Region: Europe

  • North East and Cumbria river metal pollution tackled by £9m scheme

    North East and Cumbria river metal pollution tackled by £9m scheme

    In the Ore Mountains, a vast reserve of lithium is found. If the Czech Republic authorities proceed with its extraction, known as the “white gold,” it has the potential to boost the economy of both the country and the Usti nad Labem region. However, not everyone shares the same enthusiasm for these plans. The village of Cinovec, located near the German-Czech border, possesses a small yet valuable treasure. Situated approximately 100 km northwest of Prague, this village holds around three to five percent of the world’s lithium reserves, making it the largest lithium deposit in Europe.

    Lithium mining has become a strategic investment area in the Czech Republic, gaining immense significance in recent years, particularly in the field of battery production. The transition to alternative energy sources and the advancement of electromobility heavily rely on lithium-based energy storage. Furthermore, the soaring prices of lithium make its extraction economically viable for the Czech Republic. According to an analysis conducted by the Czech Chamber of Commerce, the country has exhausted its previous sources of economic growth, which indicates potential stagnation in the upcoming years. However, Prime Minister Petr Fiala remains hopeful that lithium mining could breathe new life into the Czech economy. In his vision for the country’s development over the next thirty years, Fiala outlined six strategic investment areas, with lithium mining and processing receiving the most attention.

    Fiala emphasized the pivotal role of lithium as a crucial raw material for electromobility, especially in battery cells. He stressed the government’s commitment to initiating extraction as soon as possible, ideally by 2026.

    The region possesses sufficient raw materials to produce one million lithium batteries annually. Cinovec is situated in a mining region with a long history of extracting various ores since the 13th century, including tungsten and tin in the 1940s. In the 2010s, geological surveys revealed significant lithium reserves in the area, extending across the German-Czech border into Zinnwald, albeit to a lesser extent. Prague has already entered into an agreement with the federal state of Saxony to explore potential cooperation in lithium mining. On the Czech side, the state-owned company Czech Energy Works (CEZ) will spearhead these efforts. Over a 25-year period of lithium extraction, it is estimated that a thousand miners will find employment in the region. Additionally, the construction of a gigafactory dedicated to electric vehicle battery production will generate new job opportunities and revenue. CEZ anticipates that mining this scarce resource could commence within four years.

    The authorities in the Usti nad Labem region support the development of the lithium deposit, provided that it adheres to stringent environmental standards. Jan Schiller, head of the region’s administration and a member of the opposition party “Action of Dissatisfied Citizens” (ANO), views lithium mining as an opportunity. However, he underscores the importance of establishing favorable conditions before commencing mining operations. The region still bears the consequences of coal mining, and any negative impact on living conditions must be adequately compensated.

    The prospect of new opportunities or further resource extraction?
    The Usti nad Labem region receives funding from the JTF, an EU fund dedicated to mitigating the consequences of ending coal mining and facilitating economic restructuring in affected regions. It is expected that a portion of the fund’s resources will be allocated to further develop the lithium project.

    Nonetheless, some experts caution against simply replacing coal mining with lithium extraction after the end of brown coal mining in the region. They recommend utilizing the funds from Brussels to invest in education and overall economic restructuring. Similar sentiments are echoed among the local population. Michal Koletzko, a professor at the Jan Evangelista Purkyne University in Usti nad Labem, staunchly opposes lithium mining in the region. Koletzko believes that lithium is not the right path and suggests focusing on fundamental changes to secure a new future for the region. He advocates for investing in areas that have the potential to not only provide an economic backbone but also transform the social composition and educational level of the population.

    Concerns about negative environmental impact
    Opinions among the residents of the Cinovec area are divided. On September 7, 2023, a discussion was held in the nearby town of Dubi between local residents and representatives of CEZ, and the venue was filled to capacity. Czech Radio reports that the primary concerns among villagers revolve around threats to the water supply and deterioration of air quality due to the transportation of extracted raw materials. Like any non-renewable resource, lithium mining does have environmental consequences. In South America, where approximately 70% of the world’s lithium reserves are concentrated in the “lithium triangle” spanning Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina, the extraction of lithium-containing brine has caused a significant decline in groundwater levels in certain regions. Careless actions by mining companies have also resulted in instances of air, water, and soil pollution. In Cinovec, lithium will be extracted from solid rock formations. While this method is water-intensive and consumes more energy compared to brine extraction

  • Poland issues environmental permit for first nuclear power plant

    Poland issues environmental permit for first nuclear power plant

    PEJ, the Polish government company that is progressing its policy to deploy up to six reactors at multiple sites in the country by 2040, submitted the environmental impact assessment (EIA) report for the first plant to GDOŚ on 29 March 2022. GDOŚ is an expert institution responsible for environmental protection and control of the investment process.

    The EIA report examined the environmental impact of constructing and operating a plant with a generating capacity of up to 3750 MWe in the area of ​​the municipalities of Choczewo, Gniewino and Korkowa in the province of Pomerania. PEJ said the final EIA report complied with the provisions of the decision of GDOŚ, which in 2016 defined the scope of the environmental report in relation to the considered location variants and their technical sub-options, as well as in relation to the infrastructure accompanying the power plant.

    The draft decision was reviewed by the Director of the Maritime Office in Gdynia, the State Sanitary Inspector for the Pomorskie Voivodeship, the Director of the Regional Board of Water Management in Gdańsk of the State Water Holding Wody Polskie, the President of the Polish National Atomic Energy Agency, and the Minister of Climate and Environment.

    GDOŚ has now issued its final decision, which PEJ said is “a key permit obtained in the investment process, as subsequent administrative approvals, including the location decision and the construction permit, must be consistent with the terms and conditions contained in the decision on environmental conditions”.

    The obtained decision on environmental conditions determines the site variant for the first nuclear power plant in Poland, at the Lubiatowo-Kopalino site in the Choczewo municipality. It also defines the conditions of using the environment at the stage of development and operation of the facility, requirements concerning the environment protection necessary to be included in the design documentation, requirements for counteracting the effects of industrial accidents, and it also imposes an obligation of the reassessment of environmental impact, as part of the procedure for issuing the construction permit.

    The decision was preceded by national and transboundary consultations with 14 countries that applied for participation in this procedure. The national consultations, held from 20 July to 18 August 2023, included all residents of Poland, who could review the documentation and submit their comments and conclusions. The transboundary consultations were held from September 2022 until July 2023. As part of the procedure, relevant protocols were signed with all the countries involved, including four protocols signed after intergovernmental expert meetings held under Article 5 of the Espoo Convention, which contributed to closing the process within the assumed timeframe.

    “The issued decision on environmental conditions is one of the most important stages in the permitting process and brings us significantly closer to the start of the construction of the first nuclear power plant in Poland,” said PEJ President Mateusz Berger. “It defines the conditions that must be met in order to execute a nuclear investment project in compliance with environmental regulations and requirements on both the national and international level.”

    PEJ – a special-purpose vehicle 100% owned by the State Treasury – has already obtained a decision-in-principle issued by the Ministry of Climate and Environment confirming that the company’s investment is in line with the energy policy implemented by the state. In August, it applied to the head of the Pomeranian Voivodeship for a location decision for the plant.

    The Polish government selected the Westinghouse AP1000 reactor technology for construction at Lubiatowo-Kopalino in Pomerania in November 2022.

    Westinghouse and Bechtel have just signed a formal agreement to partner on the design and construction of the plant. They expect to sign an engineering services contract with PEJ within the next week.

