Researchers at Germany’s Fraunhofer Research Institution for Energy Infrastructures and Geotechnologies have begun developing a mobile lithium extraction plant designed to recover the metal from deep geothermal brines beneath the North German Basin — a geological formation estimated to hold one of Europe’s largest lithium resources.
The work is being carried out under the RoLiXX project, a $3.2 million initiative supported by the German Federal Ministry of Research, Technology and Space, involving Fraunhofer IEG and several academic and industry partners. The target is the Rotliegend — a 300-million-year-old layer of sandstone and volcanic rock several miles below the surface — whose geothermal waters are considered highly promising for lithium extraction. Estimates suggest the basin’s underground reserves could contain up to 1.27 trillion tonnes of lithium equivalent.
The project aims to create a dual-use model in which geothermal heat production and lithium recovery happen simultaneously, allowing operators of existing geothermal facilities to extract lithium without disrupting power generation. The pilot system has been deliberately designed for mobility: it weighs approximately 250 kilograms, occupies roughly two cubic metres and can be transported by van or forklift directly to geothermal sites.
A central engineering challenge is preventing corrosion and mineral buildup inside the extraction system, which the team is addressing through an adaptive plant capable of adjusting process parameters and chemical additives based on the local thermal water composition. The system also employs a solid-free extraction process to avoid mineral residues that could interfere with geothermal infrastructure.
Fraunhofer IEG project manager Tilman Cremer said the initiative demonstrated that critical raw materials could be sourced locally. “Europe needs its own sources of strategic raw materials. By developing lithium resources in the North German Basin, Germany could in the future play a central role in covering both German and European demand,” he said. The team plans to analyse samples and drilling data spanning from the Dutch border to Poland to better understand how lithium accumulates and how it can be safely recovered.
China runs five times more mining projects in Central Asia than all European companies combined. But a shift is under way. Türkiye is investing billions, building rare earth processing capacity, and forging a new industrial corridor from the Caspian to the Mediterranean. In this episode, we explore why Ankara is emerging as the pivot point in the global race for critical metals — and what it means for Kazakhstan, Europe, and the West.
Let us begin with a single figure. Seventy per cent. That is the share of Central Asia’s critical mineral output that currently goes to China. Twenty-five active Chinese projects in the region — five times the number of all European projects combined. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan is capable of producing half of the thirty-four materials the European Union classifies as critical: lithium, cobalt, copper, tungsten, rare earth elements. The Senate of Kazakhstan has valued the country’s subsoil potential at forty-six trillion dollars. Let that figure sink in.
The question is — who will become the partner in transforming this wealth from ore into finished products? Who will help build the full value chain, from geological exploration to processing? And who will offer not merely capital, but technology, market access, and industrial expertise?
It is precisely to address these questions that we are holding the twelfth International Mining and Exploration Forum, MINEX Asia, which will take place on the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth of June at the Hilton Ankara.
The choice of Türkiye as the venue is no coincidence. The forum operates in a nomadic format, moving from country to country and retracing the routes of the Great Silk Road. This year, we are undertaking what is, in many ways, a unique endeavour — to offer an in-depth assessment of the strengthening ties amongst Turkic nations and the transition towards a new quality of partnership, uniting the mineral-rich countries of Central Asia with Türkiye’s industrial might and the financial capital of the West and the Middle East.
Just a week ago, on the thirteenth and fourteenth of May, President Erdoğan paid a state visit to Astana. Thirteen agreements were signed in the fields of investment, energy, and infrastructure, including the historic Declaration on Eternal Friendship and Partnership. The implementation of these projects is expected to attract over 920 million dollars in investment and create more than 3,100 jobs in Kazakhstan.
President Tokayev placed particular emphasis on the mining sector as one of the priority areas of cooperation. He highlighted the considerable experience of Turkish companies and urged them to take a more active role in Kazakh projects. This was not a formulaic diplomatic remark. It was a concrete political signal. And we are already seeing tangible results: Miryıldız is building a mining and processing plant in the Abai region, Çelikler Holding is developing coal chemistry, and Aksa Energy is delivering an energy project in Kyzylorda. To date, approximately one hundred investment projects worth four billion dollars have been carried out in Kazakhstan with Turkish participation, and a further fifty projects of comparable value are currently under way. The total volume of investment cooperation has reached an impressive eight billion dollars.
