In a recent presentation, Alp from UK Export Finance (UKEF) elucidated the agency’s operations and its pivotal role in financing critical minerals projects across Turkey, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe. UKEF, established over a century ago, serves as the UK government’s official export credit agency, aiming to bolster UK companies’ export growth while also extending its support to non-UK sellers supplying UK buyers. This dual approach is particularly significant in the context of critical minerals, where funding is essential for developing project pipelines and scaling investments.
Alp highlighted UKEF’s impressive financial capacity, noting that in the last financial year, the agency provided £14.5 billion in support for export contracts, which generated over 70,000 jobs in the UK and contributed to GDP growth. UKEF’s guarantees can cover up to 85% of a contract’s value, enabling companies to secure financing with tenors of up to 22 years, significantly more favourable than standard commercial loans. Although UKEF’s presence in Central Asia has been limited, its overall lending capacity for the region has reached £40 billion, a substantial resource for the burgeoning critical minerals sector.
The agency’s support is designed to foster economic development in host countries, with past projects including railways, hospital development, and mining equipment. Alp’s role encompasses a wide geographical area, from Mongolia to Moldova, ensuring that transactions across this region are routed through her team. UKEF can collaborate with sovereign counterparts or directly with the private sector, assessing the bankability of projects and offering tailored financing solutions.
Alp explained how UKEF-backed guarantees alter borrowing economics, allowing lenders to price transactions based on the UK government’s credit rating rather than the borrower’s financial strength. This leads to more competitive interest rates and longer repayment terms. The mechanics of a UKEF-guaranteed transaction involve the agency issuing guarantees to approved lenders, who then extend these guarantees to borrowers, facilitating a smoother financing process.
Focusing on critical minerals, UKEF maintains a list of minerals it supports, with a key requirement being the existence of an offtake agreement with a UK company. This policy aims to bolster the use of critical minerals in UK manufacturing destined for export. Notably, funding accessed through UKEF does not have to be strictly tied to the export contract; it can also assist with broader working capital needs. The agency’s financing can have a multiplier effect, allowing companies to access significantly more funding than the value of their export contracts.
Alp also shared case studies showcasing UKEF’s diverse support across various sectors, while clarifying that the agency does not finance fossil fuel-related transactions. Furthermore, UKEF is increasingly collaborating with other export credit agencies and multilateral development banks to co-finance larger regional projects and is open to supporting cross-border partnerships, provided they meet a minimum UK content threshold. The presentation concluded with an invitation for further discussions on how specific projects could be structured to access UKEF support, emphasising the agency’s commitment to fostering ongoing engagement with potential partners in the region.
In the mining sector, vast amounts of data are processed daily from various sources such as task orders, shift reports, instrument readings, and accounting logs. Any discrepancies—be it a measurement error, a missed event, or an incorrectly recorded downtime—can distort the operational picture, leading to misguided management decisions and unplanned downtimes that can result in significant financial losses for mining companies. Automation of reporting is emerging as a vital solution to streamline data handling, transforming disparate metrics into reliable summaries.
Tim Zinin, managing partner at ‘Zinin, Shturbin and Partners’, a firm specialising in the implementation of AI in industrial documentation, elaborates on the tools available for automating reports. One of the critical issues in shift reporting is that the final report rarely reaches management in a complete form. Zinin points out that the same shift hour may be described differently in various documents, creating confusion. For instance, one employee may note a ‘conveyor stop’, while another might refer to it as ‘loading unit downtime’. This inconsistency, along with variations in recording times and measurement units, leads to reports that lack a direct link to the original source, rendering the aggregated data unreliable.
The data processing begins with collecting primary sources such as scanned documents, photographs of forms, data exports from accounting systems, and Excel spreadsheets. The digital system structures these documents by identifying the site, shift, equipment, and relevant metrics. It extracts events from free text, such as specific equipment stoppages or complaints about safety conditions. Handwritten notes and illegible scans require additional steps for recognition, ensuring that errors are flagged for human verification before being included in the summary.
The automation process culminates in a comprehensive report that can be generated daily, weekly, or by site. When management poses a question, they receive an answer linked to the specific document and the relevant line within it, allowing for rapid verification of claims. Zinin emphasises that every figure and statement must trace back to the original report, enhancing accountability and transparency in data reporting.
However, Zinin cautions that AI should not replace human oversight in certain situations. When discrepancies arise between two versions of a report, the system prompts human intervention to determine the correct version. Moreover, the system must also account for access rights, as different employees may have varying permissions to view specific documents. Critical incidents, such as accidents or safety issues, must always be reviewed by a human, ensuring that the decision-making process remains robust and informed.
To successfully implement automated reporting, several conditions must be met: a unified list of equipment and sites for data comparison, a documented version of regulations and instructions, and a designated individual responsible for resolving disputes. The effectiveness of automation can be measured through metrics such as the time taken from the end of a shift to the completion of a report, the percentage of reports processed without manual adjustments, and the frequency of disputes flagged for human review.
Prominent companies in Central Asia are already digitising their documentation processes and automating report handling. For instance, the Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Complex has implemented a business process management system that has reduced paper reports by 92%. Similarly, the Eurasian Resources Group has automated 47 business processes, resulting in a 40% reduction in approval times and saving $50,000 annually in processing costs. These examples highlight how digital transformation is simplifying production management in the mining industry, paving the way for more efficient operations and improved decision-making.
Central Asia is emerging as a pivotal player in the global nuclear energy landscape, with Kazakhstan at the forefront due to its substantial uranium reserves. Expert Iqbal Guliyev from MGIMO highlights the region’s pragmatic approach to nuclear energy, particularly in its interactions with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The region’s nuclear projects are attracting international attention, as evidenced by frequent visits from IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, who engages with regional leaders to discuss long-term cooperation and strategic roadmaps.
The geopolitical context, marked by crises and sanctions, has disrupted traditional supply chains, making reliable nuclear fuel supply a critical concern for the United States and the European Union. For Central Asian countries, which are eager to move beyond their roles as mere raw material suppliers, this presents an opportunity to become full-fledged technological partners in nuclear energy. Kazakhstan, a global leader in uranium production, supplying about 40% of the world’s needs, is looking to not only export uranium but also participate in the entire nuclear fuel cycle.
Guliyev emphasizes that while Kazakhstan’s potential as a full-cycle nuclear player is significant, the country has yet to establish this capability fully. He notes that while Kazakhstan has a robust uranium base and can develop processing and production infrastructure, the more complex stages of conversion and enrichment require international cooperation rather than complete technological autonomy. The ongoing sanctions and logistical challenges indeed compel market participants to diversify uranium supply routes, but Guliyev warns against conflating geopolitical assumptions with verified facts.
The close collaboration with the IAEA serves as a means for Central Asian states to safeguard their national interests, with nuclear power plants (NPPs) seen as vital for economic survival amid acute electricity shortages. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are central to this competition, with various international corporations, including Russia’s Rosatom and China’s CNNC, proposing NPP projects in the region.
Guliyev argues that the presence of the IAEA is not about pushing narrow geopolitical interests but rather about ensuring safety and compliance with international norms. The agency’s role is to provide oversight and guarantees rather than to dictate commercial partnerships. For Kazakhstan, this means international scrutiny and support for its nuclear projects, including those involving Rosatom, without political interference in the selection of technology partners.
Beyond geopolitics, Grossi’s visits also have humanitarian implications, fostering cooperation in nuclear medicine and food security. Initiatives like the ‘Rays of Hope’ project aim to combat cancer, while agreements on using radiation technologies in agriculture are crucial for a region still haunted by the legacy of nuclear testing. These developments are essential for building public trust in nuclear technologies, especially in Kazakhstan, where historical memories of the Semipalatinsk test site linger.
