MINEX Forum

Website: Kazakhstan.com

  • Wartime Disruptions Push Tungsten Market Toward China and Turn Central Asia Into a Strategic Alternative

    Wartime Disruptions Push Tungsten Market Toward China and Turn Central Asia Into a Strategic Alternative

    Tungsten has emerged as one of the focal points of today’s geo-economic competition, as the disruption of traditional supply routes has reshaped the global market and intensified the search for alternative sources. The full-scale crisis that began in 2022 exposed the fragility of critical mineral supply chains, particularly for metals essential to defence and advanced manufacturing.

    Before the war in Ukraine, a significant share of global tungsten supply came from Russia and China. Sanctions imposed on Moscow effectively halted Russian exports, forcing the closure of several mines and removing Russian material from Western markets. As a result, global supply became even more concentrated in China, deepening Western dependence on a single dominant producer.

    The conflict also triggered a surge in defence production across NATO countries, driving higher demand for tungsten used in ammunition and military equipment. In response, G7 states agreed in 2023 on a mineral security agenda aimed at diversifying supply and countering monopolistic practices in critical raw materials markets. The United States moved particularly quickly, setting regulatory targets to eliminate tungsten purchases from China and Russia for defence needs by 2027. Pentagon procurement plans alone envisaged demand exceeding 2,000 tonnes in 2025. At the same time, Canada’s Almonty Industries accelerated the restart of South Korea’s Sangdong mine to supply the U.S. market.

    China, which controls up to 83% of global tungsten production and more than half of confirmed reserves, has adjusted its strategy as relations with the West have deteriorated. After years of price dumping and oversupply that pushed competitors out of the market, Beijing tightened export controls. From February 2025, tungsten exports became subject to licensing by China’s Ministry of Commerce. While not a formal ban, the policy has increased supply risks. Chinese tungsten exports fell by nearly a quarter in the first half of 2025, while prices surged to record levels, with ammonium paratungstate exceeding $60,000 per tonne.

    These shifts have pushed investors and governments to look more closely at deposits outside China, particularly in Central Asia. Chinese companies, seeking to retain influence, have also stepped up overseas resource investments. In Kazakhstan, a new tungsten processing plant backed by Chinese capital began operations in mid-2025, with an annual capacity of around 3.3 million tonnes of ore. Despite this, nearly all of Kazakhstan’s tungsten concentrates continue to be exported to China.

    The return of Donald Trump to the White House in 2025 added fresh momentum to the scramble for strategic minerals. The new U.S. administration elevated critical metals to a foreign-policy priority and renewed its focus on Central Asia. In November 2025, Washington and Astana announced agreements to jointly develop the North Katpar and Upper Kairakty tungsten deposits in Kazakhstan’s Karaganda region. With resources estimated at 755 million tonnes of ore and around 854,000 tonnes of tungsten trioxide, Upper Kairakty is considered the largest tungsten deposit in the world.

    A joint venture was established in which U.S.-based Cove Capital holds a 70% stake and Kazakhstan’s Tau-Ken Samruk 30%. The project targets initial production of about 12,000 tonnes of tungsten per year, equivalent to roughly 15% of current global output, with a mine life exceeding 50 years. If fully realized, Kazakhstan could emerge as the world’s second-largest tungsten producer after China.

    Beyond Kazakhstan, other Central Asian states are also seeking to position themselves within new supply chains. Uzbekistan has begun engaging Western investors in rare earths and other critical minerals, while Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, though smaller in scale, hold geologically significant deposits. For the region, this represents an opportunity to diversify economies, attract capital and increase geopolitical relevance amid a global reconfiguration of mineral supply.

    Despite these developments, the tungsten market remains far from multipolar. China continues to dominate mining, processing and pricing, and Western economies are likely to remain partially dependent on Chinese supply in the near term. Nevertheless, the foundations of an alternative supply architecture are being laid, with Central Asia emerging as a key pillar in efforts to rebalance the global tungsten market.