To lend further momentum to this process, President Tokayev proposed the establishment of a joint fund for mining projects. Moreover, Kazakhstan’s new Tax Code now directly incentivises deep processing of raw materials through a favourable royalty regime.
The intensification of engagement with Turkish business is taking place across virtually all Central Asian countries. A Turkish-Uzbek business forum was recently held in Tashkent, where ambitious plans to raise bilateral trade to five billion dollars were presented. Uzbekistan is launching a critical minerals development programme worth two and a half billion dollars. Last September, a Kyrgyz-Turkish business forum set a new benchmark for economic cooperation. Kyrgyzstan has identified twenty-two critical minerals for strategic development, and Turkish investment in the country already exceeds one and a half billion dollars.
We are witnessing a systemic shift. The Turkic states are moving from the political rhetoric of brotherhood towards pragmatic economic partnership. And the mining industry sits at the very heart of this process.
Now, a word on Türkiye. It has long ceased to be merely a transit country along the Middle Corridor. Türkiye’s mineral resource potential is valued at three and a half trillion dollars. The Beylikova project is one of the world’s largest, rare-earth deposits. Türkiye has announced the creation of a mining exchange in 2026 and is preparing a large-scale national programme for the processing of critical metals. The country is purposefully transitioning from raw material exports to high-technology processing — from boron to rare earth magnets and battery precursors.
What precisely will be discussed at the forum?
Day one focuses on strategy and capital. We shall begin with Türkiye’s mining strategy and its shift towards a model of industrial autonomy. Next — the Middle Corridor: how the Trans-Caspian route can become not simply a logistical bypass, but an integrated industrial belt linking extraction, processing, and end markets. A dedicated session will address the most pressing question — who is financing the future of mining in our region? China, the West, the Middle East — each is playing its own hand, and the countries of the region must build a balanced, multi-vector strategy. Day one will conclude with presentations of projects being delivered by Turkish companies in Central Asia and the Caspian region.
In the evening, we shall host a reception at the residence of the British Embassy, in partnership with the Department for Business and Trade, attended by senior dignitaries.
Day two centres on technology and sustainable development. How can Kazakhstan and the countries of Central Asia integrate into European supply chains in light of the CBAM mechanism and digital product passport requirements? How should tailings storage facilities be managed to international standards? How is artificial intelligence already transforming geological exploration — from the processing of Soviet-era archival data to unmanned geophysics?
Who is expected to attend the forum?
Amongst the key organisational partners on the Turkish side are the Supreme Mining Council of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Türkiye (TOBB), the Gold Producers’ Association, and the Turkish Mining Association, which accounts for approximately seventy-five per cent of all mineral extraction in the country. The forum also anticipates the participation of senior officials from the Türkiye Wealth Fund, as well as leading companies such as Dama Engineering, Argetest, KSE Mining, Kayen Maden, Positive Group Makine Muhendislik, DMT Türkiye, ExxonMobil and many others.
Now — the most important point. What specifically does this forum offer Kazakh companies?
Firstly, Central Asian countries, like Kazakhstan, produces nineteen of the thirty-four critical minerals for EU countries. Yet the bulk of output is still exported in unprocessed form. The forum provides a platform to find a processing partner, and Türkiye — with its industrial infrastructure and the logistical reach of the Middle Corridor — is a natural candidate.
Secondly, investment. The forum includes a dedicated session where your projects — copper, gold, lithium, rare earths — can be presented directly to investors. Not through intermediaries, not via correspondence, but face to face with the decision-makers.
Thirdly, the Korean Institute KIGAM last year discovered a lithium deposit in East Kazakhstan valued at nearly sixteen billion dollars. A comprehensive plan for the development of rare and rare earth metals through to 2028 is already under way. However, competing with China in processing is no easy task — and it is precisely for this reason that partnership with Turkish companies, which are themselves building processing capacity, opens a new route for landlocked Central Asian countries to Western markets.
