MINEX Forum

Website: Eurasia.com

  • A new plant for the production of special coke was presented in Kazakhstan

    A new plant for the production of special coke was presented in Kazakhstan

    As part of the 1st International Forum “KAZSODERZHANIE 2.0”, Eurasian Resources Group ( ERG ) carried out a technological launch of a special coke production plant via teleconference. The new production, after reaching its design capacity, will allow us to abandon a significant part of the import of reducing agents and will increase the percentage of Kazakhstani content in the domestic ferrochrome produced by ERG.

    The plant is located on the territory of the coal enterprise Shubarkol Komir JSC in the Karaganda region. Its capacity is 400 thousand tons of special coke per year. Investments in the project amounted to 60 billion tenge. The plant will create 184 jobs. The production uses the most modern technological solutions and automation.

    Also at the forum, ERG signed memorandums of cooperation with domestic producers and supply agreements. Documents signed with companiesTPB AGROMIR LLP, Kazakhstan Industrial Enterprise LLP, Zhaik Electric LLP, Machine-Building Plant named after S.M. Kirov”, LLP “Caspian Plus”, LLP “Saryopan Operating”.

    For Kazakhstan ERG enterprises, it is planned to purchase high-pressure hoses, spare parts for pumps, bearings, pumps, hydrocyclones, lime, as well as metal supports and components.

    – Today we have concluded long-term agreements and memorandums. An off-take contract was also signed with TPB AGROMIR LLP. This provides great business opportunities,” said Serik Shakhazhanov, General Director of ERG in Kazakhstan. – The counterparty will supply high-pressure hoses; previously we purchased these spare parts from dealers and intermediaries. We are glad that the quality of goods and services from domestic producers is growing and becoming competitive in comparison with foreign analogues. All this leads us to a mutually beneficial and long-term partnership.

    ERG purposefully, systematically and effectively participates in the implementation of the state policy for the development of local content. The Group is expanding its interaction with domestic manufacturers and demonstrating a steady increase in the purchase of goods, works and services from them from 51% in 2018 to 62.05% in 2022.

    Every year the company purchases more than 15,000 goods from Kazakhstani manufacturers – from raw materials fuels and lubricants to finished products.

    The Group pays special attention to supporting domestic small and medium-sized businesses. In 2022, ERG purchased goods, works and services worth more than 518 billion tenge from 2,794 domestic manufacturers.

    Procurement procedures in ERG are carried out on two main platforms: Electronic trading platform, synchronized with the NADLoC Register, where procurement is carried out according to the rules of subsoil use and natural monopolies (www.e-port.kz) and the ERG Procurement Portal ( www.torgi.erg.kz ), where all other purchases are made.

  • Orano is investing up to $500 million in uranium mining in Uzbekistan

    Orano is investing up to $500 million in uranium mining in Uzbekistan

    French company Orano has expressed its intention to invest up to $500 million in uranium mining and processing in Uzbekistan, as revealed by the Minister of Mining Industry and Geology, Bobir Islamov. He mentioned the existence of a strategic partnership agreement between Uzbekistan and Orano. Currently, the French company is conducting geological exploration, and by the end of this year, a preliminary technical and economic justification for the project will be prepared.

    Islamov explained that the strategic agreement includes the exploration of two additional sites in the Tamdyn district of the Navoi region. The final decision regarding these sites will depend on the results of the technical and economic analysis. However, Islamov expressed optimism about the progress of the project.

    The minister emphasized that current uranium production volumes have already secured markets. As the production of nuclear fuel increases, Uzbekistan will consider expanding its exports based on market conditions.

    “When it comes to uranium, our prices are tied to global prices. If the price rises, our delivery costs increase as well,” stated the minister.

    Islamov highlighted the growth in uranium exports to various destinations this year, underscoring the importance of diversifying supply sources. In 2022, Uzbekistan increased uranium exports to the European Union by 2.71 times, reaching 441 tons.

    During a visit to Samarkand, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that Orano, in collaboration with the local joint venture Nurlikum Mining, had initiated a pilot project for uranium mining. President Shavkat Mirziyoyev expressed his support for the expansion of geological exploration for uranium deposits with Orano.