  • Central Asia’s Uranium Endowment Turns Into a Strategic Test of Governance and Geopolitics

    Central Asia’s Uranium Endowment Turns Into a Strategic Test of Governance and Geopolitics

    Central Asia occupies a pivotal position in the global uranium market, combining vast geological resources with a legacy of extraction that continues to shape policy, public trust and international interest. The region holds one of the world’s largest concentrations of economically recoverable uranium, with Kazakhstan alone accounting for roughly 12–15% of known global resources and producing about 40% of annual world output. Uzbekistan ranks among the top ten global producers and holds the second-largest uranium reserves in the post-Soviet space, while smaller but sensitive deposits remain in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.

    This resource wealth is inseparable from history. Uranium mining under the Soviet nuclear program was carried out with minimal environmental safeguards or community consultation. Sites such as Taboshar in northern Tajikistan and Mailuu-Suu in southern Kyrgyzstan remain contaminated decades after closure, with exposed tailings posing long-term health and environmental risks. These legacies continue to influence public attitudes toward new uranium projects, making transparency, safety and governance as critical as geology itself.

    As nuclear power regains prominence in the global energy transition, uranium has shifted from a technical commodity to a strategic asset. This transformation has intensified great-power competition in Central Asia, where Russia, China and Western actors pursue distinct strategies across the uranium and nuclear value chain.

    Russia remains the most deeply embedded external player. Through Rosatom, it offers a vertically integrated model that spans mining partnerships, reactor construction, fuel supply and long-term operation. In Kazakhstan, Rosatom is leading the consortium for the country’s first nuclear power plant, while discussions on a second plant could further entrench Russian technical standards. In Uzbekistan, agreements to build small modular reactors would significantly increase domestic uranium demand and lock in long-term reliance on Russian technology and fuel services. While this turnkey approach offers speed and financing, it also creates structural dependence and exposes projects to sanctions and governance risks.

    China has taken a more upstream-focused approach, prioritizing access to uranium resources rather than immediate reactor exports. Chinese state-owned firms hold stakes in Kazakh uranium ventures and maintain long-term offtake agreements to supply China’s rapidly expanding nuclear fleet. Beijing has also revisited uranium potential in Tajikistan, reflecting a patient, resource-first strategy tied to broader infrastructure investments. For Central Asian governments, Chinese involvement offers diversification and capital, but raises concerns over transparency, environmental oversight and debt exposure.

    Western engagement follows a different path. Rather than dominating mining or reactor construction, the United States and its allies focus on diversifying global supply chains, supporting high environmental and governance standards, and strengthening downstream and regulatory capacity. Companies such as France’s Orano and Japan’s ITOCHU have partnered with Uzbekistan’s uranium sector, emphasizing international safety norms. Western and allied reactor vendors have also participated in tenders and discussions in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, while broader cooperation extends to nuclear safety regulation, workforce training and remediation of legacy sites.

    For Central Asian states, this competition offers leverage rather than inevitability. By sequencing projects, maintaining competitive procurement and separating mining decisions from reactor build-outs, governments can avoid exclusive dependence and negotiate better terms. The primary risk lies not in geopolitical rivalry but in weak governance. Fragmented regulation, limited institutional independence, opaque licensing and underfunded remediation frameworks threaten to recreate the long-term liabilities of the past.

    Globally, uranium demand is rising as more than 60 reactors are under construction and over 100 additional units are planned. In this context, Central Asia is not a marginal supplier but a systemically important pillar of the nuclear fuel cycle. Kazakhstan’s low-cost in-situ leaching operations place it at the bottom of the global cost curve, while Uzbekistan’s expansion plans could further consolidate the region’s role.

    The economic upside, however, depends on moving beyond mining alone. International experience shows that the greatest benefits come from integrating across the value chain, supported by strong regulation and openness to high-standard investors. Without this, new projects risk repeating Soviet-era mistakes: environmental damage, social opposition and fiscal burdens that persist long after production ends.

    Ultimately, uranium development in Central Asia is a governance challenge as much as a geological one. Independent regulators, transparent licensing, enforceable financial guarantees for closure and remediation, and regional cooperation on transboundary risks are essential. Aligning national frameworks with international safety and ESG standards would not only protect communities and ecosystems, but also expand access to long-term, high-quality investment. In a sector where reputational risk is high and capital is mobile, governance quality is not a constraint on growth, it is the condition for sustainable participation in the global nuclear economy.