  • INEOS Enterprises Acquires Eramet Titanium & Iron (ETI) for $245 million

    INEOS Enterprises Acquires Eramet Titanium & Iron (ETI) for $245 million

    The deal which takes immediate effect, was completed today, following the satisfaction of regulatory approvals.
    ETI consists of an ilmenite transformation plant in Norway which produces raw materials used in the pigments industry.
    These are good quality, well located assets, complemented by an experienced operations team with high safety, health and environmental standards.
    INEOS Enterprises has today announced the acquisition of Eramet Titanium & Iron (ETA) from Eramet for $245m. The deal which takes immediate effect, was completed today following the satisfaction of regulatory approvals. ETI consists of an ilmenite transformation plant in Norway producing titanium slag which is used in the pigments industry. It also produces high-purity pig iron sold to European foundries. The business will be known as INEOS Tyssedal The agreement between Eramet and INEOS Enterprises also includes a long-term supply contract for ilmenite produced by Grande Côte Opérations (“GCO”), the Group’s subsidiary which operates the mineral sands mine in Senegal.

    Commenting on the acquisition, Ashley Reed, CEO INEOS Enterprises said “We are very pleased to acquire ETI from Eramet. This is a good quality asset, complemented by an experienced operations team. We believe the next phase of ETI’s development can be well progressed under INEOS ownership and further improve the long-term sustainability of the company.”

  • Europe’s largest deposit: lithium frenzy in the Czech Republic

    Europe’s largest deposit: lithium frenzy in the Czech Republic

    In the Ore Mountains, lies an abundance of lithium deposits. Should the Czech Republic’s authorities embark on its extraction, the region of Usti nad Labem, as well as the country’s economy, could reap the benefits of this “white gold.” However, not everyone is enthused about such plans. The village of Cinovec, situated near the German-Czech border, holds a small yet significant fortune. This village, approximately 100 km northwest of Prague, is home to approximately three to five percent of the world’s lithium reserves, making it the largest lithium deposit in Europe.

    Lithium mining has become an area of strategic investment in the Czech Republic, gaining immense importance in recent years, particularly in battery production. The transition to alternative energy sources and the advancement of electromobility heavily rely on lithium-based energy storage. Furthermore, the soaring prices of lithium make its extraction economically viable for the Czech Republic. The Czech Chamber of Commerce’s analysis reveals that the country has depleted its previous sources of economic growth, signaling potential stagnation in the near future. However, Prime Minister Petr Fiala remains hopeful that lithium mining could rejuvenate the Czech economy. In his vision for the country’s development over the next three decades, Fiala identified six strategic investment areas, with lithium mining and processing taking the spotlight.

    Fiala emphasized the significance of lithium as a crucial raw material for electromobility, particularly for battery cells. He expressed the government’s commitment to initiating extraction as soon as possible, ideally by 2026.

    The raw materials in the region are ample, with the potential to produce a million lithium batteries annually. Cinovec is situated in a mining region with a long history of extracting various ores since the 13th century, including tungsten and tin in the 1940s. In the 2010s, geological surveys unveiled substantial lithium reserves in the area, extending across the German-Czech border into Zinnwald, albeit to a lesser extent. Prague has already signed an agreement with the federal state of Saxony to explore potential cooperation in lithium mining. On the Czech side, the state-owned company Czech Energy Works (CEZ) will spearhead these efforts. Over a 25-year span of lithium extraction, it is estimated that a thousand miners will find employment in the region. Moreover, the construction plans for a gigafactory dedicated to electric vehicle battery production will generate new job opportunities and revenue. CEZ anticipates that mining this scarce resource could commence within four years.

    The authorities in the Usti nad Labem region support the development of the lithium deposit, provided that the process adheres to strict environmental standards. Jan Schiller, head of the region’s administration and a member of the opposition party “Action of Dissatisfied Citizens” (ANO), considers lithium mining as an opportunity. However, he emphasizes the importance of establishing favorable conditions before commencing mining operations. The region still bears the consequences of coal mining, and any negative impact on living conditions must be justly compensated.

    New possibilities or further resource extraction?
    The Usti nad Labem region receives funding from the JTF, an EU fund dedicated to mitigating the consequences of coal mining cessation and facilitating economic restructuring in affected regions. It is anticipated that a portion of the fund’s resources will be allocated to further lithium project development.

    Nonetheless, some experts caution against simply replacing coal mining with lithium extraction after the end of brown coal mining in the region. They recommend utilizing the funds from Brussels to invest in education and overall economic restructuring. Similar sentiments are echoed among the local population. Michal Koletzko, a professor at the Jan Evangelista Purkyne University in Usti nad Labem, staunchly opposes lithium mining in the region. Koletzko believes that lithium is not the right path and suggests focusing on fundamental changes to secure a new future for the region. He advocates for investing in areas that have the potential to not only provide an economic backbone but also transform the social composition and educational level of the population.

    Concerns about negative environmental impact
    Opinions among the residents of the Cinovec area are divided. A discussion held on September 7, 2023, in the nearby town of Dubi between local residents and CEZ representatives witnessed a packed hall, highlighting the significant concerns among villagers. Czech Radio reports that the primary concerns revolve around threats to water supply and deterioration of air quality due to the transportation of extracted raw materials. Like any non-renewable resource, lithium mining does have environmental consequences. In South America, where approximately 70% of the world’s lithium reserves are concentrated in the “lithium triangle” spanning Bolivia, Chile, and Argentina, the extraction of lithium-containing brine has resulted in a significant decline in groundwater levels in certain regions. Mining companies’ careless actions have also led to instances of air, water, and soil pollution. In Cinovec, lithium will be extracted from solid rock formations. Although this method is water-intensive and consumes more energy compared to brine extraction, it is considered less detrimental to the environment.

  • By 2030, EU may rely on China’s batteries as it did Russian energy

    By 2030, EU may rely on China’s batteries as it did Russian energy

    A paper prepared for EU leaders has raised concerns about the potential dependency of the European Union on China for lithium-ion batteries and fuel cells by 2030, similar to its past dependence on Russia for energy prior to the conflict in Ukraine. This issue will be a focal point of discussions on Europe’s economic security during the EU leaders’ meeting in Granada, Spain, on October 5th.

    Given China’s increasing assertiveness and economic influence on the global stage, the leaders will evaluate the European Commission’s proposals to mitigate the risk of excessive reliance on China and explore diversification opportunities towards Africa and Latin America.

    The paper emphasizes that due to the intermittent nature of renewable energy sources such as solar or wind, Europe must develop energy storage solutions to achieve its goal of net-zero carbon dioxide emissions by 2050. As a result, the demand for lithium-ion batteries, fuel cells, and electrolyzers is expected to surge between 10 and 30 times in the coming years, according to the paper prepared by the Spanish presidency of the EU.

    While the EU holds a strong position in the intermediate and assembly stages of electrolyzer production, boasting over 50% of the global market share, it heavily relies on China for crucial components like fuel cells and lithium-ion batteries, particularly for electric vehicles.

    Without implementing robust measures, the paper warns that by 2030, the European energy ecosystem could face a different but equally concerning dependence on China, akin to the dependency on Russia before the invasion of Ukraine.

    Before the Russian invasion, the EU sourced over 40% of its total gas consumption, 27% of its oil imports, and 46% of its coal imports from Russia, according to the European Commission’s data. The abrupt cessation of energy purchases from Russia caused an energy price shock in the EU, leading to a surge in consumer inflation. This necessitated the European Central Bank to raise interest rates significantly, ultimately dampening economic growth.

