EU and US critical minerals lists. For investors and industrial offtake partners, the titanium story in Kazakhstan differs from the rare earth story in one crucial respect: the supply chain is already functioning. The opportunity is in expanding and securing existing capacity, not in building it from scratch.
3.4 Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan — Early-Stage, High-Risk, Potentially High-Reward
The CPC report and the C5+1 framework rightly include Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Kumtor Gold in Kyrgyzstan and Zarafshon Gold in Tajikistan are the flagship projects, but the rare earth and critical mineral potential in both countries is largely unexplored. Legal frameworks are weaker, infrastructure is thinner, and political risk is higher. But for investors and juniors willing to absorb early-stage risk, the geological endowment is compelling.
The legal reform chapter of the CPC report is a necessary reality check here. As Dr. Ruchan Kaya argues directly: No Reform, No Mining. Without clear subsoil use codes, transparent licensing, independent dispute resolution, and ESG frameworks compatible with Western capital markets, foreign investment will remain shallow. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have work to do.
3.5 Technology Transfer and Workforce Development
Central Asian governments are unanimous on one point: they do not want to be raw material exporters indefinitely. They want technology transfer, workforce development, and the creation of domestic industrial capacity. This creates a genuine market for mining engineering services, training, metallurgical technology, and environmental management expertise. European, Japanese, and South Korean companies with this expertise have an opening that pure extractive investors do not.
4. The Six-Party Chess Board: China, Russia, USA, EU, Türkiye, Japan/South Korea
China — The Incumbent with a Structural Advantage
China’s position in Central Asian critical minerals is not primarily about geology. It is about infrastructure, processing capacity, financing terms, and decades of relationship-building. The BRI has locked in logistical corridors, off-take agreements, and debt obligations that are difficult to unwind quickly. Chinese firms continue to invest at scale: Zijin Mining — now the world’s fourth-largest gold producer — has assembled a “Gold Triangle” across Kazakhstan (Raygorodok, $1.2 billion acquisition completed October 2025), Kyrgyzstan (Taldybulak Levoberezhny), and Tajikistan (Jilau and Taror mines, where it is the largest gold producer accounting for over 70% of national output). East Hope Group — one of China’s largest private industrial conglomerates and a top-ten global aluminium producer — is advancing a $12.6 billion fully integrated aluminium cluster in Kazakhstan: bauxite mining, a two million tonne per year alumina refinery, a one million tonne per year primary aluminium smelter, and a captive one-gigawatt power plant across the Kostanay and Aktobe regions. The framework agreement was signed with Astana in February 2025; geological exploration of eleven bauxite and coal deposits is already under way. If delivered, it would be one of the largest single foreign direct investment projects in Kazakhstan’s industrial history — and a textbook example of the integrated industrial model China deploys while Western investors are still circling at the MoU stage. China National Gold Group is advancing into Uzbekistan via government-level MoUs on exploration and technology transfer. Chinese cumulative investment in Central Asia reached $35.9 billion by mid-2025, a 1.5-fold increase since 2020, with Kazakhstan in the first half of 2025 alone attracting an estimated $23 billion in BRI-linked commitments — making it the single largest BRI capital recipient globally in that period. Any honest assessment must acknowledge that China will remain the dominant actor in Central Asian mineral supply chains throughout the 2020s.
The more important question is whether China’s dominance is vulnerable to a strategic discontinuity rather than gradual erosion. The CFR’s February 2026 report makes an argument that cuts against the grain of most current thinking: the United States cannot out-mine or out-process China, and attempting to do so is the wrong strategy. The correct approach is to leapfrog China’s dominance through innovation — scaling rare-earth-free magnets, mine tailings recovery, e-waste recycling, and AI-accelerated materials science. If this thesis is correct, the entire paradigm of building competing mine-to-magnet supply chains in Central Asia may be strategically secondary to the innovation race happening in US and allied laboratories. Central Asian governments and their Western partners should be alert to this possibility: the strategic premium on Central Asian deposits is real today, but it is not permanent if substitute materials technologies mature.