  • Kazakhstan Emerges as Key Tungsten Supplier Amid Global Shortage

    Kazakhstan Emerges as Key Tungsten Supplier Amid Global Shortage

    A supply deficit in the global tungsten market in 2025, triggered by tighter production controls in China, has pushed the United States and other international investors to seek alternative sources, placing Kazakhstan’s tungsten reserves firmly in the spotlight.

    According to data from Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Industry and Construction cited by LS, the country holds a significant and geographically diverse tungsten resource base. In northern Kazakhstan, four deposits are currently in operation, with combined balance reserves of about 77,100 tonnes of tungsten trioxide. Central Kazakhstan represents the core of the country’s resource potential, hosting 14 deposits, including 10 with balance reserves totaling around 1.69 million tonnes. Major sites such as Karaoba, North Katpar, Verkhne-Kairakty, Akshatau, and Batystau have already been transferred to subsoil users.

    Eastern Kazakhstan accounts for a smaller share, with two deposits holding an estimated 4,000 tonnes of off-balance reserves, while southern Kazakhstan contains more than 230,000 tonnes of balance reserves concentrated at the Bogutinskoye and Karagailyaktas deposits, both of which are in industrial operation.

    Growing international interest has also been driven by joint projects involving foreign capital. US-based Cove Capital, together with Tau-Ken Samruk, is preparing to begin development at the North Katpar and Verkhne-Kairakty deposits, which together hold approximately 410,000 tonnes of tungsten resources under the JORC classification.

    China continues to dominate the global tungsten market, accounting for about 80% of world production. However, export restrictions introduced in February 2025 significantly reduced Chinese tungsten exports by 20% year on year, while imports into China surged by more than 58%. These shifts have reshaped trade flows.

    Data from the Shanghai Metals Market show that Kazakhstan became China’s largest supplier of tungsten concentrates in 2025. Shipments from Kazakhstan reached 6,900 tonnes during the year, representing roughly one-third of China’s total imports. A substantial share of these volumes came from the Bogutinskoye deposit, which was brought into operation in mid-2025.

    As supply constraints persist and demand for tungsten grows in strategic industries, Kazakhstan is increasingly viewed as a critical player in the global tungsten market and a potential counterbalance to China’s dominance.

  • Critical Mineral Stockpiles Would Last Only Weeks in a Global Supply Shock

    Critical Mineral Stockpiles Would Last Only Weeks in a Global Supply Shock

    Most economies would struggle to keep industry running for more than a few weeks if global supplies of critical minerals were suddenly disrupted, highlighting a major vulnerability at the heart of the modern economy.

    Critical minerals underpin everything from electric vehicles and renewable energy systems to electronics and defence equipment. Yet their production and processing are highly concentrated in a small number of countries, leaving supply chains exposed to geopolitical tensions, trade restrictions and conflict, according to the International Energy Agency.

    In response, governments have begun building strategic stockpiles intended to buffer industries against shocks. However, a review of publicly disclosed reserves shows that most countries remain poorly prepared. Outside a small group of exceptions, stockpiles are generally insufficient to sustain even priority sectors for more than a few months during a major disruption. In several cases, governments do not publish data at all, citing national security concerns.

    China stands out as the most resilient player. It not only dominates mining and processing for many critical minerals but also holds the world’s largest known state reserves. Industry estimates suggest China could support domestic demand for months in minerals such as rare earths and battery metals. Recent export controls on materials including gallium, germanium and graphite demonstrated how quickly this leverage can be exercised.

    Among major importers, Japan and South Korea are the most advanced. Japan overhauled its approach after a rare earth supply crisis in 2010 and now maintains reserves covering several months of demand for minerals such as cobalt and nickel. South Korea has built stockpiles equivalent to roughly two months of consumption, with systems designed for rapid release during emergencies.