    However, the vulnerability of the EU extends beyond lithium-ion batteries and fuel cells. The paper highlights the potential for a similar scenario in the digital-tech sector, as the demand for digital devices such as sensors, drones, data servers, storage equipment, and data transmission networks is projected to rise sharply in the coming decade.

    While the EU maintains a relatively strong position in certain aspects of the digital-tech sector, notable weaknesses exist in other areas, as stated in the document.

    By 2030, this foreign dependency could severely hinder the productivity gains urgently required by the European industry and service sector. Furthermore, it could impede the modernization of agricultural systems necessary to address the challenges posed by climate change, the paper concludes.

  • Ukraine has successfully dispatched its inaugural consignment of uranium, sourced from the esteemed Eastern Mining and Processing Plant to Canada

    Ukraine has successfully dispatched its inaugural consignment of uranium, sourced from the esteemed Eastern Mining and Processing Plant to Canada

    Regrettably, it is disheartening to acknowledge that Russia still maintains considerable control over a substantial portion of the global uranium market. This vexing situation poses challenges when it comes to imposing sanctions, given the numerous contractual agreements that various companies have with Russian entities for uranium supply. Nevertheless, we remain resolute in our efforts to displace them from this market and bolster uranium production within Ukraine,” emphasized the Minister.

    In light of this collaborative endeavor, the initial batch of Ukrainian uranium, diligently extracted from the esteemed VostGOK facility, has been expertly loaded and dispatched to Canada.

    Furthermore, Ukraine has been granted a credit guarantee by the esteemed UK government, amounting to a noteworthy £192 million, as part of a fruitful partnership with Urenco. This credit guarantee has been extended to support Energoatom in availing uranium enrichment services.

    The Minister also shared the uplifting news that merely a few days ago, the maiden shipment of nuclear fuel, thoughtfully developed by the esteemed American company Westinghouse Electric Sweden AB in close collaboration with accomplished Ukrainian specialists from the esteemed National Atomic Energy Company Energoatom, was seamlessly loaded into the VVER-440 reactor at the illustrious Rivne Nuclear Power Plant.

  • Ukrainian titanium leader Velta retains Hatch to design new US manufacturing facility

    Ukrainian titanium leader Velta retains Hatch to design new US manufacturing facility

    “This new partnership brings Velta one step closer to bringing our revolutionary titanium powder technology to the US market, which is dangerously over-reliant on foreign supply chains,” Velta chief executive officer Andriy Brodsky said. “Hatch’s expertise in optimizing metallurgical facility design and operation will help Velta meet the enormous, unmet US demand for quality titanium. We’re ready to get to work.”

    Velta is currently engaged in an intensive site selection process. The facility Hatch has been retained to help design will become one of only a small number of US facilities producing titanium after decades of declining domestic production. The capacity of the new facility is being designed to produce upwards of 1,000 tonnes of titanium powder per annum with the potential to scale.

    Hatch is an engineering and project implementation consultancy with experience in various metal and minerals projects, including various TiO2 projects globally.

  • Who Controls Ukraine’s Titanium Industry

    Who Controls Ukraine’s Titanium Industry

    Strategic minerals are those that hold strategic value for a country’s sustainable economic development and defense capabilities. In Ukraine, a list of 37 such strategic minerals has existed since 2021. The war in Ukraine waged by Russia has changed the market for these minerals, prompting the world to resist the influence of China and Russia on economic development, including altering sources and supply chains of strategic raw materials.

    This is an opportunity for our country to make a statement because Ukrainian subsoil contains 117 types of useful minerals out of the world’s 120. Of these, 22 useful minerals are a priority for European Union countries. Their extraction, processing, and enrichment sometimes require billions of dollars, necessitating foreign investments. These investments will be particularly crucial after the war when funds will be needed for reconstruction. In the future, these investments could become a part of our security.

    The Anti-Corruption Action Center (AntAC) has analyzed which companies hold special permits to use strategic subsoil. A special permit is a document issued by the state through the State Service of Geology and Subsoil (StateGeoNedra) to allow the use of subsoil for a specified period. The owner of Ukrainian subsoil is the people. The state either uses the subsoil itself or grants them to businesses for temporary use, with the business covering the cost of exploration and mining of useful minerals.

    This broken-down material is an overview of the most interesting industries, with a focus on the most promising one according to our interviewees – titanium. You can view the full list of 121 “strategic” special permits and information about their owners here. It will be updated over time. Sixteen of these special permits relate to deposits located in the territories occupied by Russia. Several dozen more are located in the front-line areas. In total, Russia has captured one-third of Ukraine’s subsoil, which is over 700 out of more than 2,160 deposits. BACKGROUND. Uses of titanium: aerospace industry, aviation, equipment for the oil and gas industry, shipbuilding, defense complex, energy, 3D printing, medicine, laptops, smartphones, robotics, jewelry, paint and coatings, plastics, inks, cellulose, rubber hardware. Sixteen special permits are issued for the development of titanium-containing deposits.

    Due to the war and the global search for supplies, titanium is becoming increasingly important. The most promising strategic mineral in Ukraine is titanium-bearing ores. According to some estimates, Ukraine holds 20% of the world’s titanium raw material reserves. We provide, also according to various estimates, 4-7% of the world’s production of titanium-bearing ores.

    China is the leader in terms of total production of all titanium-bearing minerals and titanium raw materials. Mozambique is second. Ukraine’s production is between India and Madagascar, both of which are among the top 10 countries in this regard. Most of the ores mined in Ukraine are used to produce titanium dioxide. It imparts a white color to paint, paper, cosmetics, plastics, toothpaste, and more. The main consumers of titanium dioxide are China, India, the USA, Japan, and Germany.

    Ores with a high content of titanium dioxide are used to produce titanium sponge. It is used to melt ingots, billets, and produce titanium products. This is the segment of metallic titanium that covers the needs of the defense industry (titanium is present in rockets, Abrams tanks, Bradley BMPs, M777 howitzers, Barrett rifles, Black Hawk helicopters), aerospace industry, medical field (prosthetics, implants), and more. Less than 5% of all titanium-bearing ores in the world are used to produce metallic titanium.

    There are several stages from ore mining to metallic titanium or titanium dioxide. Titanium-bearing ore is processed into concentrates, primarily rutile and ilmenite (rutile and ilmenite are important titanium minerals).

    And from them, titanium dioxide or sponge (metallic titanium) is produced. The technology for producing metallic titanium is outdated, energy-intensive, environmentally unfriendly, and complex. That’s why scientists are looking for new ways to process raw materials into metallic titanium. Ukrainian company “Veltha,” led by Andriy Brodsky, has announced that it is getting closer to discovering such a method.”
    Until recently, metallic titanium was produced in seven countries: India, Kazakhstan, China, the USA, Russia (before the full-scale war, Russia imported raw materials from Ukraine), Ukraine, and Japan.

    However, in 2020, the titanium plant in the USA, Timet, was closed due to competition from China and Russia. Ukrainian metallic titanium was produced at the Zaporizhzhia Titanium-Magnesium Plant (ZTMC), but it is currently not operational due to the war.

    Major consumers of metallic titanium include the American corporation Boeing and the French company Airbus, which manufacture passenger planes, military equipment, and weapons.

