The Kyrgyz Embassy in Washington has opened a formal call for partners on the Soviet Union’s old rare-earth mine. The heavy-element split is the reason to look; the licence history is the reason to look carefully.
The Embassy of the Kyrgyz Republic to the United States has invited mining companies, processing groups, technology providers and investors to explore cooperation with State Enterprise Kyrgyzgeology on Kutessay II, the past-producing rare-earth deposit in the Kemin district of Chuy region. The Embassy and Kyrgyzgeology will jointly host an online briefing and question session on 24 November at 09:00 Washington time – 20:00 in Bishkek. Attendance is optional; the project presentation and supporting documents are available to any interested company, with expressions of interest registered through the Embassy’s registration form..
The approach to American industry follows the package Bishkek took to London earlier this year, when the UK government’s Growth Gateway published investment notes on Kutessay II alongside the Kalesay beryllium deposit and the North Aktash antimony–gold–fluorite project. All three licences sit with Kyrgyzgeology under the presidential decree of January 2024.
A restart, not a discovery
Kutessay II was found in 1943 and explored through two campaigns, reclassified as the Soviet production profile shifted – polymetallic, then thorium, then, on the instruction of the USSR Ministry of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy in 1957, rare earths. Production began in 1958, underground for two years and by open pit from 1960. From 1966 until closure the mine ran as a rare-earth polymetallic operation, recovering lead, molybdenum, silver and bismuth alongside the rare earths.
Ore was milled at the Aktyuz plant about a kilometre from the pit. Rare-earth concentrate went roughly 45 km to the Kyrgyz Chemical Metallurgical Plant at Orlovka, lead concentrate to Shymkent and molybdenum to Balkhash. For nearly three decades that chain supplied around 80% of Soviet rare-earth output, in as many as 120 finished products – oxides, metals and alloys of all the lanthanides at purities up to 99.99%. Mining stopped in 1991 and the operation was placed on care and maintenance, formally in 1995.
Two sets of numbers
Anyone modelling the asset will meet two reserve estimates built on different foundations, and the distinction matters. The Soviet-lineage figures, recorded on the Kyrgyz State Balance and traceable to GKZ Protocol No. 2678 of 1959 as revised by the Kyrgyz Territorial Reserves Commission in 1995, show some 20.2 million tonnes of ore carrying about 51,500 tonnes of total rare-earth oxide in categories B+C1+C2 at grades of 0.22–0.27%, with a further 16.4 million tonnes and 11,800 tonnes of oxide sitting off-balance.
The JORC estimate prepared in 2011 by Kazakhstan Mineral Company for the then licence holder reports 42,980 tonnes of total rare-earth oxide in 16.27 million tonnes of measured and indicated ore at 0.26%, plus 3,560 tonnes inferred at 0.20%. The two are not in conflict – the JORC number is the more conservative subset, drawn on cut-off parameters a Western financier will recognise – but a reader who lifts 51,500 tonnes from one document and the 0.26% grade from another will build the wrong model.
The basket is the story
Tonnage is not what distinguishes Kutessay II. At 0.26% total rare-earth oxide the deposit is low-grade against the bastnäsite carbonatites that dominate world supply. Its claim rests on distribution.
Heavy rare earths account for 46.1% of the contained basket, against 52.3% light – close to parity, where the large Chinese and American carbonatite mines run nearer nine to one in favour of the lights. Yttrium alone is 26.7% of the basket. Dysprosium is 6.1%, terbium 1.6%, neodymium 8.2% and praseodymium 3.8%. Terbium and dysprosium are the constrained elements in sintered neodymium-iron-boron magnets – the additions that hold coercivity at the temperatures a traction motor actually runs at – and they are precisely where Chinese export licensing has bitten hardest. The project presentation names terbium, dysprosium, praseodymium and neodymium as the foundation of the business case, and on the geology that is the right place to put the weight.