    Prior to Macron’s visit, Bloomberg reported that his objective in visiting Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan was to discuss the expansion of uranium supplies, as France considers Central Asia as an alternative to Russian nuclear fuel.

    In November 2022, the State Committee of Geology, Navoi Mining, and Orano signed a tripartite agreement to expand uranium mining and processing. Uzbekistan aims to follow the French model in the “nuclear fuel value chain.” Orano has stated its readiness to invest “several hundred million euros.”

  • The British Anglo Asian Mining has received permission to resume activities in Gedabek

    The British Anglo Asian Mining has received permission to resume activities in Gedabek

    British company Anglo Asian Mining, which is involved in the extraction of precious metals in Azerbaijan, has been granted permission to resume its operations in the “Gedabek” contract area.

    Following the announcement of the immediate resumption of mining, Anglo Asian Mining’s shares experienced a significant increase of 42%, reaching 70.93 pence per share.

    The gold, copper, and silver producer has signed a protocol with the government of Azerbaijan, outlining a plan of action to enhance its operations and procedures based on recommendations from a recent environmental audit conducted by Micon International Ltd.

    “Most of the proposed measures will be implemented by the end of next year, and they will not require substantial costs,” stated the company.

    Anglo Asian Mining highlighted that the prompt resumption of mining activities will result in the production of gold ore and copper concentrate returning to previous levels. The company has maintained its annual production forecast at 30-34 thousand ounces of gold equivalent.

    “The remaining restart operations will be carried out gradually. The flotation plant is expected to resume operations in approximately 90 days, after raising the wall of the existing tailings dam,” the company explained.

    It is worth noting that in late July, Micon representatives visited the Gedabek gold mine to conduct a comprehensive inspection at the request of the Azerbaijani government, focusing on environmental protection and safety measures.

    In September, Anglo Asian Mining reported that radiation levels in the operational area were consistent with natural background conditions, with no issues regarding air quality, and no detection of cyanide exceeding the analytical limits in any soil sample.

    During the audit, the need for modernization to enhance the handling and storage of reagents and other chemicals, as well as the implementation of emergency plans for incidents such as spills or cyanide-related incidents, was identified. Additionally, a technical-economic justification for alternative tailings storage facilities will be prepared.

    The company also expressed its commitment to accelerating the development of the Gilar mine and “actively cooperating” with the government of the Autonomous Republic of Azerbaijan to ensure the successful implementation of work to further raise the existing tailings dam at the flotation plant.

    Anglo Asian Mining currently operates in the “Gedabek” and “Gosha” contract areas. Gold extraction began in 2009 at the Gedabek deposit, and in September 2013, the company commenced development in the “Gosha” contract area. This year, mining is planned to commence at the Vejnali and Gilar deposits.

    The PSA-type contract, signed on August 21, 1997, provided for the development of six deposits, with Azerbaijan holding a 51% share in the contract and Anglo Asian Mining PLC holding the remaining 49%. Currently, the company holds the rights to develop eight contract areas in Azerbaijan.

    In 2022, Anglo Asian Mining mined 43,114 thousand ounces of gold in Azerbaijan (an 11.4% decrease compared to 2021), 182,046 thousand ounces of silver (a 17.8% increase), and 2,516 thousand tons of copper (a 5% decrease). In global markets, 34,918 thousand ounces of gold ingots were sold in 2022 (an 11.7% decrease) at an average price of $1,783 per ounce.

  • The head of Polymetal commented on ArcelorMittal’s departure from Kazakhstan

    The head of Polymetal commented on ArcelorMittal’s departure from Kazakhstan

    Gold mining company Polymetal has made a firm commitment to sell its Russian assets, which are subject to U.S. sanctions, no later than the first quarter of next year. The CEO of the company, Vitaly Nesis, informed investors about this during a conference call on the production results for the third quarter last week.

    “When we relocated to Kazakhstan in August, we signed an official commitment stating that the company will sell its sanctioned Russian subsidiary, which is listed on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, within nine months. This document serves as a preliminary condition for changing jurisdiction. While we cannot be excluded from the Moscow Exchange, we believe that this commitment represents a contractual obligation for us. Violating this obligation would have serious consequences for the company,” said Nesis.