Russia — The Shadow Partner
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has paradoxically accelerated Central Asia’s strategic importance to the West while complicating its own position in the region. Central Asian governments are navigating with care — they cannot afford to antagonise Moscow, which retains significant economic and security leverage, but they are actively diversifying. Russia’s ability to invest in and benefit from Central Asian critical mineral development is constrained by sanctions, capital flight, and the rerouting of its own economy. For the near term, Russia’s role is more that of a constraint than a competitor in the Western engagement story.
United States — Urgency Without Sustained Patience
Washington’s engagement since 2025 has been substantive. Project Vault (a USD 12 billion public-private reserve initiative), FORGE (the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement), the Critical Minerals Ministerial with 54 countries, and the DFC’s Central Asia investment pipeline represent genuine institutional commitments. The C5+1 framework gives the US a multilateral architecture in the region.
However, it is important to understand what FORGE actually is — and what it is not. The Atlantic Council’s analysis makes a distinction that most coverage obscures: FORGE is structurally different from its predecessor, the Minerals Security Partnership. The MSP functioned primarily as a pooled investment co-ordination vehicle. FORGE is designed as a ‘membership by trade’ model — participation conditioned on adherence to shared market rules and price floors, rather than joint capital deployment. Investment remains bilateral. This means FORGE will not produce a multilateral investment fund for Kazakhstani or Uzbekistani mining projects. It will produce a shared pricing and trade architecture that in theory de-risks bilateral deals — but the capital mobilisation burden still falls on individual governments and DFIs acting separately. For Central Asian partners watching from Astana or Tashkent, this distinction matters enormously.
It is worth keeping the bilateral relationship in perspective: Kazakhstan has attracted more than $480 billion in cumulative foreign direct investment since independence, with gross FDI inflows reaching $20.5 billion in 2024 and investors from more than 120 countries currently active in the country. The US relationship is therefore being built onto an already diversified investment base, not into a vacuum. Kazakhstan signed USD 17 billion in new bilateral agreements with the US during President Tokayev’s November 2025 Washington visit, while Uzbekistan committed to investing up to USD 35 billion in the US over the next three years — directions of flow and deal structures that differ significantly, but which together signal that the C5+1 relationship has acquired genuine commercial weight. But commercial weight at the announcement stage and capital deployed in-country are different things.
The European Union — Engaged But Fragmented
The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act and the selection of 60 Strategic Projects — including Kazakhstan and Ukraine as external partner countries — represent a serious policy commitment. But the EUISS Chaillot Paper is damning on Europe’s pace of execution: American, Japanese, and particularly European diversification efforts are not on track to replace the volume or range of China-dominated production over the next decade.
The EU’s problem goes deeper than slow bureaucracy or fragmented financing instruments. As of late 2025, despite all the summits, roadmaps, and declared billions, only five EU companies have actually invested in CRM projects in Central Asia. That is not a financing gap problem — it is a near-total absence of private sector engagement. EU policy documents treat Central Asia as five countries of strategic importance; EU commercial reality has concentrated almost entirely on Kazakhstan, which is the only fully recognised EU external strategic partner with both the resource base and the legal framework for large-scale collaboration. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and even Uzbekistan remain largely outside the EU’s actual investment footprint despite featuring prominently in its diplomatic declarations. Brussels risks building an elaborate architecture of frameworks and roadmaps that covers five countries on paper but delivers in one.
Türkiye — The Underappreciated Swing Player
Türkiye’s role in Central Asian critical minerals deserves far more analytical attention than it currently receives. Ankara’s position as a NATO member, a pragmatic economic partner to both Russia and China, and the institutional convener of the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) gives it a combination of relationships that no other actor in this space possesses.
The OTS — which brings together Türkiye, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, and observer states — is an increasingly active institutional vehicle for economic co-operation amongst Turkic-speaking nations. For critical minerals specifically, it creates a framework for Türkiye to position itself not merely as a transit corridor but as a co-investor and processing ally for Central Asian governments that want to move up the value chain.