    BACKGROUND: Boeing produces and services airplanes, spacecraft, satellites, and defense products, such as precision-guided GLSDB bombs (the latest in cooperation with the Swedish company SAAB). Before Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Boeing purchased about one-third of its titanium from the Russian company VSMPO-Avisma, with the rest coming from the USA, Japan, China, and Kazakhstan. After the invasion, Boeing suspended cooperation with Russia, closed its engineering office in Moscow, shut down its training center in Skolkovo, and stopped sending parts to Russian airlines, reorienting its supplies to the USA and Japan.

    Airbus manufactures airplanes, drones, tankers, and satellites. Recently, the company joined the transatlantic mission to create the new Starlab space station. Not long ago, Airbus was embroiled in a scandal regarding the removal of the Russian company VSMPO-Avisma from the EU sanctions list. The latter services the Russian military-industrial complex and should be under sanctions as a weapons producer. However, in the summer of 2022, at the last moment, Avisma was removed from the sanctions list because France, Germany, Spain, and other EU members opposed it. Since the Russian company is a crucial supplier of titanium products to Airbus, opponents of sanctions argued that Russia could retaliate by blocking titanium supplies. In December 2022, Airbus still announced that they would stop using Russian titanium, calling it “a matter of months.” Reuters, citing industry sources, reported that Airbus “expanded its purchases from the United States and Japan” but was also seeking other sources of supply.

    However, as investigations by The New York Times in May 2023 and The Telegraph in August 2023 reveal, Russia managed to obtain aircraft parts worth tens of millions of dollars through bypassing sanctions for Boeing, Airbus, and other companies. Although Russia had to reorient itself to other suppliers as well. After February 24, 2022, China became the source of about half of the parts for airplanes and other war-related products in Russia, followed by India.

    According to information from The Wall Street Journal, Ukraine could be a potential supplier that would help reduce America’s dependence on titanium from unfriendly countries. However, Kiev’s attempts are undermined by internal political conflicts and the war. In any case, according to former Boeing CEO John Byrne, Ukraine “will definitely be among the places that will be considered” when looking for alternative sources of titanium supply.

    Ukraine’s titanium industry has undergone changes in recent decades. In the Soviet Union, Ukraine had a complete closed-cycle titanium industry. Two enterprises operated in the extraction of titanium raw materials: the Irshansky Mining and Processing Plant (GOK) in the Zhytomyr region and the Volnogorsk Mining and Metallurgical Plant (GMK) in Dnipropetrovsk.

    The Volnogorsk GMK supplied raw materials to producers of sponge titanium – VSMPO-Avisma – in Russia, the Ust-Kamenogorsk Titanium-Magnesium Plant in Kazakhstan, and ZTMC. Titanium dioxide was produced by Ukrainian Sumykhimprom and Crimean Titanium, which also imported raw materials from Ukrainian deposits. The last three enterprises were under the influence of oligarch Dmytro Firtash.
    The titanium enterprises that remained in Ukraine after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as well as those established later, primarily focused on exporting titanium-containing raw materials to foreign markets. According to the State Customs Service, the main consumers of Ukrainian titanium-containing ores and concentrates in the first seven months of 2023 were Turkey (30.6%), Japan (26.98%), and India (8.57%). In 2022, titanium-containing ores were exported to the Czech Republic (47.91%), the United States (11.94%), and Romania (9.75%). In 2021, exports were made to Mexico (21.22%), China (18.17%), and the Czech Republic (14.07%). Ukraine now faces the imperative of integrating into global supply chains, transitioning from the sale of raw materials to processing and enrichment, and ultimately replacing Russia in the global titanium market.

    For instance, the United Mining and Chemical Company (UMCC) reveals that the profit margin for 1 ton of ilmenite concentrate can reach up to $70, while for titanium dioxide, it can reach up to $600, and for 1 ton of titanium sponge, it can be as high as $2500. However, the establishment of modern plants for deeper processing requires attracting substantial investments, often amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars. Our sources within the mining companies highlight the lack of “political will” in this regard. International investors demand improvements in the investment climate and transparent regulations, which can be particularly challenging during a full-scale war. Additionally, there are other challenges specific to the titanium industry. Currently, Ukraine only mines titanium ores from placer deposits that can be easily excavated. However, placer deposits constitute only about 10% of the known reserves, with the majority being primary deposits that require blasting. Mining in such areas is more complex and costly, as it necessitates the construction of mines and the acquisition of expensive equipment.

    The mining industry has also been impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic and the ongoing war. The global market has experienced a slowdown in construction activities, leading to a decrease in demand for titanium dioxide. Moreover, the market is saturated with Chinese products, as China is responsible for over half of the world’s titanium dioxide production. The construction industry in China, like elsewhere, has faced stagnation. The production costs for Ukrainian manufacturers have risen due to increased prices of energy resources and fuel, logistical challenges related to the war, the implementation of new export control rules, shelling incidents, infrastructure destruction, and other factors.

    For example, UMCC is heavily dependent on exporting its products through ports in the Odessa region, accounting for nearly 90% of its shipments. The full-scale war has severely disrupted titanium ore shipments from Ukraine, necessitating a complete overhaul of the country’s export routes.

    The following are the owners of special permits for the use of Ukrainian titanium deposits:

    – UMCC Titanium (United Mining and Chemical Company, or UMCC Titanium): This company mines titanium-containing ores and produces ilmenite, rutile, and zircon concentrates. Previously, the enterprise generated revenues of up to 600 million UAH per year, but the current financial results are undisclosed. The State Property Fund, acting on behalf of the state, announced in the summer that UMCC would be privatized in the fourth quarter of 2023. However, the former head of the State Property Fund, Rustem Umerov, recently spoke of the sale of UMCC in the past tense when questioned about its completion by the end of the year, stating, “We set such a goal.”

    UMCC began operating in the summer of 2014 when the government decided to transfer the management of the Volnogorsk Mining and Metallurgical Plant and the Irshansk Mining and Concentrating Plant to the company. These plants were previously leased by Firtash’s structures and supplied Crimean Titanium. After the Maidan revolution, UMCC came under the management of the Ministry of Economic Development, and in 2019, it was transferred to the State Property Fund.

    UMCC’s management has faced consistent accusations of supplying goods to Russia through intermediaries, which involved profit margins. Notable cases involved individuals such as Ruslan Zhurilo, the former head of UMCC, who had close ties to ex-MP Nikolai Martynenko, and Dmitry Sennichenko, the former head of the State Property Fund.

    In an interview with Vladislav Itkin, who served as the head of UMCC in early 2023, he expressed pride in the fact that their team had not been accused of betraying national interests or engaging in shadowy supplies of titanium raw materials to sanctioned territories. Since 2014, they became the first management team at UMCC to avoid such disgraceful allegations.

    Group DF, however, maintains that their titanium business does not require the outdated facilities of UMCC for ore processing, as they possess their own modern GOK plant, which is currently underutilized. The Firtash Group dismisses claims that Kalandadze is Firtash’s man or that David Arakhamia has any involvement in the matter, labeling them as mere fabrications created by PR specialists.

    Despite the challenging reputational issues, OGKhK could potentially replace the Russian company VSMPO-Avisma under certain conditions. According to Kalandadze, UMCC is already engaging with various engineering companies to address technical challenges and conduct relevant research. However, such ambitious plans necessitate significant investments. The State Property Fund has previously attempted to sell the company three times before the outbreak of war, but no buyers emerged. Our sources highlight three reasons for this lack of interest.