    In September, Nesis predicted that the Russian division of Polymetal International would be sold within the next 6-9 months.

    Nesis also highlighted that if the deal is not completed within the required timeframe, there may be significant consequences.

    “If we fail to meet the deadline, we will lose a substantial amount of political capital in Kazakhstan. Political capital is crucial in the mining sector. I don’t want to draw any inappropriate parallels, but it’s worth considering what happened to ArcelorMittal in Kazakhstan after multiple security failures. While we hope to avoid such a scenario, it is evident that managing potential problems arising from the loss of political reputation is of utmost importance,” he noted in response to a question about the potential issues that may arise if the company’s Russian assets are not sold within the promised period.

    According to Nesis, obtaining official approval from Russian authorities for the planned deal is unlikely to be necessary. However, repatriating the proceeds from the sale to Kazakhstan may face challenges due to currency restrictions imposed in Russia. This is particularly relevant as some of the current shareholders of Polymetal, who may benefit from the sale through dividends, are residents of countries considered unfriendly by the Russian government. The decision on dividend payments for this year will depend on the progress of the sale of Russian assets. If the deal with the Russian subsidiary cannot be completed, the company may consider the previously discussed option of establishing a separate entity in Kazakhstan, although this could have tax implications.

    One of the conditions for finalizing the deal, as discussed with potential buyers, is Polymetal’s requirement for strong assurances that toll processing of low-carbon concentrate from the Bakyrchik deposit in Kazakhstan at the Amursk hydrometallurgical plant will continue. The matter of preserving these supplies from the Kazakh mine is still under discussion with the Office for Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the U.S. Treasury’s Foreign Assets Control.

  • France’s Strategic Pivot to Central Asia: Strengthening Ties with Uzbekistan and Shaping Regional Dynamics

    France’s Strategic Pivot to Central Asia: Strengthening Ties with Uzbekistan and Shaping Regional Dynamics

    In the wake of Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev’s visits to Paris in 2018 and 2022, French President Emmanuel Macron paid a two-day official visit to Uzbekistan on November 1 and 2. The visit holds profound symbolism, as it coincided with the 30th anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between Paris and Tashkent. The visit’s importance resonated not only within Central Asia but also across Europe, given France’s substantial influence within the European Union (EU).

    The rationale behind France’s proactive efforts to bolster cooperation with Uzbekistan and the other Central Asian nations amid intense global power competition can be understood through several key factors.

    First and foremost, France is driven by its own ambition to adjust its status as a secondary actor in the strategically vital Central Asian region. The region is often viewed through a “great game” framework, with Russia striving to maintain its strong presence through organizations like the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), and China deeply embedding itself through the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). France’s enhanced engagement with Central Asian countries serves as a counterbalance to ensure that no single power dominates the Eurasian region.

    Second, France is keen on intensifying cooperation with Central Asian countries, especially with Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, to diversify its sources of energy. Recent disruptions in global energy markets, along with political tensions, have underscored the need for France to expand its energy import partners. Central Asia, with its untapped hydrocarbon reserves, offers a promising solution. Notably, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have significant uranium reserves, with Kazakhstan being the world’s largest producer and Uzbekistan the fifth largest. Given that approximately 70 percent of France’s electricity comes from nuclear power, deepening partnerships in the region could ensure a steady supply of uranium for French reactors.

    Third, France aims to enhance cooperation with Central Asian countries to reduce risks associated with the import of critical minerals, vital for the green energy transition. These minerals are essential in the production of a wide range of technologies, from smartphones and wind turbines to rechargeable batteries for electric vehicles. Despite being relatively underexplored, Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries have the potential to assist France and other EU countries at large in reducing their heavy dependence on China for these essential minerals, thereby mitigating the risks associated with their technological advancement.