The strategic picture that emerges from available data is striking in its specificity. Türkiye’s mineral engagement operates across four distinct partner-and-material vectors:
Partner
Key Materials / Vectors
Türkiye’s Function
Central Asia
Boron, refined REEs, battery recyclables
Co-investor and institutional processing ally via the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS)
China
Manganese, chromium, lithium, copper
Supply chain alternative and competitor in REE midstream processing
Russia & Iran
Light and heavy rare earth oxides
Corridor guardian; bypassing northern routes via the Middle Corridor
Logistics vectors
Transport infrastructure, regional border security
Gateway and facilitator for Eurasian mineral freight flows
Read together, these vectors tell a coherent story. Türkiye is positioning itself simultaneously as a co-investor with Central Asian partners in boron and REE processing (leveraging the OTS institutional framework), as a competitive alternative to China in REE midstream capacity, and as the indispensable corridor guardian for the Middle Corridor route that bypasses both Russia and Iran.
What is new and underreported is the domestic industrial ambition underpinning this positioning. At the OECD Critical Minerals Forum in Istanbul in April 2026, Türkiye’s Energy and Natural Resources Minister Alparslan Bayraktar made a declaration that amounts to a strategic doctrine: “Having resources alone is no longer sufficient. You must be able to process them. Türkiye is building exactly that, combining extraction with deep processing capacity and high-tech industrial value creation.” The Beylikova REE project in Eskişehir province — described by Bayraktar as potentially one of the world’s largest deposits — already has a pilot facility operational, with plans for full industrial production including separation and processing of rare earth oxides for permanent magnets. A comprehensive Critical Raw Materials strategy is forthcoming from Ankara. This is not transit ambition. This is industrial policy.
The active Iran conflict and Hormuz disruption, which Bayraktar explicitly cited at the same forum, reinforces the Middle Corridor’s necessity. The corridor’s importance is no longer merely a response to the Ukraine war and the sanctioning of Russian routes — it is now being validated in real time by a second simultaneous crisis in maritime supply chains. Türkiye’s own boron endowment — approximately 73% of the world’s reserves — and the January 2026 mining sector MoU with Uzbekistan, which carries the weight of a presidential-level strategic council endorsement rather than a routine ministerial agreement, position Ankara as a co-architect of the post-Chinese supply chain rather than a passive transit facilitator.
The MINEX Asia Forum in Ankara on 24–25 June sits at exactly this intersection. Whether Türkiye chooses to deepen its processing and co-investment role, or remains primarily a corridor facilitator, will significantly shape the commercial geography of Central Asian mineral exports through 2030 and beyond.
Japan and South Korea — Quiet but Serious
Japan and South Korea have some of the most sophisticated critical mineral diversification programmes of any Western-aligned economies. Japan’s rare earth diversification after China’s 2010 export restriction was a decade-long institutional effort that produced real results. South Korea’s Korea Zinc committed USD 7.4 billion to new zinc refining in the US in 2025. Both countries are watching Central Asia closely and have existing relationships — South Korean companies are active in Kazakhstan’s energy and industrial sectors.
The EUISS paper notes that US and Japanese stockpiling and state-sponsored diversification efforts have been more successful than Europe’s — and that this risks disrupting the level playing field between downstream industries. Japan and South Korea’s engagement in Central Asia is likely to deepen significantly through 2030, and they may prove more reliable long-term partners than the US for the Central Asians, precisely because they have demonstrated institutional continuity in minerals diplomacy.
5. A 2030 Forecast: Honest Probabilities, Not Promotional Headlines
Based on the analysis above, the Forum’s assessment of where Central Asia is likely to stand in the global critical minerals picture by 2030 is as follows.
What Will Likely Have Happened
Kazakhstan will have advanced several significant critical mineral projects, particularly in uranium conversion and enrichment outside Russian supply chains, and in copper with one or two major Western-backed expansions. The Middle Corridor will carry materially higher volumes of goods, including mineral concentrates, with improved port and rail infrastructure — assuming the Georgia bottleneck is resolved, either through Tbilisi reversing course on Anaklia or through the TRIPP route becoming operational.