In conclusion, Central Asia is strategically leveraging its uranium resources, establishing itself as a key energy hub in Eurasia while fostering strong partnerships with the IAEA. This relationship not only enhances the predictability of the uranium market but also allows Central Asian nations, particularly Kazakhstan, to navigate the interests of major powers like Russia, China, and the USA while maintaining control over their energy independence. The IAEA’s involvement does not contradict Kazakhstan’s collaborations with Russia but rather reinforces trust in projects involving Russian technology, enabling Kazakhstan to develop its nuclear energy capabilities within a framework of international legitimacy.
Something significant has shifted. In the span of eighteen months, Central Asia has moved from a footnote in Washington and Brussels policy documents to a headline. The Caspian Policy Center’s new report — ‘Central Asia and the New Critical Minerals Frontier: Progress in Reshaping Global Supply Chains’ — is the latest in a wave of think-tank, government, and investor analyses arriving at the same conclusion: the region’s critical mineral resources are strategically indispensable.
This analysis cuts through the optimism to ask the harder questions. What has actually changed on the ground? Which players are genuinely committed versus which are signing MoUs for photo opportunities? And by 2030, what will Central Asia’s real role be in the global supply of critical raw materials?
This analysis draws on the CPC report, the EU Institute for Security Studies’ Chaillot Paper on China’s critical raw material weapon, the C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue in Astana on 10 June 2026, the Carnegie Endowment’s analysis of the Middle Corridor, the CFR’s report on leapfrogging China’s dominance, and the Forum’s accumulated perspective from running MINEX Asia, MINEX Europe, and MINEX Eurasia.
1. The Geopolitical Wake-Up: Real, But Overdue
The CPC report is unambiguous: critical mineral supply chains are no longer an economic issue — they are a national security and geopolitical issue. China controls approximately 90% of global rare earth refining, 60% of lithium processing, and over 70% of cobalt refining. By 2022, China controlled 100% of global graphite processing. These are not numbers that have crept up on policymakers. They have been visible for years. What has changed is the willingness to act — and the nature of Beijing’s own use of this leverage.
The EUISS Chaillot Paper published in May 2026 makes for sober reading. Beijing’s sharp reduction of critical raw material exports in 2025 — covering germanium, gallium, antimony, bismuth, and rare earths — was not a one-off retaliation against US semiconductor restrictions. It evolved into a systematic geo-economic weapon. The paper documents how China used its export licensing regime to extract information about Western defence-industrial networks, coerce EU trade policy on electric vehicle tariffs, and deter Japan from strengthening its defence posture on Taiwan.
What is less widely understood is how the apparent ‘détente’ of late 2025 conceals a structural tightening. The October 2025 rare earth export controls were suspended for one year as part of the Xi–Trump Busan summit deal — they are due to re-activate in November 2026. Critically, the April 2025 controls remain fully in force; only the October tranche was suspended. More consequentially, China’s export licensing architecture now includes extraterritorial provisions that allow Beijing to restrict re-exports of products containing Chinese-origin rare earth content even between third countries. The détente is not a resolution. It is a one-year suppression of symptoms while the structural disease remains untreated.
China does not merely hold rocks in the ground. It holds the refinery, the processing plant, the magnet manufacturer, and the pricing mechanism. Owning a deposit in Central Asia without access to non-Chinese processing is like owning an oil field with no pipeline.
This is the fundamental reality that too many Western policy documents still dance around. The CPC report is admirably direct about the midstream gap — the fact that even where Western investors enter Central Asian mining, the ore typically still travels east for processing. Closing that gap requires not just exploration investment but decades of patient capital in refining and processing infrastructure. That capital has not yet materialised at the required scale.
2. The MoU Inflation Problem
What should concern anyone serious about this sector is the following. The United States, the EU, Japan, South Korea, and Türkiye are all engaged in what the Forum terms ‘MoU inflation’ with Central Asian governments. The CPC report catalogues a remarkable number of bilateral frameworks, memoranda of understanding, and strategic partnerships signed since 2025. The C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue in Astana on 10 June produced more of the same.
These instruments are not worthless — they establish political will and create frameworks for future action. Kazakhstan’s Minister of Industry, Yersayin Nagaspayev, rightly highlighted that Kazakhstan has adopted a new Subsoil and Subsoil Use Code, implemented a ‘first come, first served’ licensing principle, launched a unified digital subsoil platform, and fully adopted CRIRSCO international reporting standards since 2024. Investment in geological exploration has tripled since 2018, exceeding one billion dollars. Western majors including BHP (via its Xplor programme), First Quantum Minerals, Ivanhoe Mines, Teck Resources, Fortescue, and US-based Cove Capital have entered the Kazakh market. Chinese companies are moving faster and at greater scale: Zijin Mining completed a $1.2 billion acquisition of Kazakhstan’s Raygorodok gold mine in October 2025, adding to its existing operations at the Taldybulak Levoberezhny mine in Kyrgyzstan and the Jilau and Taror gold mines in Tajikistan — a three-country “Gold Triangle” across Central Asia. East Hope Group — one of China’s largest private industrial conglomerates and a top-ten global aluminium producer — is advancing a $12.6 billion fully integrated aluminium cluster in Kazakhstan’s Kostanay and Aktobe regions: bauxite mining, a two million tonne per year alumina refinery, a one million tonne per year primary aluminium smelter, and a captive one-gigawatt power plant. The project framework was signed with the Kazakh government in February 2025 and geological exploration of eleven deposits is already under way. If delivered, it would be one of the largest single foreign direct investment projects in Kazakhstan’s industrial history. China National Gold Group has signed an MoU with Uzbekistan covering geological exploration and technology transfer. These are real signals of intent — though the Western and Chinese signals point in very different directions.
But the gap between MoU and mine is measured not in months but in decades. The CPC report states this plainly: developing a major mining project from inception to production can take twenty or more years. Processing and refining require additional capital beyond the mine gate. Political cycles — in Washington, in Brussels, and in Central Asian capitals — run on four-to-five-year horizons. China’s BRI financing runs on twenty-year horizons. This asymmetry is not a detail. It is the central challenge of Western engagement with Central Asia’s mineral sector.
The question is not whether Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, or Tajikistan have the minerals. They do. The question is whether Western partners have the institutional patience, the risk appetite, and the financing instruments to compete with a counterparty that thinks in decades, not electoral cycles.
The US International Development Finance Corporation’s recent approval of USD 2.5 billion in strategic investments and the C5+1 roadmap for geological exploration, mining and processing, and global value chain integration are positive steps. But the gap between announced capital and deployed capital in this region remains historically wide. The Forum has documented this cycle repeatedly: enthusiasm peaks around major geopolitical events, and then the deals stall in permitting, due diligence, or financing committees.
3. Where the Real Business Opportunities Are
The following sets out where genuine commercial opportunities are opening up, rather than where the diplomatic activity is concentrated.
3.1 Midstream Processing — The Untapped Prize
The CPC report’s section on closing the midstream gap is the most commercially important part of the document. Central Asia produces raw ore and exports it, largely to China, which captures the value-added margin in processing and refining. The governments in the region know this and want to change it. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have explicitly stated they want to develop industrial clusters that capture more of the value chain domestically.
For investors and mining companies, this creates a specific opportunity: joint ventures in processing and refining that give Central Asian governments the industrial development they want and give Western offtake partners the supply chain security they need. This is not easy — it requires technology transfer, long-term offtake agreements, and patient capital — but it is where the alignment of interests is strongest. Companies with refining technology and Western governments with DFI instruments should be looking at this window seriously.