    By contrast, the United States and Europe appear more exposed than commonly assumed. US reserves are largely focused on defence needs and would likely cover only weeks of broader economic demand in a large-scale disruption, despite recent efforts to rebuild stocks of rare earths, cobalt and antimony. Europe is still debating coordinated stockpiling under the Critical Raw Materials Act, leaving its industrial base vulnerable in the near term.

    Australia is pursuing a producer-led strategy, developing reserves based on domestically mined materials such as rare earths, antimony and gallium, both to improve national resilience and support allied supply chains. India, meanwhile, has acknowledged the need for stockpiles in its critical minerals strategy but remains at an early stage of implementation.

    The reality is stark: if global production halted tomorrow, most economies would be counting their remaining buffer in weeks rather than years. Governments would be forced to prioritise defence, energy and essential manufacturing, while other sectors would face immediate shortages.

    Stockpile size alone, however, does not determine resilience. Effectiveness depends on how well reserves match real demand, how quickly they can be released, and whether alternative supplies or substitutes are available. Small but targeted stockpiles, combined with diversified sourcing, can sometimes offer more protection than large but poorly aligned reserves.

    For mining companies and investors, this shift underscores a broader change. Critical minerals are no longer viewed solely as commodities but as strategic assets, with their value increasingly shaped by geopolitics, security and resilience as much as by traditional supply and demand dynamics.

  • Pallas Confirms Shallow Supergene Copper Discovery at Satpayev Project in Kazakhstan

    Pallas Confirms Shallow Supergene Copper Discovery at Satpayev Project in Kazakhstan

    Pallas Resources has confirmed a shallow, flat-lying supergene copper discovery following laboratory assay results from its maiden drill program at the 100%-owned Satpayev Sediment-Hosted Copper Project in central Kazakhstan.

    In 2025, the company completed 4,800 metres of KGK (aircore-equivalent) drilling across the Satpayev licence area, targeting shallow copper mineralisation beneath thin cover along the interpreted continuation of the Dzhezkazgan mineralised contact. Drilling intersected supergene copper oxides and native copper from depths starting at approximately 6 metres, with assays returning broad, near-surface mineralised intervals consistent with a supergene enrichment zone.

    Notable intercepts from the program include 29.5 m at 3.04% Cu, 31 m at 2.78% Cu, and 30.5 m at 2.73% Cu, highlighting the strength and continuity of mineralisation. The discovery has so far been outlined over an initial area of approximately 400 metres by 150 metres and remains open to the northwest, where powerline infrastructure limited further drilling.

    Drilling depth was also locally restricted by refusal using the selected drilling method, preventing penetration into the underlying bedrock in some areas and leaving any potential primary sulphide copper system untested at this stage. To address this, Pallas is conducting detailed mineralogical and geochemical studies to refine its geological model and develop vectors toward a possible primary copper source beneath the weathered horizon.

    The company is planning a 2026 exploration program that will include additional shallow drilling to expand the supergene footprint, as well as deeper reverse circulation and/or diamond drilling aimed at testing the underlying primary sulphide copper system at depth.

  • ERG to Invest Over $1 Billion in Mining and Metallurgical Projects in Kazakhstan

    ERG to Invest Over $1 Billion in Mining and Metallurgical Projects in Kazakhstan

    Eurasian Resources Group (ERG) plans to invest more than $1 billion in its mining and metallurgical assets in Kazakhstan, marking the largest investment programme in the country in the company’s history.

    The funding will be directed primarily toward ERG’s existing operations, as well as the construction of new production facilities and projects focused on higher value-added products. The investment plans were announced by ERG CEO Shukhrat Ibragimov during a visit to one of the group’s Kazakh sites this week.

    Kazakhstan remains ERG’s core operating base, accounting for more than one-third of the country’s total metals and mining output. The company is also a major player in the Democratic Republic of Congo, where its Metalkol operation ranks among the world’s largest cobalt producers and is a significant source of copper. The government of Kazakhstan holds a 40% equity stake in ERG.

    Key projects scheduled for development this year include a hot briquetted iron (HBI) plant with a planned capacity of 2 million tonnes per year, an iron ore pelletising facility, and an 80-megawatt ferroalloy gas utilisation power station at the Aktobe ferroalloys plant in northwestern Kazakhstan.