Uzbekistan will have attracted significant investment in gold and copper, building on its already-strong trajectory, and will have made progress on rare earth exploration, though commercial production at scale is unlikely before 2030.
Türkiye will have deepened its institutional role through the OTS and established at least one significant co-processing or co-investment arrangement with a Central Asian partner, most likely in boron derivatives or light rare earth oxides. The Beylikova project will have moved from pilot to initial industrial scale, giving Ankara credible processing capacity for the first time.
FORGE will have produced a shared pricing architecture and several concrete offtake agreements. However, because FORGE is a trade-rules framework rather than a pooled investment vehicle, the capital mobilisation it generates will be diffuse and bilateral rather than concentrated and strategic. The gap between FORGE’s institutional ambition and its actual investment footprint in Central Asia will remain a source of frustration.
Processing and refining capacity in Central Asia will have increased from its current low base, but will still represent a small fraction of what is needed to be genuinely China-independent. The midstream gap will have narrowed, not closed.
What Will Likely Not Have Happened
Central Asia will not have become a major supplier of processed rare earth materials to Western markets by 2030. The timeline from geological survey to commercial rare earth processing facility is typically fifteen to twenty years, and the clock has not been running long enough.
China’s dominance in processing will not have been broken. It may have been reduced at the margin — particularly for specific materials where Western-backed alternatives have been developed — but the structural advantage Beijing built over three decades cannot be unwound in five years.
A unified, coherent Western investment approach to Central Asia will not have materialised. The EU, US, Japan, South Korea, and Türkiye will continue to operate largely in parallel rather than in co-ordination, missing the synergies that a genuinely multilateral approach could generate.
The Wild Cards
Innovation as disruptor. The CFR’s February 2026 analysis argues that the US and its allies cannot out-mine or out-process China — and should not try. The alternative is to leapfrog China’s dominance through disruptive technologies: rare-earth-free magnets that eliminate the most geopolitically vulnerable inputs, mine tailings recovery that yields critical minerals from existing waste streams faster and more cheaply than new extraction, and e-waste recycling at industrial scale. If these technologies mature faster than expected, the strategic premium on Central Asian deposits could diminish even as geopolitical interest in the region remains high. For Central Asian governments, this is both a warning and an opportunity: the window in which their geological endowment commands maximum strategic attention may be narrower than current diplomatic momentum implies.
The China re-activation deadline. The October 2025 rare earth export controls suspended under the Xi–Trump deal are due to re-activate in November 2026 unless the deal is renewed. By the time of MINEX Eurasia in London on 30 November, this will be an immediate live issue. If Beijing re-activates, the urgency around alternative supply chains — including Central Asian ones — will intensify sharply. If it extends the suspension, the pressure on Western governments to maintain costly diversification programmes will ease, potentially slowing capital deployment.
Geopolitical escalation beyond Ukraine. The Hormuz blockade has already demonstrated that disruption can arrive simultaneously from multiple directions. Central Asia’s importance as both a resource base and a logistics corridor increases with every crisis in maritime routes. But escalation can also redirect capital and political attention away from the patient, long-horizon work of building supply chains.
Domestic political stability in Central Asia itself is not guaranteed. Kyrgyzstan in particular has experienced significant political turbulence. Investors will need to see sustained legal and regulatory reform to deploy long-term capital at scale.
Conclusion: The Window Is Open — But Not Indefinitely
Central Asia’s critical minerals moment is real. The geology is there. The geopolitical will is growing. The legal frameworks are improving in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The Middle Corridor is becoming a genuine alternative logistics route — though its Georgian gateway is more fragile than most analyses acknowledge. And for the first time in a generation, Central Asian governments are actively seeking to diversify away from exclusive dependence on Chinese and Russian capital and markets.