3.2 The Middle Corridor — A Structural Shift in Logistics, With a Named Weak Link
Freight along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route has increased fivefold in seven years, reaching 4.1 million tonnes across the Caspian in 2024 alone. The war in Ukraine has accelerated this, but the trend is structural. For critical minerals, the Middle Corridor offers an alternative to Chinese-controlled logistics networks. Kazakhstan’s commitment to developing this route is serious, and the Hormuz blockade in place since February 2026 — with oil above $110 a barrel at the time of writing — is providing a live demonstration of exactly why overland alternatives to maritime choke points matter.
But the optimism around the corridor needs to be tempered by a specific and underreported vulnerability. Georgia is currently the corridor’s only gateway to Europe. Until the TRIPP route via Armenia and Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave becomes operational, Tbilisi is structurally irreplaceable. Yet the Georgian government has just cut funding for the Anaklia deep-sea port — identified by both the World Bank and the EU’s Trans-European Transport Network as the corridor’s central infrastructure priority — from 150 million lari to 50 million lari. Georgia’s existing port capacity is already nearing exhaustion.
The explanation for this decision is contested, but one strand is disturbing: after a Western-led consortium lost the Anaklia contract in 2020, the Georgian government selected as its preferred contractor a Chinese-Singaporean firm currently under US sanctions. There is a credible case that Beijing, which benefits from the Northern (Russian) Corridor and has no strategic interest in the Middle Corridor displacing it, is quietly applying pressure on Tbilisi to limit the western terminus’s capacity.
Kazakhstan’s position in this corridor is more structural than is commonly appreciated: approximately 80% of all rail cargo travelling between China and Europe already passes through Kazakhstan, making it not an emerging alternative route but the existing backbone of Eurasian overland trade. The commercial opportunity in the corridor’s logistics and infrastructure layer is real — port capacity at Aktau and Kuryk, rail and intermodal connectivity through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Türkiye — but companies positioning in this space need to price in the Georgia risk. Türkiye’s role as the corridor’s westernmost reliable node therefore becomes more, not less, strategically significant if Georgia continues to under-invest.
3.3 Uranium — The Quiet Giant
Central Asia produces approximately 50% of global uranium. Kazakhstan alone, through Kazatomprom, dominates global supply. The US Geological Survey has added uranium to its updated list of critical minerals. As the energy security debate in Europe and the US re-centres on nuclear power as a baseload complement to renewables, and as advanced reactor programmes (SMRs in particular) gather momentum, uranium supply security from non-Russian, non-Chinese sources becomes a premium.
The investment thesis for uranium in Kazakhstan is arguably more mature and more deliverable than for rare earths, precisely because the infrastructure already exists. The opportunity is in midstream — converting, enriching, and fabricating fuel outside of Russian-controlled supply chains — and in ensuring Western utilities have long-term offtake agreements with Kazakh producers.
3.3a Titanium — The Overlooked Aerospace Play
Titanium rarely features in critical minerals analysis focused on Central Asia, yet Kazakhstan accounts for approximately 20% of the global aerospace-grade titanium market — a concrete, active commercial relationship, not a geological aspiration. This matters because aerospace titanium supply has been severely disrupted by the Russia sanctions regime: VSMPO-AVISMA, previously the dominant Western supplier accounting for roughly 30% of global aerospace titanium, became inaccessible to Western manufacturers after 2022. Boeing, Airbus, and their tier-one suppliers have been seeking alternative sources ever since. Kazakhstan’s existing market position fills part of that gap and has been doing so quietly while the policy debate concentrates on rare earths and lithium. Titanium is now on both the EU and US critical minerals lists. For investors and industrial offtake partners, the titanium story in Kazakhstan differs from the rare earth story in one crucial respect: the supply chain is already functioning. The opportunity is in expanding and securing existing capacity, not in building it from scratch.
3.4 Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan — Early-Stage, High-Risk, Potentially High-Reward
The CPC report and the C5+1 framework rightly include Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Kumtor Gold in Kyrgyzstan and Zarafshon Gold in Tajikistan are the flagship projects, but the rare earth and critical mineral potential in both countries is largely unexplored. Legal frameworks are weaker, infrastructure is thinner, and political risk is higher. But for investors and juniors willing to absorb early-stage risk, the geological endowment is compelling.
The legal reform chapter of the CPC report is a necessary reality check here. As Dr. Ruchan Kaya argues directly: No Reform, No Mining. Without clear subsoil use codes, transparent licensing, independent dispute resolution, and ESG frameworks compatible with Western capital markets, foreign investment will remain shallow. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have work to do.
3.5 Technology Transfer and Workforce Development
Central Asian governments are unanimous on one point: they do not want to be raw material exporters indefinitely. They want technology transfer, workforce development, and the creation of domestic industrial capacity. This creates a genuine market for mining engineering services, training, metallurgical technology, and environmental management expertise. European, Japanese, and South Korean companies with this expertise have an opening that pure extractive investors do not.
4. The Six-Party Chess Board: China, Russia, USA, EU, Türkiye, Japan/South Korea
China — The Incumbent with a Structural Advantage
China’s position in Central Asian critical minerals is not primarily about geology. It is about infrastructure, processing capacity, financing terms, and decades of relationship-building. The BRI has locked in logistical corridors, off-take agreements, and debt obligations that are difficult to unwind quickly. Chinese firms continue to invest at scale: Zijin Mining — now the world’s fourth-largest gold producer — has assembled a “Gold Triangle” across Kazakhstan (Raygorodok, $1.2 billion acquisition completed October 2025), Kyrgyzstan (Taldybulak Levoberezhny), and Tajikistan (Jilau and Taror mines, where it is the largest gold producer accounting for over 70% of national output). East Hope Group — one of China’s largest private industrial conglomerates and a top-ten global aluminium producer — is advancing a $12.6 billion fully integrated aluminium cluster in Kazakhstan: bauxite mining, a two million tonne per year alumina refinery, a one million tonne per year primary aluminium smelter, and a captive one-gigawatt power plant across the Kostanay and Aktobe regions. The framework agreement was signed with Astana in February 2025; geological exploration of eleven bauxite and coal deposits is already under way. If delivered, it would be one of the largest single foreign direct investment projects in Kazakhstan’s industrial history — and a textbook example of the integrated industrial model China deploys while Western investors are still circling at the MoU stage. China National Gold Group is advancing into Uzbekistan via government-level MoUs on exploration and technology transfer. Chinese cumulative investment in Central Asia reached $35.9 billion by mid-2025, a 1.5-fold increase since 2020, with Kazakhstan in the first half of 2025 alone attracting an estimated $23 billion in BRI-linked commitments — making it the single largest BRI capital recipient globally in that period. Any honest assessment must acknowledge that China will remain the dominant actor in Central Asian mineral supply chains throughout the 2020s.
The more important question is whether China’s dominance is vulnerable to a strategic discontinuity rather than gradual erosion. The CFR’s February 2026 report makes an argument that cuts against the grain of most current thinking: the United States cannot out-mine or out-process China, and attempting to do so is the wrong strategy. The correct approach is to leapfrog China’s dominance through innovation — scaling rare-earth-free magnets, mine tailings recovery, e-waste recycling, and AI-accelerated materials science. If this thesis is correct, the entire paradigm of building competing mine-to-magnet supply chains in Central Asia may be strategically secondary to the innovation race happening in US and allied laboratories. Central Asian governments and their Western partners should be alert to this possibility: the strategic premium on Central Asian deposits is real today, but it is not permanent if substitute materials technologies mature.
Russia — The Shadow Partner
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has paradoxically accelerated Central Asia’s strategic importance to the West while complicating its own position in the region. Central Asian governments are navigating with care — they cannot afford to antagonise Moscow, which retains significant economic and security leverage, but they are actively diversifying. Russia’s ability to invest in and benefit from Central Asian critical mineral development is constrained by sanctions, capital flight, and the rerouting of its own economy. For the near term, Russia’s role is more that of a constraint than a competitor in the Western engagement story.