The mineralogy is correspondingly awkward. Rare earths at Kutessay II are carried across monazite, xenotime, fluocerite, yttrofluorite, yttroparisite, yttrobastnäsite, yttrosynchysite, ferrithorite, zirconolite and malacon, finely disseminated through eight distinct ore types that the Soviets treated as separate beneficiation problems. The recoveries achieved – at least 63.5% of total rare earths into concentrate, 70% for yttrium – are modest, and are among the more candid figures in the pack. Thorium travels with the ore in ferrithorite and monazite; neither document addresses radionuclide handling, and a Western-financed restart will have to.
The infrastructure is the strongest card
The most persuasive part of the case has nothing to do with geology. The pit is intact. The Aktyuz beneficiation plant stands adjacent to it. The Orlovka separation plant – which ran at about 500 tonnes a year of finished product, and which the Soviet Union had started but never finished expanding to 1,500 tonnes – is 45 km away; an equipment assessment cited from Stans Energy’s 2013 filings found 97% of its rare-earth processing equipment in good or satisfactory condition, with 3% needing repair. Power reaches the mine on a 110 kV line, water comes from the Kichi-Kemin, and the railhead is 43 km distant. The Kalesay beryllium deposit, holding 11,700 tonnes of beryllium oxide, lies a few hundred metres away and can be developed on the same infrastructure, while five tailings sites at Aktyuz and Orlovka hold a further 5,700 tonnes of rare-earth oxide. Outside China, very little of this exists anywhere.
The economics, and a gap in them
The indicative business case carries capital expenditure of about US$400 million. The Growth Gateway note puts the return at 10%, against 22% for Kalesay and 36% for North Aktash on roughly $34 million – making Kutessay II the weakest of the three Kyrgyz projects on paper, and the one most dependent on where terbium and dysprosium prices sit when it comes on stream.
Mine life needs care. The presentation states 20 years. The Soviet-era reference material, working from the 1992 reserve statement at a plant throughput of 300,000 tonnes a year, implies 40 years within the designed pit boundary and 67 years on the full balance, with exploration below the 2,213 m level expected to add another 10 million tonnes of ore. Those are not the same project, and the pack does not explain the difference.
The question every board will ask first
Kutessay II was held from 2009 by Kutisay Mining LLC, acquired by Toronto-listed Stans Energy, which also bought the Orlovka plant and commissioned the JORC report. The licence was revoked in 2012 after a parliamentary committee concluded the acquisition had been tainted; Bishkek alleged the rights were obtained through bribery. Stans pursued the Republic first through a Moscow Chamber of Commerce tribunal, which awarded $118 million in 2014 – an award subsequently set aside – and then under UNCITRAL rules, where a tribunal chaired by Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel awarded roughly $24 million including interest and costs in August 2019, about 6% of the claim.
The presentation’s timeline records the Stans period and moves on. It does not mention the arbitration. The omission is conspicuous rather than concealing – the record is public and the counterparty knows it – but a promoter seeking $400 million of foreign equity is better served meeting that history directly than leaving it to the data room.
Why Washington, and why now
The timing is not accidental. American engagement with Central Asian critical minerals has accelerated since the C5+1 summit of November 2025, with a government-to-government memorandum signed with Kazakhstan and, in February, an implementation framework with Uzbekistan involving the US International Development Finance Corporation. Kyrgyzstan has a critical minerals memorandum with the United Kingdom and is discussing with London the adoption of English common-law protections and independent arbitration for investment disputes – a reform aimed squarely at the credibility problem the Stans case created. Domestically, Resolution No. 347 of June 2025 permits subsoil licences to be issued without competitive tender, which removes process risk for a negotiated partner and raises governance questions for everyone else. Chinese interest in the deposit was reported as recently as January 2025.
For the Eurasian mining sector the significance is as much in the method as in the asset. Bishkek is running a documented, English-language investor process on a named deposit, with a state licence holder, a published business case and a stated intention to align with IFC Performance Standards, the Equator Principles, EITI, IRMA and the ICMM principles. Whether $400 million finds its way to Kemin will turn on metallurgy and on whether a partner believes the licence will hold. The packaging, at least, is a long way from where Kyrgyz asset promotion stood five years ago.
The Embassy and Kyrgyzgeology briefing takes place on 24 November 2026 at 09:00 Washington, D.C. time / 20:00 Bishkek. Project materials and registration for the briefing are available through the Embassy’s registration form.