But the picture is more complicated than the wave of optimistic policy documents suggests. FORGE is a trade-rules architecture, not a capital deployment machine — and the distinction matters for Central Asia. The EU has five companies on the ground despite its ambitious declarations. China’s export control détente has a hard expiry date in November 2026. And the CFR’s innovation thesis raises a genuinely uncomfortable question: what if the West’s best path to supply chain security runs through the laboratory rather than the mine shaft?
Türkiye’s OTS-anchored positioning adds a genuinely new dimension to this picture. An Ankara that is actively building REE processing capacity at Beylikova, institutionalising economic co-operation through the OTS, and serving as the corridor’s most reliable western terminus is not a passive transit hub. It is a co-architect of the post-Chinese critical mineral supply chain — if it chooses to be.
The businesses and investors who will win in this space are not those signing MoUs at ministerial summits. They are those who are currently doing the detailed geological work, building the processing partnerships, securing the offtake agreements, and positioning in the Middle Corridor logistics chain. They are thinking in fifteen-year horizons, not fifteen-month ones.
At MINEX Asia in Ankara, MINEX Europe in Ireland, and MINEX Eurasia in London, the Forum is convening these conversations — not about what Central Asia might become, but about what concrete steps, in what sequence, with what capital and what institutions, will make the difference between another wave of declarations and a genuine reorientation of global critical mineral supply chains.
The rocks are there. The question is whether the will, the capital, and the institutions are there too — and whether they will arrive before the window closes.
Chinese uranium company CGN Mining is closely studying amendments to Kazakhstan’s Subsoil and Subsoil Use Code adopted in December 2025, which could significantly alter the ownership structure of its joint ventures with Kazatomprom when existing licences come up for renewal — potentially stripping the company of a substantial portion of its uranium resource base within four to five years.
Under the updated Code, Kazatomprom can claim up to a 90% stake in uranium projects at the point of contract renewal, unless the foreign joint venture partner applies an option to transfer uranium conversion and enrichment technology. The Chinese side possesses such technology, which provides a theoretical negotiating lever. The legislation also increased Kazatomprom’s mandatory participation in new uranium ventures transitioning from exploration to production from 50% to 75%.
CGN Mining holds 49% stakes in two joint ventures with Kazatomprom. In Semizbay-U — acquired for $133 million in 2014 — the company holds subsoil rights to the Semizbay deposit in Akmola Region, with a licence valid until 2031, and the Irkol mine in Kyzylorda Region, valid until 2030. JORC-compliant reserves and resources at year-end 2025 stood at 4,600 tonnes at Semizbay and 1,800 tonnes at Irkol. In 2025, the joint venture produced 862 tonnes of uranium against a plan of 861 tonnes — 397 tonnes from Semizbay at a production cost of $37 per pound U3O8 and 465 tonnes from Irkol at $31 per pound. CGN received nearly $33 million in after-tax dividends from Semizbay-U in 2025.
At current extraction rates, the Semizbay deposit’s reserves would take more than ten years to exhaust — well beyond the contract’s expiry. This creates a clear risk: upon renewal, Kazatomprom could claim 90% of the project, leaving CGN with a dramatically reduced position. Irkol’s reserves may be depletable before contract expiry, but additional resources estimated under Kazakhstan’s State Reserve Commission standard leave uncertainty.
The second asset, Ortalyk — acquired for $435 million in 2021 — operates two mines in Turkestan Region: the Central Mynkuduk block with a licence until 2033 and Zhalpak until 2042. Combined reserves and resources stood at approximately 30,000 tonnes of uranium at end-2025. Ortalyk produced 1,834 tonnes of uranium in 2025 after processing losses, generating $64.7 million in after-tax dividends for CGN. At current rates, the Central Mynkuduk block cannot be fully depleted before its 2033 contract expiry — requiring approximately ten years at current output — meaning a portion of its resources could transition to Kazatomprom upon renewal. Zhalpak, with its 2042 deadline, offers a realistic chance of full utilisation if annual output increases to around 1,000 tonnes.