United States — Urgency Without Sustained Patience
Washington’s engagement since 2025 has been substantive. Project Vault (a USD 12 billion public-private reserve initiative), FORGE (the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement), the Critical Minerals Ministerial with 54 countries, and the DFC’s Central Asia investment pipeline represent genuine institutional commitments. The C5+1 framework gives the US a multilateral architecture in the region.
However, it is important to understand what FORGE actually is — and what it is not. The Atlantic Council’s analysis makes a distinction that most coverage obscures: FORGE is structurally different from its predecessor, the Minerals Security Partnership. The MSP functioned primarily as a pooled investment co-ordination vehicle. FORGE is designed as a ‘membership by trade’ model — participation conditioned on adherence to shared market rules and price floors, rather than joint capital deployment. Investment remains bilateral. This means FORGE will not produce a multilateral investment fund for Kazakhstani or Uzbekistani mining projects. It will produce a shared pricing and trade architecture that in theory de-risks bilateral deals — but the capital mobilisation burden still falls on individual governments and DFIs acting separately. For Central Asian partners watching from Astana or Tashkent, this distinction matters enormously.
It is worth keeping the bilateral relationship in perspective: Kazakhstan has attracted more than $480 billion in cumulative foreign direct investment since independence, with gross FDI inflows reaching $20.5 billion in 2024 and investors from more than 120 countries currently active in the country. The US relationship is therefore being built onto an already diversified investment base, not into a vacuum. Kazakhstan signed USD 17 billion in new bilateral agreements with the US during President Tokayev’s November 2025 Washington visit, while Uzbekistan committed to investing up to USD 35 billion in the US over the next three years — directions of flow and deal structures that differ significantly, but which together signal that the C5+1 relationship has acquired genuine commercial weight. But commercial weight at the announcement stage and capital deployed in-country are different things.
The European Union — Engaged But Fragmented
The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act and the selection of 60 Strategic Projects — including Kazakhstan and Ukraine as external partner countries — represent a serious policy commitment. But the EUISS Chaillot Paper is damning on Europe’s pace of execution: American, Japanese, and particularly European diversification efforts are not on track to replace the volume or range of China-dominated production over the next decade.
The EU’s problem goes deeper than slow bureaucracy or fragmented financing instruments. As of late 2025, despite all the summits, roadmaps, and declared billions, only five EU companies have actually invested in CRM projects in Central Asia. That is not a financing gap problem — it is a near-total absence of private sector engagement. EU policy documents treat Central Asia as five countries of strategic importance; EU commercial reality has concentrated almost entirely on Kazakhstan, which is the only fully recognised EU external strategic partner with both the resource base and the legal framework for large-scale collaboration. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and even Uzbekistan remain largely outside the EU’s actual investment footprint despite featuring prominently in its diplomatic declarations. Brussels risks building an elaborate architecture of frameworks and roadmaps that covers five countries on paper but delivers in one.
Türkiye — The Underappreciated Swing Player
Türkiye’s role in Central Asian critical minerals deserves far more analytical attention than it currently receives. Ankara’s position as a NATO member, a pragmatic economic partner to both Russia and China, and the institutional convener of the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) gives it a combination of relationships that no other actor in this space possesses.
The OTS — which brings together Türkiye, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, and observer states — is an increasingly active institutional vehicle for economic co-operation amongst Turkic-speaking nations. For critical minerals specifically, it creates a framework for Türkiye to position itself not merely as a transit corridor but as a co-investor and processing ally for Central Asian governments that want to move up the value chain.
The strategic picture that emerges from available data is striking in its specificity. Türkiye’s mineral engagement operates across four distinct partner-and-material vectors:
Partner
Key Materials / Vectors
Türkiye’s Function
Central Asia
Boron, refined REEs, battery recyclables
Co-investor and institutional processing ally via the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS)
China
Manganese, chromium, lithium, copper
Supply chain alternative and competitor in REE midstream processing
Russia & Iran
Light and heavy rare earth oxides
Corridor guardian; bypassing northern routes via the Middle Corridor
Logistics vectors
Transport infrastructure, regional border security
Gateway and facilitator for Eurasian mineral freight flows
Read together, these vectors tell a coherent story. Türkiye is positioning itself simultaneously as a co-investor with Central Asian partners in boron and REE processing (leveraging the OTS institutional framework), as a competitive alternative to China in REE midstream capacity, and as the indispensable corridor guardian for the Middle Corridor route that bypasses both Russia and Iran.
What is new and underreported is the domestic industrial ambition underpinning this positioning. At the OECD Critical Minerals Forum in Istanbul in April 2026, Türkiye’s Energy and Natural Resources Minister Alparslan Bayraktar made a declaration that amounts to a strategic doctrine: “Having resources alone is no longer sufficient. You must be able to process them. Türkiye is building exactly that, combining extraction with deep processing capacity and high-tech industrial value creation.” The Beylikova REE project in Eskişehir province — described by Bayraktar as potentially one of the world’s largest deposits — already has a pilot facility operational, with plans for full industrial production including separation and processing of rare earth oxides for permanent magnets. A comprehensive Critical Raw Materials strategy is forthcoming from Ankara. This is not transit ambition. This is industrial policy.
The active Iran conflict and Hormuz disruption, which Bayraktar explicitly cited at the same forum, reinforces the Middle Corridor’s necessity. The corridor’s importance is no longer merely a response to the Ukraine war and the sanctioning of Russian routes — it is now being validated in real time by a second simultaneous crisis in maritime supply chains. Türkiye’s own boron endowment — approximately 73% of the world’s reserves — and the January 2026 mining sector MoU with Uzbekistan, which carries the weight of a presidential-level strategic council endorsement rather than a routine ministerial agreement, position Ankara as a co-architect of the post-Chinese supply chain rather than a passive transit facilitator.
The MINEX Asia Forum in Ankara on 24–25 June sits at exactly this intersection. Whether Türkiye chooses to deepen its processing and co-investment role, or remains primarily a corridor facilitator, will significantly shape the commercial geography of Central Asian mineral exports through 2030 and beyond.
Japan and South Korea — Quiet but Serious
Japan and South Korea have some of the most sophisticated critical mineral diversification programmes of any Western-aligned economies. Japan’s rare earth diversification after China’s 2010 export restriction was a decade-long institutional effort that produced real results. South Korea’s Korea Zinc committed USD 7.4 billion to new zinc refining in the US in 2025. Both countries are watching Central Asia closely and have existing relationships — South Korean companies are active in Kazakhstan’s energy and industrial sectors.
The EUISS paper notes that US and Japanese stockpiling and state-sponsored diversification efforts have been more successful than Europe’s — and that this risks disrupting the level playing field between downstream industries. Japan and South Korea’s engagement in Central Asia is likely to deepen significantly through 2030, and they may prove more reliable long-term partners than the US for the Central Asians, precisely because they have demonstrated institutional continuity in minerals diplomacy.
5. A 2030 Forecast: Honest Probabilities, Not Promotional Headlines
Based on the analysis above, the Forum’s assessment of where Central Asia is likely to stand in the global critical minerals picture by 2030 is as follows.
What Will Likely Have Happened
Kazakhstan will have advanced several significant critical mineral projects, particularly in uranium conversion and enrichment outside Russian supply chains, and in copper with one or two major Western-backed expansions. The Middle Corridor will carry materially higher volumes of goods, including mineral concentrates, with improved port and rail infrastructure — assuming the Georgia bottleneck is resolved, either through Tbilisi reversing course on Anaklia or through the TRIPP route becoming operational.