    At the same time, France’s deliberate efforts to step up cooperation with some Central Asian countries on a strategic level could open up various opportunities for Tashkent across political, economic, and environmental dimensions. Strengthened ties with France offer Uzbekistan a chance to diversify its international engagement and enhance its international standing, creating opportunities for collaborative diplomacy in light of recent global trends and geopolitical developments in Eurasia. Addressing crucial regional issues can foster stability not only in Central Asia but also in Afghanistan, promoting peace in the broader region. Furthermore, political cooperation with Paris can significantly support the Uzbek government’s “Uzbekistan – 2030” strategy, outlining the country’s vision for the next seven years. France’s expressed willingness to support Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in their reform and modernization efforts aids in diversifying their international relations effectively.

    In addition to political collaboration, closer ties between Paris and Tashkent could facilitate greater economic and investment partnerships. The economic relationship between the two nations has flourished, marked by a tripling of joint ventures involving French companies in Uzbekistan. With an active project portfolio exceeding 10 billion euros, French businesses are poised to boost investments in Uzbekistan’s growing sectors. This collaboration not only promotes economic growth and job creation but also facilitates technology transfer. France’s expertise in technology, smart agriculture, and tourism can help Uzbekistan reduce its dependence on traditional industries, fostering economic diversification. Moreover, France, home to leading nuclear energy companies, can assist Uzbekistan in addressing the complexities of constructing a nuclear facility. This collaboration could promise a comprehensive and enduring partnership, contributing significantly to Uzbekistan’s energy sector.

    Beyond economic collaboration, Paris and Tashkent can join forces to tackle shared challenges related to water resources management. France’s expertise in sustainable water practices can assist Uzbekistan in efficient water use and conservation. Additionally, France can help mitigate the adverse effects of climate change by sharing green technologies and best practices. This support aids Uzbekistan in environmental conservation and sustainable development. Importantly, Paris can also mobilize public and private funding, particularly through guarantees and blending, to further increase investments for European initiatives like the Global Gateway on Water, Energy, and Climate.

    Despite all these positive rationales, there is a persistent challenge hindering enhanced cooperation between the two countries. This is the limited capacity of the Trans-Caspian Transport Route, also known as the “Middle Corridor.” which links China and Central Asia via the Caspian Sea to the Caucasus, Turkey, and Europe. In 2022, transit volumes through the Middle Corridor witnessed an impressive surge, nearly tripling compared to the previous year. This spike in trade activity has placed considerable strain on already overburdened borders, resulting in visible delays in cross-border transport operations.

    To address these challenges, France should collaborate closely with not only with Central Asian nations but also other EU countries to foster the development and prominence of the Middle Corridor. If achieved, it would reduce transit times from 38-53 days in the previous year to just 12-23 days. This would not only provide Europe with alternative optimal trade routes but also encourage the active participation of Central Asian nations in global connectivity and collaboration.

    In conclusion, France’s strategic moves in Central Asia, exemplified by Macron’s visit to Uzbekistan, are driven by a multifaceted approach, aiming to balance regional power dynamics, diversify energy sources, and ensure a stable supply of critical minerals for sustainable technological development. These efforts underscore France’s commitment to fostering cooperation and stability in the region, bearing broader implications for both Central Asia and Europe. At the same time, France’s deliberate efforts to strengthen cooperation with Uzbekistan can result in a multitude of opportunities for Tashkent. By focusing on political collaboration, economic growth, and environmental initiatives, both countries can foster mutual benefits, regional stability, and global partnerships.

    Looking ahead, the future prospects of the partnership between France and Uzbekistan are promising, offering mutual benefits in political, economic, and environmental dimensions. By leveraging each other’s strengths and addressing challenges collaboratively, both nations stand to gain significantly, contributing to regional stability, economic growth, and sustainable development in the years to come.

  • Canadian Cameco will increase uranium production next year

    Canadian Cameco will increase uranium production next year

    Its production share in the Kazakh joint venture “Inkai” remains highly profitable.

    Canadian uranium company Cameco plans to increase uranium production next year. This information is stated in its third-quarter report posted on the corporate website, as reported by inbusiness.kz.

    “Thanks to market improvements, new long-term contracts we have signed, and negotiation progress on contracts, we are maintaining our plans to increase uranium production to 36 million pounds (approximately 13.8 thousand tons) with 22.4 million pounds being our share (about 8.6 thousand tons), starting in 2024,” the report states.