    Additional investments will support the development of a new chromium mine with annual capacity of 7.5 million tonnes, as well as modernisation of the Aksu power station. At the Pavlodar alumina plant, ERG plans to build vertical calcination kilns, install new product filtration units, and add recovery facilities capable of producing up to 15 tonnes of gallium per year.

    Both gallium and HBI, which are used in semiconductors, advanced alloys and steelmaking, are not currently produced in Kazakhstan, making these projects strategically significant for the country’s industrial diversification.

    Separately, ERG signed a three-year cobalt supply agreement in 2024 with Electra Battery Materials to supply its refinery in Ontario, Canada. From 2026, ERG is expected to deliver around 3,000 tonnes of cobalt hydroxide annually. Once fully commissioned, the refinery could produce enough cobalt to support battery production for up to 1.5 million electric vehicles per year.

  • Kazakhstan to Draft Gas and Coal Power Development Plan as QazaqGaz Expands Exploration

    Kazakhstan to Draft Gas and Coal Power Development Plan as QazaqGaz Expands Exploration

    Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Energy and the Samruk-Kazyna sovereign wealth fund have been tasked with developing a comprehensive programme for the development of coal-fired and gas-fired power generation within one month. The initiative will also include detailed planning for the development of new oil and gas reserves to ensure a reliable long-term supply of gas for future energy facilities.

    The national gas company QazaqGaz is expected to play a central role in strengthening the country’s resource base. According to the Ministry of Energy, QazaqGaz is currently carrying out an extensive geological exploration programme across 14 sites, where preliminary estimates indicate gas resources of around 515 billion cubic metres.

    The exploration programme is set to expand significantly in the coming years. QazaqGaz plans to increase its exploration portfolio to 30 sites, with the combined potential of these areas estimated at up to 1.7 trillion cubic metres of gas. This expansion is intended to provide a solid foundation for future growth in gas production, particularly against the backdrop of rising domestic demand.

    As part of these efforts, QazaqGaz announced on 12 January that it had signed an agreement with Agip Caspian Sea to carry out joint geological and geophysical studies on the Kamenkovsky block in the Pre-Caspian sedimentary basin, targeting hydrocarbon potential.

    In parallel, the authorities plan to attract investment and reduce exploration risks through a series of electronic auctions. Around 50 prospective subsoil plots are expected to be offered. Geological exploration on these sites will be financed jointly by QazaqGaz, Samruk-Kazyna and private investors.

  • Kazakhstan Proposes Revised Energy Efficiency Targets for Major Energy Consumers

    Kazakhstan Proposes Revised Energy Efficiency Targets for Major Energy Consumers

    Kazakhstan’s Ministry of Industry and Construction has submitted for public discussion a draft order revising energy efficiency targets for the country’s largest energy consumers. The proposed changes apply to enterprises included in the State Energy Register (SER) that consume more than 50,000 tonnes of standard fuel per year.

    According to the ministry, the introduction of energy-saving and energy-efficiency measures should not affect product prices or regulated tariffs. Instead, the measures are aimed at more rational energy use and reducing losses, while investments in energy-efficient technologies are expected to pay for themselves through lower energy consumption.

    The draft order forms part of a broader policy framework to reduce the energy intensity of Kazakhstan’s economy under the Energy Conservation Development Concept for 2023–2029. The previous set of target indicators was approved on 29 November 2022.

    At present, 108 organisations fall within the scope of the proposed regulation. Of these, 51 operate in the energy and water supply sector (47.2%), 29 in manufacturing (26.9%), 22 in mining (20.3%), four in pipeline transportation (3.7%), and two in the transport sector (1.9%). The ministry noted that this list is not final and may change as companies’ energy consumption increases or decreases.

    Energy efficiency targets are set individually for each enterprise, based on consumption trends over recent years and the results of mandatory energy audits. Companies will be required to meet the approved targets starting from the first year of implementation.

    The indicators include fuel and energy consumption for electricity and heat generation, specific electricity use per unit of output, energy costs for extraction, processing and transportation, as well as permissible loss levels in electricity and heat transmission.