Uzbekistan will have attracted significant investment in gold and copper, building on its already-strong trajectory, and will have made progress on rare earth exploration, though commercial production at scale is unlikely before 2030.
Türkiye will have deepened its institutional role through the OTS and established at least one significant co-processing or co-investment arrangement with a Central Asian partner, most likely in boron derivatives or light rare earth oxides. The Beylikova project will have moved from pilot to initial industrial scale, giving Ankara credible processing capacity for the first time.
FORGE will have produced a shared pricing architecture and several concrete offtake agreements. However, because FORGE is a trade-rules framework rather than a pooled investment vehicle, the capital mobilisation it generates will be diffuse and bilateral rather than concentrated and strategic. The gap between FORGE’s institutional ambition and its actual investment footprint in Central Asia will remain a source of frustration.
Processing and refining capacity in Central Asia will have increased from its current low base, but will still represent a small fraction of what is needed to be genuinely China-independent. The midstream gap will have narrowed, not closed.
What Will Likely Not Have Happened
Central Asia will not have become a major supplier of processed rare earth materials to Western markets by 2030. The timeline from geological survey to commercial rare earth processing facility is typically fifteen to twenty years, and the clock has not been running long enough.
China’s dominance in processing will not have been broken. It may have been reduced at the margin — particularly for specific materials where Western-backed alternatives have been developed — but the structural advantage Beijing built over three decades cannot be unwound in five years.
A unified, coherent Western investment approach to Central Asia will not have materialised. The EU, US, Japan, South Korea, and Türkiye will continue to operate largely in parallel rather than in co-ordination, missing the synergies that a genuinely multilateral approach could generate.
The Wild Cards
Innovation as disruptor. The CFR’s February 2026 analysis argues that the US and its allies cannot out-mine or out-process China — and should not try. The alternative is to leapfrog China’s dominance through disruptive technologies: rare-earth-free magnets that eliminate the most geopolitically vulnerable inputs, mine tailings recovery that yields critical minerals from existing waste streams faster and more cheaply than new extraction, and e-waste recycling at industrial scale. If these technologies mature faster than expected, the strategic premium on Central Asian deposits could diminish even as geopolitical interest in the region remains high. For Central Asian governments, this is both a warning and an opportunity: the window in which their geological endowment commands maximum strategic attention may be narrower than current diplomatic momentum implies.
The China re-activation deadline. The October 2025 rare earth export controls suspended under the Xi–Trump deal are due to re-activate in November 2026 unless the deal is renewed. By the time of MINEX Eurasia in London on 30 November, this will be an immediate live issue. If Beijing re-activates, the urgency around alternative supply chains — including Central Asian ones — will intensify sharply. If it extends the suspension, the pressure on Western governments to maintain costly diversification programmes will ease, potentially slowing capital deployment.
Geopolitical escalation beyond Ukraine. The Hormuz blockade has already demonstrated that disruption can arrive simultaneously from multiple directions. Central Asia’s importance as both a resource base and a logistics corridor increases with every crisis in maritime routes. But escalation can also redirect capital and political attention away from the patient, long-horizon work of building supply chains.
Domestic political stability in Central Asia itself is not guaranteed. Kyrgyzstan in particular has experienced significant political turbulence. Investors will need to see sustained legal and regulatory reform to deploy long-term capital at scale.
Conclusion: The Window Is Open — But Not Indefinitely
Central Asia’s critical minerals moment is real. The geology is there. The geopolitical will is growing. The legal frameworks are improving in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The Middle Corridor is becoming a genuine alternative logistics route — though its Georgian gateway is more fragile than most analyses acknowledge. And for the first time in a generation, Central Asian governments are actively seeking to diversify away from exclusive dependence on Chinese and Russian capital and markets.
But the picture is more complicated than the wave of optimistic policy documents suggests. FORGE is a trade-rules architecture, not a capital deployment machine — and the distinction matters for Central Asia. The EU has five companies on the ground despite its ambitious declarations. China’s export control détente has a hard expiry date in November 2026. And the CFR’s innovation thesis raises a genuinely uncomfortable question: what if the West’s best path to supply chain security runs through the laboratory rather than the mine shaft?
Türkiye’s OTS-anchored positioning adds a genuinely new dimension to this picture. An Ankara that is actively building REE processing capacity at Beylikova, institutionalising economic co-operation through the OTS, and serving as the corridor’s most reliable western terminus is not a passive transit hub. It is a co-architect of the post-Chinese critical mineral supply chain — if it chooses to be.
The businesses and investors who will win in this space are not those signing MoUs at ministerial summits. They are those who are currently doing the detailed geological work, building the processing partnerships, securing the offtake agreements, and positioning in the Middle Corridor logistics chain. They are thinking in fifteen-year horizons, not fifteen-month ones.
At MINEX Asia in Ankara, MINEX Europe in Ireland, and MINEX Eurasia in London, the Forum is convening these conversations — not about what Central Asia might become, but about what concrete steps, in what sequence, with what capital and what institutions, will make the difference between another wave of declarations and a genuine reorientation of global critical mineral supply chains.
The rocks are there. The question is whether the will, the capital, and the institutions are there too — and whether they will arrive before the window closes.
Central Asia and Mongolia will remain resilient to geopolitical shocks and record the highest growth rates of the EBRD countries of operation in 2026 and 2027, according to the latest Regional Economic Prospects report published on 3 June 2026, by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The combined economies of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan are projected to grow by 5.6% in 2026 and 5.3% in 2027.
These are compelling headline figures. Yet beneath them lies a more consequential story—one that the OECD’s March 2026 report, Advancing Security and Transparency for the Governance of Critical Raw Materials in Central Asia, articulates with rare precision: the region is not merely growing; it is repositioning itself at the very heart of the global critical raw materials race.
The mining sector is no longer a background variable in Central Asia’s development story. It is the plot itself.
MINEX Asia 2026 is where it gets real. Join EBRD and OECD peers presenting on Kazakhstan’s scale, Tajikistan’s green pivot, Uzbekistan’s processing ambitions—and the governance gaps that determine success.
The Regional Narrative: Resilience With Structural Depth
Growth prospects remain robust but are increasingly dependent on the pace of domestic reforms and efforts to strengthen resilience to external shocks. Strong domestic consumption, rising real wages, and robust capital investment are real. But so are the fault lines: downside risks include energy price volatility, supply-chain disruptions, economic sanctions, and slower growth in the region’s largest trading and economic partners, Russia and China.
The OECD note adds a structural dimension that the growth forecasts alone cannot convey. Central Asia’s substantial yet untapped resource base, combined with its location between major markets in Europe and Asia, raises the region’s relevance in CRM geopolitics and efforts to diversify global supply chains. This is a geostrategic statement. The region holds extraordinary assets: Kazakhstan, already the world’s largest producer of uranium, produces and processes around twenty of the 34 CRMs included on the European Union’s official list. The Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan both host some of the world’s largest antimony reserves. Uzbekistan possesses some of the largest copper reserves globally and is advancing lithium and molybdenum production.
Taken together, these endowments amount to a critical minerals portfolio of exceptional strategic depth. Whether the region can translate that portfolio into durable prosperity is the central question of the coming decade.
Country by Country: Where the Headlines Don’t Tell the Full Story
Tajikistan: Gold and Strategic Minerals
Tajikistan: Gold and Strategic Minerals
Tajikistan’s economic performance continues to confound those who underestimate it. In March 2026, Moody’s upgraded Tajikistan’s sovereign credit rating to B2 with a stable outlook, citing the country’s continued economic resilience. The EBRD projects growth easing to 7.9 per cent in 2026 — still remarkable for a landlocked, remittance-dependent economy navigating elevated regional volatility.