    Firstly, there is a limited resource base. Approximately 70-75% of OGKhK’s revenue is generated by the Volnogorsk plant, with the remaining 20-25% coming from the Irshansky plant. It is estimated that the Volnogorsk plant’s reserves will last for only a few more years. To replenish this resource base, new special permits are required. There has been some improvement in this regard, as in June 2023, the State Geographical Directorate seized the Selishchansky titanium ore site in the Zhytomyr region from Firtash. Additionally, OGKhK regained its special permit for subsoil use, No. 5269, which was previously held by Firtashevsky Mezhdurechensky GOK. However, there are ongoing legal battles and an investigation by the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine regarding this matter. Oleg Arestarkhov, the head of corporate communications at Group DF Firtash, states that if they lose the lawsuits for Selishchanka in Ukraine, they will pursue international legal avenues, which would further taint the asset.

    According to Deputy Chairman of the State Property Fund, Alexander Fedorishin, there is a constructive dialogue and alignment of positions with the Antimonopoly Committee of Ukraine (AMCU) regarding the privatization of UMCC, acknowledging the need for an attractive product. However, the market remains cautious. As individuals within the titanium industry suggest, potential investors may prefer to observe how the state handles the situation rather than engage in legal battles with Firtash.

    Another obstacle is the absence of JORC (international reserve assessment), which can cost up to $500,000 and requires up to two years for completion. Denis Aleshin, the director of strategic development at the lithium company Ukrlitiydobycha, emphasizes the necessity of JORC, stating that “no conscious international investor will consider data based on Ukrainian standards.” International investors are accustomed to specific standards, and adherence to these standards is crucial for companies seeking international success.

    While Ukraine currently possesses technical, legal, and financial analyses of UMCC, accurate information regarding reserves remains the key missing piece. International investors would demand this information, seeking confirmation from reputable sources. The OGKhK case involving Zhurilo revealed official damages of nearly $13 million. If the ambitions of OGKhK managers had been more modest, a JORC assessment could have been completed long ago.

    Furthermore, there is a lack of effective communication with investors. In 2021, the State Property Fund enlisted the services of auditing and consulting company BDO to engage with potential investors. BDO claimed to have identified 29 potential investors, including 16 foreign entities. However, these investors requested that the Ukrainian government ensure the accuracy of all information provided about OGKhK and compensate for potential losses resulting from events preceding the sale.

    The road ahead for UMCC is challenging, requiring careful navigation of legal complexities, the establishment of a robust resource base, adherence to international standards, and effective communication with investors. Only with these crucial elements in place can UMCC position itself as a viable contender in the global titanium industry.
    The Cabinet of Ministers has failed to provide the necessary guarantees, resulting in the cessation of cooperation between the Fund and BDO, as Alexander Fedorishin mentioned, “at some point.” Presently, the Fund is contemplating the option of appealing to the Cabinet of Ministers to reevaluate the privatization terms and exclude the advisor.

    Our sources indicate that the acquisition of OGHC may pique the interest of individuals such as oligarch Rinat Akhmetov, Ukrainian billionaire Gennadiy Butkevich, the potential owner of the mining company “Velta,” Andrey Brodsky (despite his contrary statements), and Dmitry Firtash, who, due to sanctions, may not be inclined to participate. Additionally, a foreign company from Eastern Europe has been mentioned as a potential buyer.

    One of our interviewees concludes, “If the Fund manages to sell OGHC to a reputable international investor amidst the challenges of a state of war, an unconventional investment climate, resistance from various interest groups, and considering the long-term nature of the mining industry, which no previous presidents have honored, it will be an extraordinary achievement.”

    There was an event of significance that must be acknowledged as well. On August 7th, RBK Ukraine published an article alleging that “a significant portion of titanium raw materials exported from Ukraine ends up in Russia through intermediaries,” with OGHC and ZTMC being mentioned. The author of the article, Denis Kazansky, did not provide supporting evidence for the headline. Nonetheless, it gained significant traction in Ukrainian and international media, prompting the State Property Fund to publicly refute it. This scandal benefited many parties: OGHC’s competitors sought to remove the state-owned company from the market, sellers attributed the lack of demand to it, and potential buyers may have aimed to lower the price of the lot.

    The article also shed light on two problematic aspects. Firstly, OGHC still engages in transactions through intermediaries. The company claims that these intermediaries now function as financial agents rather than “padlocks” used for fund routing. Presently, ultimate buyers pay for goods with a 90-day payment delay, not accounting for the extended logistics time during the war. Intermediaries serve as a bridge to overcome this gap. This practice is prevalent across the entire market, not limited to OGHC. However, due to the confidentiality of OGHC’s contract details, it is challenging to monitor the extent to which intermediaries receive public funds. Given past controversies with intermediaries, it is even more difficult to accept the company’s word on this matter.

    Secondly, a portion of titanium-containing products exported abroad, which holds strategic importance for Russia, is subject to less stringent control by Ukraine than it could be. Currently, the State Export Control Service oversees the export of titanium-containing materials, and all ilmenite exporters must obtain special export permits. However, there are apparently certain titanium-containing products for which such permits are not required. This includes rutile, which is economically impractical for the production of metallic titanium but remains a possibility. Metallic titanium can also be derived from titanium slag and titanium tetrachloride.

    Demurinsky Mining and Processing Plant (DemGOK), situated in the Demurinsky starostin district of the Dnipropetrovsk region, possesses a quarry, an enrichment plant, and a special permit for the extraction of zircon-rutile-ilmenite placers from the Volchansk deposit. Similar to OGHC, DemGOK is involved not only in raw material extraction but also in concentrate production.

    Andrey Brodsky described DemGOK as follows in one of his interviews: “A significant portion of the equipment is domestically made, and the quarry resembles a large hole. I don’t know what to do with it next. Even if they offered it to me for free, I would decline.”

    In 2021, the enterprise’s net profit exceeded 200 million hryvnias. However, in 2022, the plant incurred losses of 260 million hryvnias.

    DemGOK was recently seized from Russian businessman Mikhail Shelkov in accordance with the sanctions imposed on him. Under Shelkov’s ownership, the plant served as a raw material base for Russian Avisma. According to the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), Ukrainian titanium-containing raw materials were utilized in Russia for the production of “Caliber” missiles, MiG-35 and Su-35 combat aircraft, and Ka-52 helicopters. Avisma also imported titanium products into the Ukrainian city of Nikopol, in the Dnipropetrovsk region, to a facility controlled by Shelkov, VSMPO “Titan-Ukraine.” Titanium pipes were manufactured there and subsequently exported back to Russia. In January 2023, the court seized these assets for the benefit of the state and Titan-Ukraine. Currently, the enterprise is under the management of the State Property Fund.

    Over the past six months, DemGOK has not been operational, partly due to legal disputes concerning its assets. While trial operations wereconducted at the plant in April 2023, production has not yet resumed. The FGIA, which currently oversees the enterprise, intends to put it up for sale. Alexander Fedorishin emphasizes that, in his personal opinion, DemGOK and OGHC “should cooperate” as the Volchansk branch of OGHC is located nearby.

    According to Nadra.info, representatives from the company “Rudomain,” associated with businessman Konstantin Karamanitsa, visited DemGOK to explore the possibility of a purchase. The FGIA confirmed the visit but clarified that the purpose was to seek potential contractors for quarry work and to assess the suitability of their services.