The broader context involves significant mutual dependence. China typically accounts for approximately half of all Kazatomprom’s uranium sales, making Kazakhstan an indispensable supplier for China’s expanding nuclear power programme. In May, Kazakhstan’s Senate ratified a bilateral investment protection agreement with China, and Chinese officials pointed to extensive international arbitration opportunities in Hong Kong for Kazakhstani companies — signals that both sides are laying legal groundwork ahead of what may be complex renegotiations.
Kazakhstan’s national atomic company Kazatomprom is accelerating its exploration activities and expanding its mineral resource base, with planned investments of 75 to 85 billion tenge in geological exploration by 2030.
The announcement was made by CEO Meirzhan Yussupov during a meeting with President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. According to the company, six uranium exploration areas have already been identified across Kazakhstan, covering a total area of more than 1000 square kilometres.
Kazatomprom reported that its group enterprises produced 25.8 thousand tonnes of uranium in 2024, with 13.5 thousand tonnes attributable directly to the company. Sales volumes increased by 11% in 2025, reaching 18.5 thousand tonnes, reflecting steady demand growth in global markets.
As part of its development strategy for 2025–2034, the company is actively expanding its international presence. Over the past year, Kazatomprom has signed supply agreements with major global energy players, including Switzerland’s AxpoPower AG, Czech utility ČEZ Group and Japan’s Kansai Electric Power. In addition, negotiations are underway for a long-term uranium concentrate supply agreement with India.
The company is also prioritising technological innovation, with a dedicated strategy focused on improving operational efficiency, reducing environmental impact and implementation solutions across its production processes.
Industry forecasts support the company’s long-term outlook. According to the World Nuclear Association, global nuclear generating capacity could reach 746 GW by 2040, while uranium demand may rise to 150 thousand tonnes annually.
Against the backdrop of anticipated supply shortages and growing reliance on nuclear energy, Kazatomprom is focusing on expanding its resource base and securing long-term contracts to maintain its leading position in the global uranium market.
Kazakhstan’s national uranium producer Kazatomprom has reported stable operations and financial performance despite ongoing geopolitical tensions, including conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East.
In its financial results for the year ended 31 December, the London-listed company stated that its production, exports and overall business activities remain unaffected. Uranium deliveries continue without disruption via both the Russian Federation and the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route, with no restrictions currently impacting shipments to customers.
However, the company cautioned that broader geopolitical uncertainty and volatility in global capital markets could influence commodity prices and market conditions in the future.
Chief Executive Officer Meirzhan Yussupov noted that the global nuclear energy sector is entering a more mature phase, with uranium increasingly recognised as a strategic resource within national energy security frameworks. According to him, major consumers are shifting focus from short-term price considerations to securing reliable long-term supply, entering contracts that extend well into the next decade.
Despite this trend, Kazatomprom indicated that overall contracting activity in 2025 remained below actual demand levels, suggesting continued tightening in the uranium market.
During the reporting period, the company expanded its international presence, adding Switzerland and the Czech Republic to its customer base, signing a supply agreement with a Japanese utility, and establishing a new long-term partnership with India.
Kazatomprom also highlighted that the majority of its revenues and financing are denominated in US dollars, which provides a natural hedge against exchange rate fluctuations and supports financial stability.
The company said it will continue to closely monitor global developments while maintaining operational resilience in a complex geopolitical environment.
This year marked a significant milestone as the Kazakhstan Chamber of Mines took the lead as the official organiser of Kazakhstan Day — and what a resounding success the debut turned out to be!
Despite a packed PDAC schedule, the session drew an impressive crowd of over 130 industry leaders, investors, and exploration experts. The atmosphere in the room confirmed one thing: the global mining community is paying very close attention to Central Asia.
MINEX Forum was proud to support the event as the Official Media Partner, capturing the insights that are shaping the next wave of exploration in the region.
Key Highlights from the Plenary Session: The tone was set by Ruslan Baimishev, President of the Kazakhstan Chamber of Mines:
“Kazakhstan is entering a new era of exploration — driven by robust reforms, international partnerships, and the soaring global demand for copper and critical metals.”