The mining dimension is crucial. Gold remains the cornerstone of export revenue and fiscal stability, and Tajikistan’s antimony sector is poised for a structural step-change. Tajikistan possesses the world’s second largest antimony reserves, and China’s effective ban on antimony exports to the US and EU provides a significant window of opportunity. Together, France and Belgium accounted for 77% of Tajikistan’s antimony exports in 2024. With TALCO nearing completion of a new antimony metallurgical plant, Dushanbe is finally beginning to capture processing value rather than simply shipping raw material.
But what I find most intriguing about Tajikistan’s trajectory is the emerging convergence of green energy and artificial intelligence with its mining ambitions. The Rogun Hydropower Project — set to have an annual capacity of over 3,600 megawatts once fully operational — would cover most of Tajikistan’s domestic consumption and create the conditions for green aluminium production, with approximately 70 per cent of output earmarked for export to Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Cheap, clean electricity is not merely an industrial asset — it is the foundation for competitive mining, smelting, and increasingly, data infrastructure.
Tajikistan has initiated groundbreaking infrastructure projects, including the launch of “Area AI” — the world’s first dedicated AI Zone — a technopark and cluster designed to serve as a hub for research, development, and application of AI technologies. The country has forged partnerships with international tech firms including Perplexity AI, Google DeepMind, Yotta and Presight to accelerate technology transfer and innovation. The government has declared 2025–2030 the “Years of Digital Economy and Innovation Development.” Taken alongside the Rogun-powered industrial ambitions, this is Tajikistan’s bid to become not just a minerals supplier but a genuinely integrated green industrial economy — using AI and clean energy together to escape the extractive trap.
The key vulnerability remains Tajikistan’s dependence on Russia, where a slowdown would depress the remittance inflows that underpin household incomes. That risk is real and should not be minimised. But the strategic direction of travel is clear — and it is more ambitious than most Western observers appreciate.
Kyrgyzstan: The Kumtor Imperative and Exploration Needs
Kyrgyzstan remains the region’s most dramatic case study in resource-dependent growth. Kumtor Gold Company — nationalised in 2022 after nearly three decades of Canadian stewardship — generated net profit exceeding USD 706 million in 2025, contributes 10–15 per cent of GDP, and represents nearly two-thirds of the country’s mineral exports. The March 2025 discovery of an additional 147 tonnes of gold reserves extended the mine’s productive life to at least another 17 years.
Underground mining operations, launched in August 2025, are transformative. At current gold prices hovering above USD 4,500 per ounce, Kumtor’s economics are exceptional — and the government’s plan to process tailings estimated to contain over 100 tonnes of gold adds further upside. Fixed capital investment rose by 25.5 per cent year on year thanks to strong investment in infrastructure, energy and housing.
Yet the near-term outlook has darkened. The European Union’s 20th sanctions package, announced in late April, restricts exports of dual-use goods to Kyrgyzstan and tightens controls on its financial and logistics sectors. The EBRD has revised its 2026 growth forecast down to 8.7 per cent as a result. This is a significant geopolitical constraint on what would otherwise be an exceptionally strong growth story — and it underscores the OECD’s broader finding that regulatory unpredictability and governance gaps impose real costs on the region’s investment attractiveness.
The OECD note also flags a structural vulnerability that sits beneath the Kumtor euphoria: limited exploration since independence means that the Kumtor mine, accounting for 90% of the Kyrgyz gold exports, is set to close in 2031 due to reserves depletion — and the lack of exploration since independence will make it harder to offset this decline quickly. The reserve discovery of 2025 has bought time but not resolved the underlying fragility.
Kazakhstan: Scale, Strategy, and Industrial Output
Kazakhstan’s mining profile is defined by scale and global strategic significance. The country holds the world’s largest chromium reserves, accounts for roughly 40 per cent of global uranium output, and produces massive quantities of refined copper, largely exported to major industrial buyers like China and Türkiye.
Graphite is a high-potential sector for Kazakhstan. With the exploitation of its Sarytogan deposit — added to the EU’s list of strategic raw material projects and reported to contain 30% of the world’s graphite reserves — Kazakhstan is expecting to become a crucial player on the world graphite market.
The tungsten story is equally striking. Kazakhstan holds roughly 2 million tonnes of tungsten resources out of approximately 3.6 million tonnes of global reserves. A joint venture between Kazakhstan’s Tau-Ken Samruk and US-based Cove Kaz Capital Group has been formed to develop the Severniy Katpar tungsten project, with the US International Development Finance Corporation issuing Letters of Interest for up to USD 700 million in potential financing — marking Washington’s most significant entry yet into the region’s critical minerals sector.
Yet the near-term picture carries a real cautionary note. In Kazakhstan, the extractive industry contracted by 11.4 per cent year on year in Q1 2026 following disruptions to the Caspian Pipeline Consortium pipeline and an incident at the Tengiz oil field. The EBRD projects Kazakhstan’s GDP growth moderating to 4.7 per cent in 2026 and 4.5 per cent in 2027 — the lowest in the region, reflecting the inherent vulnerability of commodity-led economies to infrastructure and logistics shocks.
Uzbekistan: The Ambitious Reformer
Uzbekistan’s ambitions deserve particular attention. The country is the world’s fifth-largest uranium supplier, a top-ten gold producer, and is rapidly positioning itself as a critical minerals investment destination. Uzbekistan has actively signed Memorandums of Understanding with Western partners, including the United States, for securing supply chains in the mining and processing of Critical Minerals and Rare Earths. The government has also launched massive industrial initiatives to bolster its critical minerals sector.
The Almalyk Mining and Metallurgical Complex (AMMC) and its specialised subsidiaries targeting tungsten, molybdenum, rhenium, lithium, and graphite signal a genuine strategic shift from raw extraction towards value-added processing. Whether governance and transparency standards keep pace with ambition will be the decisive variable.
The Structural Challenge: From Resource Extraction to Value Creation
Both the EBRD and the OECD converge on a single, uncomfortable truth: Central Asia’s growth is impressive, but its mining sectors remain structurally exposed. The OECD note identifies several systemic vulnerabilities that macro-growth figures obscure.
On reserves reporting: Most countries still operate on Soviet-era GKZ classification systems that differ fundamentally from international CRIRSCO standards — creating information asymmetries that deter sophisticated investors and complicate due diligence. Kazakhstan has made progress through its KAZRC system; other regional peers have barely started.
On foreign investment dynamics: Foreign actors, predominantly Chinese, actively invest in Central Asia’s mining industry. China has been a primary investor in the mining sectors of the Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan, and is increasing its presence in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, not only by investing in extraction facilities but also by supporting the development of initial processing capabilities. This creates a strong strategic dependency that the region’s governments are increasingly aware of — and that Western partners, including the EU, UK, and US, are now actively looking to balance through alternative commercial partnerships.
On the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR): Traffic along the corridor (the Middle Corridor) has increased dramatically as exporters seek reliable East–West trade alternatives. Kazakhstan in particular has long relied on the corridor for its mineral, chemical, and agricultural exports, with a substantial portion of its uranium exports to Western markets utilising this bypass route. This corridor is central to the region’s ability to diversify export markets.
On ESG and governance: The OECD is frank: mining in the region is still heavily influenced by large state-owned enterprises with overlapping regulatory and commercial roles, needing stronger occupational health and safety oversight and remediation of legacy environmental risks. These are not peripheral concerns — they are the conditions on which Western investment and international supply chain partnerships will ultimately be conditioned.
The Strategic Opportunity
The OECD projects global demand for many critical raw materials to increase multifold over the coming decades to meet the needs of the green and digital transitions. Central Asia sits atop a significant share of the reserves that will need to come online to meet that demand. The region holds massive global shares of manganese ore, chromium, lead, zinc, titanium, aluminium, copper, cobalt, and molybdenum.