    Furthermore, the FGIA has already made some assets related to DemGOK available for sale. This includes the corporate rights of the agricultural enterprise “Investagro.” Almost half of the Volchansk deposit, where the plant operates, remains untapped. Currently, this area spans 1.3 thousand hectares and is owned by individuals and territorial communities, with Investagro leasing the land. Previously, the enterprise, like DemGOK, was owned by Mikhail Shelkov but was also confiscated, put up for auction, and remained unsold. It will now be offered for sale once again, at a reduced price.
    Zhytomyr Ore Exploration (ZOE)

    Zhytomyr Ore Exploration LLC (ZOE) possesses four titanium special permits. The state, through the State Geological Enterprise “Nadra of Ukraine,” controls 90% of the company, while the remaining 10% belongs to a company with a likely dummy co-owner. In March 2023, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) conducted a search at the company’s office, which employed Dmitry Kashchuk, the head of the subcommittee on subsoil at the European Business Association. During the search, they discovered the seal of a company associated with ZOE. Sources from the mining business, when preparing this material, cautioned that ZOE might be under the control of a “conglomerate of law enforcement, prosecutors, and criminal elements,” and advised against investigating this company.

    Currently, ZOE is not engaged in any mining activities and is largely unprofitable. The company is entangled in prolonged legal disputes over its special permits and faces issues with land documents for areas where mineral extraction is possible. The land has been parceled out, and landowners oppose mining. Outdated equipment further exacerbates ZOE’s challenges. Since 2016, the company has not received any investments. Consequently, ZOE has been drilling wells for water for many years, earning meager profits and refraining from distributing dividends.

    According to the State Geological Enterprise, the initial plan was to sell ZOE’s special permits to OGHC. However, this idea was eventually abandoned due to the need for changes in the work program for the highly prospective Trostyanets deposit in the Zhytomyr region. These changes could not be made due to unresolved legal intricacies. Without these changes, the special permits cannot be sold.

    The Paromivske deposit in the Zhytomyr region includes protected reserves owned by another subsoil user. This matter will also need to be resolved through the courts, which is expected to take several years. Furthermore, our sources indicate that the special permits for the Krasnorechenske and Levoberezhne deposits in the Zhytomyr region are less promising for OGHC due to their geographical remoteness.

    Therefore, unless ZOE’s permits are sold to OGHC with changes to the work program (which is possible but unlikely), they will be annulled and put up for sale again.

    Velta LLC and Decart Minerals LLC

    The mining company “Velta,” owned by businessman Andrey Brodsky from Dnipro, recently held two special permits for the Birzulivske and Lekarevske deposits in the Kirovohrad region. Velta’s mining and processing plant is situated near the town of Novomyrhorod in the Kirovohrad region, and commercial supplies of titanium raw materials commenced there in 2012. The plant has a capacity of up to 270,000 tons of ilmenite concentrate per year.

    According to the company, it commands 2% of the global ilmenite supply market and 35% of the mining market in Ukraine. Velta supplies raw materials to the American chemical giant Chemours, which trades various products, including Ti-Pure pigments for the automotive industry, textiles, and construction. The Czech company Precheza, specializing in pigment supplies, is also a major customer of Velta.

    Until recently, Velta claimed to face pressure from the National Police (NaPol) and, previously, from the Bureau of Economic Security (BES). The Deposit Guarantee Fund (FGVF) repeatedly and unsuccessfully attempted to auction Velta’s obligations to Prominvestbank. However, in recent times, Brodsky’s company has reported predominantly positive news.

    According to the company, its scientists have developed and patented a new technology for producing metallic titanium. This technology is less energy-intensive, involves fewer production stages, and generates zero waste. Although the Wall Street Journal referred to this technology as unverified in October 2022, Brodsky’s company announced in the summer of 2023 that it is already collaborating with the New York-based boutique consulting firm EAS Advisors LLC. The collaboration aims to secure financing for the construction of a titanium powder plant in the United States, based on Velta’s technology. The Canadian company Hatch will oversee the design of this plant.

    In the summer of 2023, Brodsky also announced the establishment of the Association of Titanium Industry of Ukraine (ATIU). The association’s objective is to “create a complete cycle of titanium raw material processing in Ukraine to protect the country’s national interests and enhance its defense capabilities.”

    On August 10th, ATIU publicly disclosed the list of participants. Alongside Velta, it includes the state-owned Zaporizhzhia Titanium and Magnesium Combine (ZTMC) and the Titanium Institute. The Titanium Institute is the sole institution in Europe specializing in the design and technical solutions for large-scale titanium projects. It is managed by the StateProperty Fund of Ukraine. Additive Laser Technologies of Ukraine, the only Ukrainian manufacturer of 3D printers owned by Oles Dovgy’s group, and Dnepropress Plant, a producer of presses and equipment for mechanical engineering and forgings from steel and titanium alloys, with ties to Dmitry Mishalov’s family business group, are also participants. On August 16th, the association signed a memorandum of cooperation with the National Security and Defense Council (NSDC).

    Until recently, Velta had plans to establish another Mining and Processing Plant (GPP) – the Lekarevske GPP, with a capacity of 120,000 tons of concentrate per year. However, when changes to the Subsoil Code took effect in the spring of 2023, allowing subsoil users to sell already occupied special permits (previously restricted to companies that owned these permits), Velta became the first to sell the special permit for subsoil use of the Lekarevske deposit.

    The new owner of the titanium special permit is Decart Minerals LLC, a company previously focused on providing loans. Decart Minerals is owned by Alexey Tsarapkin, who has no prior involvement in the mining business.
    Four special permits for titanium subsoil are currently held by companies affiliated with the Dmitry Firtash group of companies. Dmitry Firtash, an Ukrainian oligarch who has been subjected to sanctions since 2021, currently resides in Austria and faces the potential extradition to the United States. American law enforcement authorities have accused him of engaging in bribery with Indian officials to obtain the rights for titanium mining.

    On March 28, 2023, there was a change in legislation regarding subsoil resources, granting the State Service of Geology and Subsoil (Gosgeonedra) the authority to suspend the operation of special permits held by sanctioned individuals. Consequently, on March 29, the agency suspended the operation of all special permits associated with the DF group. These permits remain suspended up to the present day.

    According to the law, the state cannot revoke these permits. However, companies linked to sanctioned individuals are prohibited from conducting any mining activities. As a result, Firtash’s titanium enterprises have effectively ceased operations, leading to the unfortunate layoff of approximately five hundred employees.

    Hence, there is a need to refine the mechanism for imposing sanctions on mining companies. An alternative approach to such restrictions could involve the suspension of special permits, such as the temporary freezing of corporate rights under state control. This would allow the company to continue its operations, fulfill tax obligations, pay salaries, while refraining from distributing dividends, and so forth.
    The company known as the “Apatite-Ilmenite Group,” owned by Gennady Butkevich, holds a permit for the geological exploration of the Yurovsky site, which contains apatite-ilmenite ores in the Zhytomyr region. According to Forbes, Butkevich was ranked as the 16th wealthiest individual in Ukraine in 2020, with a fortune amounting to $415 million. He is a co-owner of the “ATB-Market” network and the sole proprietor of the “Kolo” supermarket chain. These assets are consolidated under the investment group BGV Group Management (BGV).

    It is noteworthy that 8.4% of the “Apatite-Ilmenite Group” is owned by Alexander Nastenko and Vitaliy Yakimenko, who is the father of Pavel Yakimenko, a deputy from the Servant of the People party. Pavel Yakimenko chairs the subcommittee on the protection and rational use of subsoil resources within the Verkhovna Rada’s Committee on Environmental Policy and Nature Management.