We also heard high-level perspectives from H.E. Dauletbek Kussainov, Ambassador of Kazakhstan to Canada, and Iran Sharkhan, Vice-Minister of Industry and Construction.
Expert Insights & Project Showcases: The technical session, “Unlocking New Discovery Potential in Kazakhstan,” featured a stellar line-up including Tim Barry (Arras Minerals), Charlie Liu (Zijin Mining), Simon Cooper (Pallas Resources), and world-renowned experts Anna Fonseca and Professor Jeffrey Hedenquist.
The afternoon shifted to tangible opportunities, with project presentations from AMG Ltd, Kogadyr Gold, Taskora, and Muzbel. As Tim Barry aptly put it: “Kazakhstan offers unique opportunities for Canadian juniors to enter new jurisdictions — and the future looks bright.”
Kazakhstan is no longer just a “prospective” jurisdiction; it is rapidly becoming the territory where the next big copper success stories are being written.
Special thanks to the Kazakhstan Day partners:
General Sponsors: Aurora Minerals Group, NAC Kazatomprom, Pallas Resources.
Sponsors: Arras Minerals, TauGold Copper.
Missed the session? 📺 Watch the session recordings and download expert presentations at:
The uranium joint venture Katco, owned by France’s Orano (51%) and Kazakhstan’s Kazatomprom (49%), produced more than 3,700 tonnes of uranium in 2025, marking a significant increase in output following the commissioning of the South Tortkuduk section at the Moinkum deposit.
The figures were disclosed during a conference call by Orano, which confirmed that production at Katco rose from just under 2,400 tonnes in 2024 to slightly above 3,700 tonnes in 2025. Katco operates at the South and Tortkuduk sections of the Moinkum uranium field in the Sozak district of Turkestan region.
Development of the South Tortkuduk project, formalised through an additional agreement in 2022, has enabled the joint venture to extend production by up to 15 years while targeting annual output of around 4,000 tonnes. A new uranium processing plant under the South Tortkuduk project was launched in July 2024, with production from the new section gradually replacing output from older mining areas.
According to Kazatomprom’s annual reports, Katco produced 2,564 tonnes in 2022, 2,103 tonnes in 2023 and 2,388 tonnes in 2024, underscoring the scale of the 2025 increase. As of the end of 2024, Katco’s uranium reserves stood at 47,900 tonnes. Based on 2025 production levels, reserves may have declined to approximately 44,200 tonnes by year-end. With a subsoil use contract valid until 2039, sustained production at 4,000 tonnes per year would allow remaining reserves to be mined over roughly 11 years.
Financially, Katco remains one of Orano’s most profitable international uranium assets. In 2025, the Kazakh joint venture generated €628 million in revenue and €324 million in net profit, compared with €479 million and €273 million respectively in 2024.
Kazatomprom’s share of net income amounted to €159 million, reflecting its 49 percent ownership stake, along with an additional €36 million under a previously agreed 11 percent profit distribution arrangement valid through the end of the contract period. This implies that Orano’s net income from Katco in 2025 totalled approximately €129 million, a significant contribution given the French group’s adjusted net loss of €25 million for the year.
During the call, Orano’s management also indicated plans to expand exploration activities into Canada, Botswana, Australia and Mongolia, as the company seeks to diversify its uranium portfolio following the loss of operations in Niger, which had previously accounted for a substantial share of its global production.
Canada-listed uranium developer Laramide Resources has terminated its option agreement to explore for uranium in Kazakhstan’s Chu-Sarysu basin, citing regulatory changes that have reduced the project’s economic attractiveness.
In a company statement reported by inbusiness.kz, Laramide said it had decided to immediately withdraw from its agreement with Aral Resources, which granted access to more than 5,500 sq km of prospective ground near major uranium deposits and operating mines controlled by national producer Kazatomprom.