That is an extraordinary endowment. Translating it into durable prosperity requires three things that remain in genuinely short supply across the region: transparent governance, world-class ESG practice, and the institutional capacity to negotiate from strength with both regional and global partners.
This is precisely why platforms like the MINEX Forum matter. The conversation between producers, investors, policymakers, and development finance institutions that happens at these gatherings is not peripheral to the critical minerals agenda. It is where the terms of engagement are shaped.
Conclusion: Cautious Optimism, Clear Conditions
The EBRD’s projection of robust regional growth is credible. The OECD’s assessment of the region’s critical minerals potential is genuinely exciting. But both institutions are equally clear-eyed about the conditions that must be met for that potential to be realised responsibly.
Central Asia’s mining sectors are not simply economic contributors. They are strategic assets in the most consequential industrial transformation of our era. Their management — balancing extraction with environmental stewardship, concentrating revenue into productive capital formation, building institutional capacity, and securing diversified partnerships — will determine whether current growth translates into sustainable prosperity or rehearses the resource curse that has constrained other commodity-rich regions.
The next chapter will be written in mining offices, government ministries, and international forums across Dushanbe, Bishkek, Astana, Tashkent, and Ulaanbaatar. We should be not merely watching — we should be in the room.
References:
Central Asia and Mongolia to see highest economic growth in the EBRD regions
Arthur Poliakov is the Managing Director of the United Kingdom-based company Advantix Ltd and the Executive Chairman and founder of the MINEX Forum. He has over 30 years of experience in international business communications, event management, and natural resource markets.
He is currently organising the upcoming 12th MINEX Asia Forum (24–25 June 2026, Ankara, Turkey), the 10th MINEX Europe Forum (28–30 October 2026, Trim, Ireland), and the 14th MINEX Eurasia Conference (30 November 2026, London, United Kingdom).
China’s East Hope Group, one of the world’s largest producers of electrolytic aluminium and alumina, is progressing plans for a colossal $12.6 billion investment in Kazakhstan’s aluminium sector, according to the country’s Ministry of Industry and Construction.
Kazakhstan’s Industry and Construction Minister Yersayin Nagaspayev held discussions with Chen Lei, East Hope Group’s Director for Strategic Investments. The two sides discussed establishing a full-cycle aluminium cluster within Kazakhstan, spanning the entire process from bauxite extraction through to primary aluminium output.
Nagaspayev emphasised that full-cycle production projects are in keeping with Kazakhstan’s state industrial policy, which is geared towards deeper processing and the manufacture of high-value-added goods.
The talks also covered the project’s current status, the formation of a raw materials base, and the development of production capacity and industrial cooperation. The company is currently undertaking geological exploration across multiple blocks in the Aktobe and Kostanay regions. The broader vision encompasses the development of 11 bauxite and coal deposits across the Kostanay and Aktobe regions, with the project expected to generate approximately 10,000 jobs once fully operational. KursivThe Times Of Central Asia
The initiative has been gathering momentum since February 2025, when East Hope registered a subsidiary in Kazakhstan to serve as the project’s principal operational centre. An investment framework agreement was subsequently signed between East Hope and the Kazakh government. The Times Of Central AsiaMysteel
As part of the scheme, East Hope Group intends to construct a 1-gigawatt coal-fired power station in the Kostanay region, whilst also exploring potential renewable energy ventures. The project is designed around circular economy principles, with the aim of creating a complete production cycle for green aluminium products. Qazaqgreen
Both parties reaffirmed their commitment to advancing the project and strengthening investment cooperation.
A MINEX Forum Production: Escaping the Green Resource Curse in Central Asia
Welcome to this special deep-dive podcast episode, brought to you by the MINEX Forum. This episode is based on the groundbreaking research article, “Central Asia as New Battle Grounds: Critical Mineral Strategies of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan,” authored by Younkyoo Kim, Lyailya Ivatova, Sujin Kang, and Yerden Ordabek.
Whether you are driving an electric vehicle in Europe, using a smartphone in the USA, installing solar panels in Australia, or relying on advanced semiconductors in South Korea, your daily life depends on an invisible, highly concentrated global supply chain. This introductory long-read breaks down the complex science and geopolitics of critical minerals, revealing why the true battleground for the future of green technology isn’t in the mines—it’s in the midstream.
The “Hourglass” Supply Chain and the Green Resource Curse
As the world accelerates its transition away from fossil fuels, the demand for critical minerals like lithium, cobalt, nickel, and rare earth elements is skyrocketing. However, a severe structural imbalance threatens the stability of this green revolution.
While the extraction of these minerals happens all over the globe, the capability to refine and process them is heavily monopolized. The global supply chain resembles an “hourglass,” where raw materials from dozens of countries flow into a tiny number of refining bottlenecks—predominantly in China, which controls 85% to 90% of the processing capacity for key elements like rare earths, lithium, and cobalt.
For resource-rich developing nations, this creates a dangerous trap known as the “green resource curse”
. Just as oil and gas historically led to corruption, economic volatility, and environmental damage in some nations, the rush for green minerals risks repeating the cycle
. Developing countries bear the heavy environmental and social burdens of mining, only to export low-value raw ores
. They are entirely excluded from the lucrative “midstream” stages—smelting, refining, and chemical separation—meaning they must ultimately buy back expensive, finished green technologies manufactured elsewhere.
The New Battlegrounds: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan
Central Asia has emerged as a crucial “third zone” capable of disrupting these bottlenecks and offering a more secure supply chain to the world. But Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are no longer content to simply dig dirt out of the ground; they are fighting for “midstream sovereignty” to capture the actual value of their natural resources.
Kazakhstan’s “New Oil” Kazakhstan, already a dominant force in global uranium production, is treating its vast rare earth element deposits as its “new oil”. The country holds massive potential, such as the Kuirektykol deposit which holds an estimated 28.2 million tons of rare earths. However, separating rare earth elements into high-purity industrial materials requires incredibly complex precision technology. To bridge this technological gap, Kazakhstan is rapidly attracting Chinese capital—recently launching a $300 million tungsten processing plant—while simultaneously courting Western nations and South Korea to avoid becoming entirely dependent on Beijing’s vertically integrated supply chains. Uzbekistan’s $2.6 Billion Masterplan Uzbekistan is taking a highly centralized, state-driven approach. The government has consolidated its critical mineral assets under a new entity, the Uzbekistan Technological Metals Complex (UzTMK), and launched a massive $2.6 billion investment program covering 76 different projects. Remarkably, Uzbekistan is also building its own domestic electric vehicle manufacturing base, partnering with companies like BYD to ensure that the minerals they extract can be used in factories right at home. To make its products attractive to strict Western markets, Uzbekistan is pioneering eco-friendly processing methods, such as a closed-loop system for molybdenum that slashes chemical emissions.
A New Model for Partnership
As Central Asia attempts to climb the value chain, it faces competing models of global partnership. The Chinese Model offers incredibly fast infrastructure development and capital, but threatens to lock Central Asian processing into China’s broader monopolies, stifling domestic technological independence. The Western Model (US & EU) focuses heavily on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) compliance and supply chain transparency. However, Western initiatives often emphasize financial de-risking over the actual transfer of the complex refining technologies these nations desperately need.
This gap has created an opening for an alternative approach, championed by middle powers like South Korea. Because South Korea is highly reliant on mineral imports (procuring over 82% of key battery minerals from China), it is highly motivated to help Central Asia succeed. Rather than just providing cash or demanding regulatory compliance, South Korea is utilizing a “Process-Embedded Industrial Partnership Model”. Through initiatives like the Uzbek-Korea Rare Metals Center, South Korea is actively transferring laboratory skills, high-purity separation techniques, and process engineering knowledge directly to the local workforce.