And fourthly, networking. The forum offers a digital matchmaking system, bilateral meetings, an informal reception at the British Embassy in Ankara, and a gala dinner. These are the kinds of networking in-person opportunities simply cannot be forged over email.
Colleagues, let us take a broad view. Europe is seeking an alternative to its dependence on China for critical minerals. The United States has launched the C5+1 dialogue on critical minerals. Türkiye is building processing hubs. And Kazakhstan and the countries of Central Asia are sitting on a resource base that the world is quite literally searching for.
That is precisely why MINEX Asia in Ankara is not just another conference. It is the place where resources meet capital, and strategies meet concrete partners. Registration is open at 2026.minexasia.com.
Come not to listen — come to do business. We look forward to welcoming you to the forum on the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth of June.
The long-running dispute over Greenland’s Kvanefjeld rare earth project has delivered a lesson that Western governments are only beginning to absorb: a strategically important deposit is worthless to a supply chain if investors cannot trust that the regulatory framework governing it will remain stable long enough to justify spending the capital required to develop it.
Kvanefjeld’s rare earth potential has never been in question. What has undermined the project is a cycle of legal uncertainty that has made it progressively harder to finance — regardless of its geological merits. Greenland’s particular stance on uranium-linked deposits, governed by the territory’s 2021 uranium law, means that projects where uranium extraction exceeds the legal threshold face a distinct political and regulatory hurdle that is difficult to price or plan around.
The analysis emerging from the case identifies what may be Western critical minerals strategy’s most overlooked dimension. Governments and multilateral agencies have focused heavily on three questions: where deposits are located, how much processing capacity can be built outside China, and how much strategic stockpile buffer allied nations should maintain. Kvanefjeld points to a fourth question that is becoming equally decisive: whether investors believe the regulatory path will hold.
This matters because of how project finance actually works. Capital does not assess deposit size or metallurgy in isolation — it assesses whether the legal and regulatory position will remain intact by the time funds must be committed and spent. When that credibility weakens, financing terms deteriorate. Lenders demand higher risk premiums, offtake partners hesitate to commit and equity investors apply steeper valuation discounts. A project can simultaneously be declared a strategic national priority and become effectively unfinanceable if markets believe the rules could shift before construction begins. In project finance, a clear rejection is often easier to price than prolonged uncertainty.
Greenland itself is not uniformly hostile to mining. Its 2025 to 2029 Mineral Resources Strategy, a raw materials partnership with the European Union signed in 2023, and ongoing advances at the Malmbjerg molybdenum, Amitsoq graphite and Tanbreez rare earth projects all demonstrate that development continues under specific conditions. The territory is selectively open, not closed — but the conditions under which that openness applies are not always legible to outside investors before they commit significant due diligence capital.
The broader implication for Western critical minerals policy is structural. Public funding, industrial partnerships and diplomatic agreements — including the EU-Greenland framework — can only do so much if investors remain unconvinced that regulatory processes are stable, transparent and predictable through a project’s full lifecycle. Faster permitting addresses one dimension of the problem; it does not resolve the deeper question of whether approvals, once granted, are politically durable. Governments that wish to attract long-term capital into critical minerals projects need to define the rules clearly and early — including being explicit about which deposit types or co-products are politically unacceptable, tied to measurable thresholds rather than shifting political sentiment.
Kvanefjeld is, in this sense, less a story about one project in one territory than a warning about a systemic vulnerability in how Western governments are approaching the execution of their critical minerals ambitions.
Turkey’s mining sector has mounted a sharp defence of its operations and economic contribution after a senior opposition Republican People’s Party lawmaker made a series of allegations against the industry, accusing it of paying insufficient royalties to the state, smuggling gold by helicopter and using cyanide in ways that Europe has supposedly abandoned.
The Mining Platform, an umbrella body of 18 non-governmental organisations, and the Turkish Miners Association jointly issued statements on Saturday rejecting the claims made by Gökhan Günaydın, deputy parliamentary group chair of the CHP, as factually incorrect and politically damaging to an industry employing approximately 150,000 people.
On royalties, the Mining Platform said the sector paid more than 32 billion Turkish lira ($700 million) to the public treasury in state royalties last year alone. “A false perception is being created that mining enterprises pay very low shares to the state,” the statement said, adding that approximately 30 lira out of every 100 lira earned by a mining enterprise flows directly to the state through various taxes and levies.