    Additionally, there is another permit for subsoil extraction at the “Zapadny” deposit of the “Krutaya Balka,” which is held by a company called “Non-Ferrous Metals” with foreign investments. The beneficiary of this company is Eugene Kossov. However, it is important to note that over 90% of the company is owned, through “Yumin” LLC, by a separate entity known as “Zemresursy,” which is under the ownership of Nina Vizgalova.

    In the past, “Non-Ferrous Metals” was under the leadership of Dmitry Vizgalov, a businessman from the Dnipropetrovsk region. The company, which was part of the Umin group and traded in titanium-containing raw materials, operated near OGKH in Volnogorsk, Dnipropetrovsk region, within the territory of the Borovkovsky starostin district.

    According to the court register, in 2019, “Non-Ferrous Metals” encountered financial difficulties and accumulated debts for subsoil rent, leading to the termination of its contract with the state.

    Furthermore, in 2023, Gosgeonadra extended a special permit for the geological exploration of titanium ores at the Avramovsky deposit, which is located 20 km from Kropyvnytskyi, to CenterUkrGeology. This company, a subsidiary of NAK “Nedra Ukraine,” specializes in the search for solid minerals and water. However, it has been facing financial losses in recent years. Taras Kuzmich, the head of NAK “Nedra Ukraine,” has expressed that CenterUkrGeology plans to conduct exploration work and aims to attract investors due to the enterprise’s inability to handle such a large-scale project independently.

  • The mission to create Europe’s battery hub, whatever the cost

    The mission to create Europe’s battery hub, whatever the cost

    The construction of Europe’s largest factory for manufacturing batteries for electric vehicles near the city of Debrecen in eastern Hungary is a significant undertaking. This endeavor, spearheaded by China’s Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Ltd., stands as a prominent symbol of Hungary’s commitment to thriving in Europe’s green transition. Notably, Hungary ranks at the forefront globally in terms of per capita battery production acceleration.

    However, beyond the economic benefits, concerns have been raised by environmental activists, community leaders, and political opponents regarding the potential costs associated with this ambitious plan. Critics argue that the government, which exercises control over various aspects of Hungarian society, including the courts, regulators, and media, has overlooked these concerns in its pursuit of securing its future rule.

    The partnership between CATL and Mercedes-Benz AG in constructing a $7.8 billion facility is hailed as Hungary’s most significant foreign direct investment to date. Two other battery suppliers are also building their own plants adjacent to the site, while another Chinese firm, EVE Energy Co. Ltd., is establishing its facility next to BMW AG’s newly constructed factory.

    Multiple concerns have emerged in relation to these developments. These include the potential loss of valuable agricultural land, strain on water and energy resources, and questions surrounding the proper disposal of used batteries. Additionally, there is apprehension regarding the possibility of accidents in factories dealing with hazardous materials such as lithium.

    Town hall meetings concerning these battery-related investments have often devolved into heated arguments, even in areas traditionally aligned with Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s ruling Fidesz party. Some individuals have labeled local officials as “traitors.” In response to the outcry, the government has amended laws to eliminate the requirement of in-person consultations.

    Zoltan Timar, the Fidesz mayor of Mikepercs, the suburb closest to the CATL plant, expressed the sentiment shared by many: “Nobody asked us if we wanted this plant.” He emphasized the local apprehension regarding the handling of hazardous substances and the fear it has instilled in people.

    CATL claims to possess the necessary expertise to ensure that no pollution is released into the air or water. The company also expresses willingness to collaborate with local authorities to prevent any potential contamination outside the plant.

    Nonetheless, the anxiety voiced by Timar is echoed throughout various Hungarian communities. Over a dozen interviews conducted with residents, officials, and environmental groups reveal that the battery boom has left virtually no corner of the country untouched.

    These tensions underscore the complexities of embracing green initiatives. While electric vehicles are celebrated as a means of reducing emissions and combating climate change, critics argue that local environmental costs are being disregarded in favor of economic gains.

    Hungary currently houses six battery plants that are either operational or in the process of construction. Additionally, approximately two dozen other companies involved in the production chain have established a presence in the country.

    The first battery plant, converted from a plasma screen factory, opened in Göd, north of Budapest on the banks of the Danube River, in 2017. Concerns regarding noise pollution and alleged water contamination were raised by residents living nearby. Despite years of complaints, both the government and Samsung SDI, the South Korean conglomerate operating the plant, continued to expand the facility.

    Julianna Lam Palla, a teacher in Göd, reported a foul odor resembling “rotten fish” emanating from her tap water. Although she lacked concrete evidence linking it to the battery plant, her experiences of being ignored by local officials prompted her decision to relocate. Lam Palla expressed frustration, stating, “There are so many questions, so much anger and disillusionment.”

    The situation worsened when an opposition party gained control of the local municipality in 2019 and promised to investigate claims of environmental damage. In response, Orban’s government diverted the factory’s lucrative business tax receipts away from Göd to neighboring areas.

    Activists took matters into their own hands by conducting pollution measurements, which revealed the presence of N-methyl-2-pyrrolidone (NMP), a commonly used solvent in battery cathode electrode manufacturing, in wells.

    Zsuzsa Bodnar, a vice president of the local environmental group Göd-ÉRT, asserted, “We don’t fear that they’re polluting; we know they are.” She expressed frustration with authorities’ refusal to conduct tests and acknowledge their findings.

    A study published in Scientific Reports this year indicated the presence of lithium in tap water across Hungary’s 19 counties, although the quantities were not deemed hazardous to human health.

    After five years of operation, Samsung SDI is now conducting a comprehensive environmental impact study. The company has applied for a pollution prevention and control permit, given that its activities have reached levels requiring such measures.

    Samsung SDI stated that it is making continuous efforts to address environmental concerns in Göd. The company collaborates closely with Hungarian authorities and civil groups, conducting water tests to affirm the absence of NMP or any other harmful substances in the water and air.

    The municipality of Göd, currently led by a Fidesz-backed mayor once again, declined an interview request“`text
    The construction of Europe’s largest electric vehicle battery factory near Debrecen in eastern Hungary is a significant endeavor. Spearheaded by China’s Contemporary Amperex Technology Co. Ltd. (CATL), this project symbolizes Hungary’s commitment to thriving in Europe’s green transition. Hungary ranks among the global leaders in per capita battery production acceleration.

    However, alongside the economic benefits, concerns have been raised by environmental activists, community leaders, and political opponents regarding the potential costs of this ambitious plan. Critics argue that the government, which exercises control over various aspects of Hungarian society, has disregarded these concerns while pursuing its future rule.

    The collaboration between CATL and Mercedes-Benz AG in building a $7.8 billion facility is hailed as Hungary’s most significant foreign direct investment to date. Two other battery suppliers are also constructing plants in the vicinity, and another Chinese firm, EVE Energy Co. Ltd., is establishing its facility next to BMW AG’s newly built factory.

    Several concerns have emerged in relation to these developments, including the potential loss of valuable agricultural land, strain on water and energy resources, and questions surrounding the proper disposal of used batteries. Moreover, there is apprehension about the possibility of accidents in factories dealing with hazardous materials like lithium.