Why This Matters to You
The fight for midstream processing in Central Asia is not just a regional economic issue; it is the linchpin of global clean energy security. Escaping the green resource curse is the only way these nations can achieve sustainable industrialization, and diversifying the refining bottlenecks is the only way everyday consumers can rely on a stable, affordable supply of electric vehicles and renewable energy in the decades to come. Hit play on the podcast to listen to our hosts dive deeper into the strategies, the science, and the high-stakes geopolitical chess game defining the future of the global energy transition.
The MINEX Forum team is delighted to participate in the upcoming Uzbekistan–Turkey Business Forum on 5 May at the Hilton Hotel. This event serves as a vital precursor to our broader regional discussions, focusing on concrete industrial proposals and joint investment ventures.
The forum is a collaborative effort between OSTIM, the Ministry of Mining Industry and Geology of Uzbekistan, and TMK. It offers a deep dive into Uzbekistan’s ambitious industrial roadmap, specifically focusing on critical minerals and deep processing.
Key highlights include presentations on:
The R&D Park for critical minerals.
Technopark initiatives for high-value metal processing.
Graphtech’s latest mining developments.
Our representatives will be on the ground to discuss how these initiatives align with the broader goals of value creation and regional connectivity that we champion at MINEX. We invite our colleagues and partners to join us for a day of high-level networking and strategic planning.
Minespider, a leading traceability and Digital Product Passport (DPP) platform, and TETHYS Trans-Eurasian Gateway, a company specializing in bridging European technologies to mining projects in Turkey and Central Asia, announce the first Digital Product Passport (DPP) implemented at the Çataltepe Mining Project, marking a significant milestone in the digital transformation of the critical minerals sector.
This is one of the first implementations of the Digital Product Passport in mining sites in Central Asia and Turkiye, which now positions Çataltepe as a pioneering project in the region’s transition toward transparent and traceable critical minerals supply chains.
Following a collaboration that began in May 2025, the two companies launched a Digital Product Passport (DPP) pilot at the Çataltepe Polymetallic mine located in the Dardanelles (Çanakkale) in Turkey. The traceability project, including capturing and linking data of origin, processing, and ESG indicators, is planned to be introduced across the entire supply chain – from the Çataltepe Mine based in Lapseki, Çanakkale to the Yenice Flotation Plant, and finally to export.
A New Standard for Critical Minerals Transparency
The Digital Product Passport is a dynamic digital record that captures verified data across the full lifecycle of a product—from raw material extraction to end-of-life. The system will provide a transparent chain of custody for each shipment of lead concentrate, zinc concentrate and copper concentrate from the Çataltepe polymetallic mine, with the expected volumes of ~15,000 tonnes of ore processed monthly, yielding 1,000–1,200 tonnes of concentrate output. The introduction of Digital Product Passports will consolidate reporting, improve efficiency, and enhance trust with downstream customers and will help to ensure compliance with international regulations such as the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) and the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA).
Driving Accountability Across the Critical Minerals Value Chain
Digital Product Passports are rapidly becoming a cornerstone of the global transition toward sustainable and accountable supply chains. They enable the collection and sharing of product data across the entire value chain, closing information gaps and enhancing decision-making.
Leyla Keser, Chairperson of TETHYS, stated:
“At TETHYS, we define accountability not as an abstract principle, but as a measurable and traceable reality across the entire value chain. With the Çataltepe Digital Product Passport, we are embedding transparency at the very origin of critical minerals—where trust must begin. This is not only a technological milestone, but a strategic step toward aligning our region with global standards, strengthening responsible sourcing, and positioning Greater Central Asia, Türkiye, and the Balkans as reliable and future-ready partners in the global critical minerals supply chain.”
Nathan Williams, Founder & CEO of Minespider, said:
“We are entering a new phase where mineral supply chains must be not only efficient, but also transparent and verifiable by design. Each shipment can be traced back to its origin, with verified data on production and ESG parameters. This is a critical step toward enabling trusted, data-driven mineral supply chains that meet emerging regulatory requirements and industry expectations. We are proud that the Çataltepe project creates a new benchmark for sustainable mining projects in the region.”
About Tethys
Tethys operates across Greater Central Asia, Türkiye, and the Balkans, focusing on critical minerals, infrastructure, and sustainable value chains. Through its integrated approach, Tethys combines investment, technology, and ESG principles to deliver accountable, scalable, and future-oriented projects across strategic regions.
Minespider is a leading European mineral traceability platform, trusted by global companies including Microvast, Renault, Minsur, TEMSA, PTL, Ford Otosan, and Tata Elxsi. Its blockchain-based system provides secure, transparent data sharing across supply chains in Digital Product Passports (DPPs) and Digital Battery Passports (DBPs) to support compliance and sustainability from mine to manufacturer.
For more information about Minespider, please email marketing@minespider.com or visit our website at www.minespider.com.
Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan together hold some of the world’s most significant reserves of critical raw materials, yet systemic governance failures, outdated infrastructure and weak regulatory frameworks are preventing the region from capitalising on a once-in-a-generation opportunity, according to a new report from the OECD.
Published in March 2026 and funded by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, the report — Advancing Security and Transparency for the Governance of Critical Raw Materials in Central Asia — warns that despite the region’s enormous mineral wealth, investment remains constrained by unreliable geological data, dominant state-owned enterprises and a history of disputes with foreign investors.
Central Asia holds 39% of global manganese ore reserves, 31% of chromium, 20% of lead, 13% of zinc, and significant shares of titanium, aluminium, copper, cobalt and molybdenum. Kazakhstan alone — already the world’s largest uranium producer, accounting for 40% of global output — can export 21 of the 34 critical raw materials on the EU’s official list. The Kyrgyz Republic holds the world’s third-largest antimony reserves, a resource now in sharp focus following China’s export ban on the mineral. Uzbekistan, meanwhile, ranks eleventh globally for copper reserves and has begun developing lithium and molybdenum production.
On responsible business conduct, the OECD found that awareness of international standards is growing across all three countries, but that implementation remains patchy. Mining sectors in each nation are dominated by a small number of state-owned enterprises, some of which play quasi-regulatory roles — creating conflicts of interest where ministry officials simultaneously hold positions in the companies they are supposed to oversee. Corruption in public procurement and a lack of transparency continue to erode trust between governments, investors and local communities. The report notes that affected populations are frequently excluded from consultations about the risks and impacts of mining operations, with no clear guidelines on compensation or resettlement.
Environmental risk management presents a further challenge. While all three countries have adopted economy-wide strategies to cut greenhouse gas emissions, the OECD found these lack sector-specific mining targets. Water pollution, land degradation and hazardous waste — including the management of legacy Soviet-era tailings storage facilities with radioactive contamination risks — remain inadequately addressed in national frameworks.
On taxation, the report identifies serious vulnerabilities to Base Erosion and Profit Shifting practices, including the under-pricing of mineral exports between related parties, uncommercial intra-group financing arrangements and offshore indirect transfers of mining licences that allow capital gains to escape domestic taxation altogether. While all three governments are gradually aligning their tax frameworks with international standards, legislative loopholes continue to allow legal profit-shifting that undermines public revenues.
The OECD calls on governments across the region to modernise reserves reporting systems, strengthen the separation between state ownership and regulatory functions, introduce mining-specific environmental targets, and close tax loopholes through closer alignment with BEPS standards. With global demand for critical minerals forecast to rise sharply in the coming years, the report frames these reforms not merely as governance improvements, but as the essential foundation for attracting the foreign investment needed to unlock the region’s full economic potential.