The Miners Association directly challenged the gold smuggling allegation, calling it incompatible with current production and inspection processes. It noted that mining activities operate under the supervision of more than 30 public institutions, and that every gram of gold produced must first be refined to 99.5% purity at accredited domestic refineries before being offered for sale on Borsa Istanbul, where the Central Bank of Turkey holds the right of first purchase.
On the cyanide claim, the association said the assertion that EU countries have abandoned the method was simply untrue. It pointed out that 85% of gold produced worldwide uses the cyanide process and that modern gold facilities operating in Finland, Sweden and Norway employ it — countries the CHP implicitly held up as models.
Both organisations framed the broader stakes as economic sovereignty. “We are sending more than $60 billion in total resources abroad because we are not adequately utilising the mines within our own territory,” the Mining Platform said.
Cornish Metals has secured £52 million in credit facilities from its two largest shareholders — the UK government’s National Wealth Fund and Vision Blue Resources — to advance the restart of the historic South Crofty tin mine near Pool in Cornwall, as the AIM-listed company pushes toward a final investment decision.
The funding will be directed toward underground mine development and shaft refurbishment, surface facilities and infrastructure, and general operating and corporate purposes. Up to £16 million will also be used to credit the company’s escrow account.
Chief executive Don Turvey said the facility provided the financial runway needed to progress through to the final investment decision while maintaining the high level of site activity required to continue de-risking the project. “It also signals the National Wealth Fund’s and Vision Blue’s continued support for Cornish Metals and our goal to restart tin mining in Cornwall, providing a sustainable supply of this critical mineral to the West,” he said. Turvey added that the company has been engaging with investment parties interested in financing South Crofty’s development as part of the broader project financing process.
South Crofty, which Cornish Metals acquired in 2016, operated for more than 400 years before closing in 1998 due to falling metal prices and insufficient investment. The company says the mine could be producing tin again by 2028. The restart has attracted growing attention as tin prices have surged on demand from artificial intelligence infrastructure and electronics manufacturing, with the metal approaching $54,000 per tonne.
AMG Critical Materials has agreed to acquire the approximately 71% of Zinnwald Lithium it does not already own for approximately $56 million, funded equally in cash and new AMG shares, in a move the Dutch critical materials company describes as a major strategic step in consolidating Europe’s critical minerals industry.
AMG has held a stake in Zinnwald Lithium and a board representative since 2023. The full acquisition brings under single ownership the Zinnwald Lithium project in Germany — a multi-product deposit containing lithium, potassium and tin, and one of the most significant hard-rock lithium resources in Europe. The transaction is expected to close in the third quarter of this year. In the interim, Zinnwald Lithium will continue limited test work and studies to maintain permitting and project status under an existing cash management plan.
AMG chairman and CEO Dr Heinz Schimmelbusch said the company’s near-term focus post-completion would be on advancing technical development studies, with a staged approach favouring a smaller-scale initial scope over a single large-scale build. “This approach will enable AMG to leverage its world-class mining and processing capabilities,” he said.
AMG Lithium CEO Dr Stefan Scherer outlined an 18 to 24 month programme to define and advance a sustainable and profitable project scope, combining AMG’s existing mining experience with newly developed processing technology aimed at improving the project’s environmental footprint and operating cost position. Community and stakeholder engagement is also planned as the project advances.
Arafura Rare Earths has finalised agreements with Australia’s National Reconstruction Fund Corporation for approximately $145 million in government support, bringing the total equity and equity-like commitments secured for its Nolans rare earths project in the Northern Territory to around $659 million.
The agreements formalise a commitment whose key terms were first established in January 2025, with the final contracts now completed and the conversion price at which government support could be transformed into Arafura shares also defined. The National Reconstruction Fund Corporation is a state-owned body established to support domestic manufacturing and industrial capability.
The latest milestone follows binding commitments secured in April 2026 from Germany’s raw materials fund and Export Finance Australia, which together significantly expanded the project’s financing base. The Nolans project is planned to become Australia’s first facility to combine rare earth mining with downstream processing at a single integrated site — a distinction that has attracted attention from governments seeking to build rare earth supply chains outside China.