    Town hall meetings discussing these battery-related investments have often turned into heated arguments, even in areas traditionally aligned with Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s ruling Fidesz party. Some individuals have labeled local officials as “traitors.” In response to the outcry, the government has amended laws to remove the requirement of in-person consultations.

    Zoltan Timar, the Fidesz mayor of Mikepercs, the suburb closest to the CATL plant, expressed the sentiment shared by many: “Nobody asked us if we wanted this plant.” He emphasized the local apprehension regarding the handling of hazardous substances and the fear it has instilled in people.

    CATL claims to possess the necessary expertise to ensure that no pollution is released into the air or water. The company also expresses willingness to collaborate with local authorities to prevent any potential contamination outside the plant.

    Nonetheless, the anxiety voiced by Timar is echoed throughout various Hungarian communities. Over a dozen interviews conducted with residents, officials, and environmental groups reveal that the battery boom has left virtually no corner of the country untouched.

    These tensions underscore the complexities of embracing green initiatives. While electric vehicles are celebrated as a means of reducing emissions and combating climate change, critics argue that local environmental costs are being disregarded in favor of economic gains.

    Hungary currently houses six battery plants that are either operational or under construction. Additionally, approximately two dozen other companies involved in the production chain have established a presence in the country.

    The first battery plant, converted from a plasma screen factory, opened in Göd, north of Budapest on the banks of the Danube River, in 2017. Concerns regarding noise pollution and alleged water contamination were raised by residents living nearby. Despite years of complaints, both the government and Samsung SDI, the South Korean conglomerate operating the plant, continued to expand the facility.

    Julianna Lam Palla, a teacher in Göd, reported a foul odor resembling “rotten fish” emanating from her tap water. Although she lacked concrete evidence linking it to the battery plant, her experiences of being ignored by local officials prompted her decision to relocate. Lam Palla expressed frustration, stating, “There are so many questions, so much anger and disillusionment.”

    The situation worsened when an opposition party gained control of the local municipality in 2019 and promised to investigate claims of environmental damage. In response, Orban’s government diverted the factory’s lucrative business tax receipts away from Göd to neighboring areas.

    Activists took matters into their own hands by conducting pollution measurements, which revealed the presence of N-methyl-2-pyrrolidone (NMP), a commonly used solvent in battery cathode electrode manufacturing, in wells.

    Zsuzsa Bodnar, a vice president of the local environmental group Göd-ÉRT, asserted, “We don’t fear that they’re polluting; we know they are.” She expressed frustration with authorities’ refusal to conduct tests and acknowledge their findings.

    A study published in Scientific Reports this year indicated the presence of lithium in tap water across Hungary’s 19 counties, although the quantities were not deemed hazardous to human health.

    After five years of operation, Samsung SDI is now conducting a comprehensive environmental impact study. The company has applied for a pollution prevention and control permit, given that its activities have reached levels requiring such measures.

    Samsung SDI stated that it is making continuous efforts to address environmental concerns in Göd. The company collaborates closely with Hungarian authorities and civil groups, conducting water tests to affirm the absence of NMP or any other harmful substances in the water and air.

    The municipality of Göd, currently led by a Fidesz-backed mayor once again, declined an interview request.
    Orban’s political decision

    The EU has set a deadline of 2035 to discontinue the sale of new petrol and diesel cars, compelling manufacturers to transition to electric vehicles. Factories that fail to adapt risk closure. This circumstance has increased Hungary’s appeal, attracting primarily Chinese and South Korean battery manufacturers. By locating their plants in Hungary, these manufacturers can be in close proximity to their largest customers within the world’s largest trading bloc.

    Andrea Elteto, a researcher at the World Economy Institute in Budapest, remarks, “Battery plants have quickly become a defining feature of Hungary’s economy, but they also represent a political choice.” These plants align with Orban’s objective of bridging the gap between East and West, with the hope that the benefiting companies will contribute to his sustained power.

    The CATL plant in Debrecen will be seven times larger than the Chinese company’s only other European factory, located in Germany. The company expects production to commence within three years. Laszlo Papp, the mayor of Debrecen, describes his region as “where the union between the western European car sector and the battery industry is being solidified.”

    However, residents have expressed concerns about the cost of these developments. Battery plants require substantial amounts of water for cooling purposes, and unlike most other battery plants in land-locked Hungary, Debrecen lacks a nearby large river or lake.

    Papp asserts that the city has conducted exhaustive assessments, demonstrating that it will not run out of water for the plants or its residents. However, a local study conducted by the regional water works suggests otherwise, predicting that the city’s water resources may be strained to their limits.

    Peter Kaderjak, the head of Hungary’s battery lobby group and a former high-ranking energy official in Orban’s previous government, acknowledges the environmental risks. He suggests that the government should even fund monitoring stations where demanded by locals. However, Kaderjak emphasizes that local communities must also strive to understand the economic aspects of these endeavors.

    “The objective is not to make Hungary the global leader in battery production,” says Kaderjak, who assisted Orban in establishing the ruling Fidesz party in the late 1980s during the final stages of communism. “This will benefit Hungary’s economy only if it is environmentally sustainable and if communities feel that they gain more than they lose.”

    There are indications of a changing approach. Last month, Hungarian authorities suspended the operations of South Korean battery recycling company SungEel Hitech Co. Ltd due to several violations that jeopardized the safe functioning of the plant. New investors are now required to conduct environmental impact studies.

    In Debrecen, the city is constructing air and water monitoring stations for early detection of potential contamination, a measure that CATL welcomes, as stated in their written response to inquiries.

    Nevertheless, activists remain skeptical. Next to the wooden cabins that vacationers rent along the Danube near Göd, representatives from approximately twelve environmental groups from across Hungary gathered for the first time in August. Their purpose was to learn from the veterans in Göd and unite their efforts.

    “We understand that we cannot prevent the world’s largest battery manufacturers,” asserts activist Bodnar. “However, if this matter is of such importance to the government, then we also demand a say in the formulation of legal, environmental, and safety regulations. We refuse to be disregarded.”

  • Dutch government to pay RWE $355 mln for not using coal

    Dutch government to pay RWE $355 mln for not using coal

    The esteemed Dutch government, in a display of fiscal responsibility and environmental consciousness, announced on Monday its intention to remunerate Germany’s RWE with a sum of 331.8 million euros ($355 million) as compensation for the loss of income incurred due to the imposition of a production cap on coal companies during the 2022-2024 timeframe. The primary objective behind this cap was to effectively curtail national carbon dioxide emissions, thus fostering a greener future.

    In a letter addressed to parliament, the honorable Energy Minister Rob Jetten expounded upon the compensation, revealing that it would be somewhat lesser than the initial demand of 1.9 billion euros put forth by the three companies involved in operating coal plants within the Netherlands: RWE, Uniper, and the privately held Onyx. This reduction in compensation is rooted in the abrupt removal of the production cap in mid-2022, a consequential decision prompted by the imperative to reduce reliance on scarce gas resources in the aftermath of Russia’s incursion into Ukraine.

    While the compensation for the remaining two companies is yet to be determined, it is worth noting that the Netherlands has prudently set aside a total of 730 million euros to address such financial obligations, as articulated by Minister Jetten.

    It is worth highlighting that, in accordance with Dutch legislation, these plants will be compelled to cease operations no later than 2030. In a ruling delivered in November of the previous year, a court judiciously dismissed the claims put forth by these companies for additional compensation pertaining to the aforementioned closure. It is evident, therefore, that the Dutch government remains steadfast in its commitment to advancing an environmentally conscious agenda.