Laramide explained that amendments made late last year to Kazakhstan’s Subsoil and Subsoil Use Code significantly altered the investment framework for uranium exploration. The changes increased Kazatomprom’s mandatory participation in new uranium mining ventures from 50% to 75% and granted the national company priority rights to uranium exploration, effectively limiting opportunities for foreign juniors.
The option agreement, signed in 2024, envisaged securing up to 22 licenses in the Chu-Sarysu basin, an area considered prospective not only for uranium but also for copper and other minerals. Aral Resources had previously planned to invest tens of billions of tenge in exploration across the licensed areas.
Laramide said it will now refocus on uranium projects in Australia and the United States, which it described as more competitive and stable mining jurisdictions.
Commenting on the decision, Laramide CEO Mark Henderson said Kazakhstan’s policy amounted to a de facto nationalisation of future uranium exploration, increasing political, country and potential expropriation risks for new entrants. He warned that while Kazakhstan is seeking to secure long-term control over new discoveries, Kazatomprom itself faces a looming decline in its resource base, according to its own investor disclosures.
Henderson added that underinvestment in global uranium exploration is likely to deepen future supply deficits, potentially driving uranium prices significantly higher to incentivise new discoveries and development.
Kazakhstan’s Senate has approved, in two readings, a package of amendments to the Subsoil and Subsoil Use Code aimed at significantly strengthening state control over the country’s strategic uranium reserves. The reform marks one of the most substantial regulatory shifts in Kazakhstan’s uranium sector in recent years, reinforcing the dominant role of national company Kazatomprom and tightening restrictions on foreign participation.
Under the proposed amendments, if geological exploration confirms uranium mineralisation or deposits, subsoil users will be required either to return the explored area to the state or to transfer priority purchase rights for uranium to the national company. Lawmakers say the measure is designed to eliminate risks associated with “parallel activities” by different subsoil users operating on overlapping or adjoining territories.
Deputy Shakarim Buktugutov, cited by Kapital.kz, explained that the changes will limit the issuance of exploration licences in areas where uranium deposits or mineralisation have already been identified. Third parties will no longer be able to obtain licences to explore solid minerals in territories where uranium mining is already under way or where uranium occurrences have been officially confirmed.
A company that discovers uranium deposits will only be able to extend its licence if it relinquishes the area containing uranium mineralisation. The rule will not apply to operations where uranium is produced as a by-product or to existing projects operated by Kazatomprom.
The amendments also introduce stricter limits on foreign ownership. According to Deputy Chair of the Atomic Energy Agency Aset Makhambetov, foreign companies’ stakes in new uranium ventures will be capped at 25%.
Current law requires that the national company hold more than 50% in joint uranium projects, but the new amendments will raise Kazatomprom’s minimum mandatory stake to 75%, consolidating state control over future uranium production and strategic resource development.
Australian geological company C29 Metals has announced it is ending its operations in Kazakhstan after regulators rejected its applications to obtain rights for geological exploration (GER) at the Ulutau uranium project in the Zhambyl region. The company had previously sought a stake in the project and had secured environmental approval for exploratory drilling on one block, while considering additional exploration on three more areas of the deposit, whose historical resources are estimated at 3,800 tonnes of uranium.
To acquire 100% of the rights for exploration, C29 Metals issued additional shares worth 3 million Australian dollars, but their value has since dropped by more than half. According to the company’s report, total losses exceeded 4.9 million Australian dollars.
Kazakhstan’s regulator rejected both the initial and repeat applications, the latter submitted in March 2025. Local media attributed the decision to national security concerns. As a result, C29 Metals has suspended exploration activities that were to be carried out in partnership with Volkovgeology, a subsidiary of Kazatomprom.
Under current legislation, licenses for uranium production in Kazakhstan are issued only to companies in which Kazatomprom holds at least a 51% stake. Previously, such restrictions did not apply to exploration, but the Mazhilis is now reviewing amendments that would grant the national company priority rights for exploration in areas containing strategic uranium reserves. Analysts suggest that both administrative hurdles and the prospect of legislative changes may have pushed the Australian investor to abandon the project.