    Oversight of data accuracy will be carried out by the National Institute for Energy Conservation and Energy Efficiency Development. Failure to comply with annual energy reduction requirements or to submit data to the State Energy Register will result in administrative liability.

  • Kazakhstan Changes R&D Funding Mechanism for Subsoil Users

    Kazakhstan Changes R&D Funding Mechanism for Subsoil Users

    Kazakhstan has revised the procedure for financing research and development (R&D) by subsoil users operating in the hydrocarbons and uranium sectors, the Ministry of Energy has reported.

    Under a joint order signed on 17 December 2025 by the Ministry of Energy and the Ministry of Science and Higher Education, amendments were introduced to the rules governing the funding of scientific research, scientific and technical work, and experimental development (R&D) during the production phase.

    The key change concerns the mechanism for transferring funds. In line with the President’s instructions to centralise mandatory contributions and to align procedures with the Budget Code of Kazakhstan (Article 9, Paragraph 2), subsoil users extracting hydrocarbons and uranium will now be required to transfer R&D contributions directly to the republican budget.

    To implement this change, a dedicated budget classification code has been approved:
    KBC 401103 — “Contributions by subsoil users for scientific research, scientific and technical, and (or) experimental development works on the territory of the Republic of Kazakhstan.”

    Previously, the mandatory 1% R&D contribution paid by producing companies was administered and allocated by the Ministry of Energy.

    The amendments were officially published in the Reference Control Bank of Regulatory Legal Acts of Kazakhstan on 20 November 2025 and will enter into force after a 60-calendar-day transition period, on 19 January 2026.

  • Why Junior Exploration Companies Remain the Weakest Link in Kazakhstan’s Mining Investment Cycle

    Why Junior Exploration Companies Remain the Weakest Link in Kazakhstan’s Mining Investment Cycle

    Kazakhstan’s Subsoil and Subsoil Use Code, introduced in 2018, significantly liberalised access to geological exploration and opened the market to junior mining companies. Since then, exploration investment has tripled to more than $1 billion, attracting international players such as Barrick Gold, Fortescue, Teck, Ivanhoe and First Quantum. However, despite this progress, junior explorers continue to face severe financing constraints that threaten the long-term sustainability of the country’s resource base.

    Junior companies typically operate at the highest-risk stage of the mining cycle, conducting early-stage exploration years before reserves can be confirmed under international standards such as JORC or KAZRC. This risk profile makes them unattractive to banks and cautious investors, while major mining companies usually only engage once resources are already proven. As a result, juniors struggle to raise capital despite being responsible for up to 80–90% of primary mineral discoveries globally.

    Industry experts note that Kazakhstan has the geological potential for world-class discoveries, similar to Mongolia’s Oyu Tolgoi deposit, which was initially discovered by a junior company before attracting a major multinational partner. In Kazakhstan, some successful partnerships have emerged, including foreign majors entering joint ventures with juniors, but these remain the exception rather than the norm.

    Analysts also warn that the rapid increase in exploration licences does not necessarily reflect genuine growth of the junior sector. A portion of licence holders conduct minimal fieldwork and focus on speculative resale of licences, undermining confidence in the junior market and creating unfair competition for companies carrying out real exploration.

    Another major challenge is regulatory uncertainty. Frequent changes in subsoil, environmental and tax legislation increase project risk, particularly at the transition from exploration to mining. Juniors preparing assets for sale or partnership with major companies can see project value eroded if regulatory conditions change materially at later stages.

    Experts argue that state involvement is essential to unlock junior financing. International practice shows that governments often share early-stage exploration risk through grants, co-investment funds, tax incentives or specialised venture exchanges. Canada, Australia, Saudi Arabia and Chile all provide structured public support for early exploration, recognising it as critical infrastructure for future mining development.

    Without targeted financial instruments such as exploration funds, risk-sharing mechanisms or state-backed venture vehicles, Kazakhstan risks underinvesting in early-stage geology. Industry specialists warn that without sustained junior exploration, the country’s mining sector could face a shrinking resource base in the decades ahead, undermining future production, processing and export potential.