Despite the progress, several key steps remain before full financing can be achieved and a final investment decision made. Major project loan agreements still need to be finalised, shareholders must be engaged, and all conditions precedent to the investment decision must be satisfied.
Arafura is seeking to supply neodymium-praseodymium oxide for use in permanent magnets for electric vehicle motors and wind turbines, with planned output of 4,440 tonnes per year from the second half of 2029.
The European Council and European Parliament have reached a political agreement on the Critical Medicines Act, a landmark piece of legislation designed to reduce the EU’s dependence on single-source pharmaceutical suppliers, expand domestic production capacity and establish coordinated emergency stockpile mechanisms across member states.
EU Health Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi described the law as “Europe’s essential safety net,” saying it was designed to prevent shortages, reduce supplier concentration risk and strengthen local production to protect public health. “Patients in the EU must have access to the medicines they need, when they need them,” he said.
The agreed legislation contains four main components. On supply chain diversification, member states will be required to promote resilient and diversified pharmaceutical supply chains in public procurement procedures. Where high dependence on a single or limited number of third countries is identified, public contracting authorities must give preference to EU-manufactured products — a buy-European provision that mirrors approaches being taken in critical minerals and semiconductor policy.
On production capacity, the Act establishes a strategic projects mechanism to increase and modernise EU manufacturing of critical medicines and their active ingredients, with faster administrative support and easier access to financing. Projects producing medicines for rare diseases will benefit from accelerated approval processes.
For emergency stockpiles, member states requiring companies to maintain reserves must ensure this does not compromise supply to other EU countries. A voluntary solidarity mechanism will enable member states to share information on available stockpiles and redistribute them in the event of a shortage emergency. Joint procurement provisions aim to improve access to critical medicines and medicines for rare diseases across the bloc.
The agreement will now proceed to formal approval by both the European Parliament and the Council before entering into force.
China has issued a formal warning to the British government over its plans to nationalise British Steel, urging London to “make decisions prudently” and threatening to take action to protect the interests of Chinese companies if the process moves forward.
Beijing’s commerce ministry said China would “closely follow developments” and take “strong measures to safeguard the legitimate rights of Chinese companies,” after Prime Minister Keir Starmer announced on Monday that Britain could bring British Steel into full public ownership. The Chinese statement called on the UK government to “respect the wishes of firms and market principles, and avoid the abuse of administrative coercive measures.”
The British government seized operational control of British Steel from its Chinese owners, Jingye Group, in April 2025 after the company failed to secure the raw materials needed to keep the Scunthorpe blast furnaces operating. New legislation giving the government the power to bring the steelmaker into public ownership has since been passed. A government spokesperson said the powers would only be used “where the public interest test has been met” and that the administration remained committed to respecting the rights of businesses.
The dispute adds a fresh dimension to an already complex period in UK-China relations, as London attempts to balance economic engagement with Beijing against domestic industrial policy imperatives and growing pressure to protect strategically important manufacturing assets.
Presidents Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan were presented with a package of joint investment projects during the Kazakhstani-Turkish summit in Astana, with five new initiatives expected to attract more than $920 million in investment and create over 3,100 jobs across Kazakhstan.
The projects span five regions and multiple sectors. In Abai Region, Turkish mining company Miryıldız plans to build a mining and processing plant — an extension of the company’s existing $480 million gold development programme at the Zhanan deposit. In Almaty, İskefe Holding intends to launch gelatin production. In Turkestan Region, Orzax Group will establish a modern facility for the production of dietary supplements. In Aktobe, S Sistem Lojistik is partnering with Kazpost to create a logistics centre at the city’s international airport. In Astana, Tiryaki Holding will build a plant for the deep processing of wheat and peas.
Deputy Prime Minister Serik Zhumangarin briefed the two heads of state on the broader trajectory of Turkish investment in Kazakhstan, noting that approximately 100 investment projects involving Turkish companies have already been completed in the country, with a combined value of around $4 billion across various economic sectors. A further 50 joint projects with a total estimated value of approximately $4 billion are currently being implemented, underscoring what Zhumangarin described as a high level of investment interaction between the two countries.