    Recently, inbusiness.kz reported that more countries are ready to increase uranium production in the near future. It is also expected that in 2024, “Kazatomprom” will produce 10% below the planned parameters set in mining agreements with the government, compared to the previous target of 20% below. In September, the company’s board of directors approved an increase in production volumes in 2025 to 100% of the level stipulated in non-proliferation contracts, at around 30.5-31.5 thousand tons, an increase of 6 thousand tons from the previous year.

    According to “Vedomosti,” global uranium production increased by 6% to 50.4 thousand tons in 2022, with nuclear power plant demand at 63.5 thousand tons, and with commercial and strategic stockpiles, the total demand reached 74.3 thousand tons.

    By the way, speculative uranium funds increased their warehouse holdings. For example, Sprott Physical Uranium Trust (SPUT) increased its stocks by 5% to 62.2 million pounds (23.9 thousand tons) since the beginning of the year – it recently purchased 2.74 million pounds (about 1053 tons) on the spot market. Yellow Cake’s physical uranium volumes reached 20.16 million pounds (7.7 thousand tons), mainly purchased at a discount from “Kazatomprom.” In the first half of next year, Yellow Cake expects delivery of another 1.53 million pounds (587 tons) from the national uranium company at a price of $65.5 per pound, increasing its stocks to 21.68 million pounds (approximately 8.3 thousand tons). Currently, the spot price of uranium has approached $74 per pound, according to the UxC agency.

    By the way, in September, Cameco lowered its planned overall production targets for this year from 33 million pounds (12.7 thousand tons) of uranium with its share being 20.3 million pounds (7.8 thousand tons) to 30.3 million pounds (11.6 thousand tons) with a share of 18.7 million pounds (7.2 thousand tons).

    Meanwhile, the company’s production share in the third quarter at its key Canadian mines – Cigar Lake (54.5% stake) and McArthur River (70% stake)/Key Lake (83% stake) – increased to 3 million pounds (1154 tons) of uranium concentrate, which is 50% more than the 2 million pounds (769 tons) in the same period last year. In total, in the first nine months of this year, it produced 11.9 million pounds (4.6 thousand tons) in its share of these Canadian assets, an 80% increase compared to 6.6 million pounds (2.5 thousand tons) in January-September 2022.

    According to Cameco’s reports, the production of the Kazakh joint venture “Inkai,” in which the company is involved on a 100% basis, was 2 million pounds (769 tons) of uranium for the quarter and 6.3 million pounds (2.4 thousand tons) for the first nine months of this year. Last year, these indicators for the same periods were at the level of 2.3 million pounds (884 tons) and 5.8 million pounds (2.2 thousand tons), respectively. With the changes made to the 2016 agreement on “Inkai,” the company is entitled to purchase 4.2 million pounds (1.6 thousand tons), or 50% of the planned production volume of the joint venture of 8.3 million pounds (3.2 thousand tons) for this year. In this joint venture, Cameco controls 40% of the shares, and “Kazatomprom” – 60%.

    Last year, our publication reported that the Canadian nuclear company switched to trans-Caspian transit for its uranium, bypassing Russian territory. Recently, inbusiness.kz reported that this year, 228 containers of uranium concentrate were shipped from Aktau to the Baku port of Alyat, destined for the Georgian port of Poti via the Caspian, likely including volumes from Cameco in addition to Kazatomprom batches. Another hundred containers were expected to be shipped by the end of the year.

    “The first shipment, containing approximately two-thirds of our share in Inkai’s production in 2023, is currently on its way. We expect the batch to arrive by the end of 2023. The second batch with the remaining volume of our share of production in 2023 is expected to be shipped by the end of the year and arrive in early 2024,” Cameco’s report clarifies.

    The return on equity from “Inkai” in the third quarter was $35 million compared to $9 million for the same period last year. For the nine months, the company’s share income reached $100 million, exceeding $78 million for the first three quarters of 2022, according to the report. Judging by the financial indicators, the “Inkai” joint venture remains a highly profitable company. Thus, its profit for the third quarter was $49 million, and for the first nine months of this year, it reached $160 million.

  • Fire at ArcelorMittal’s coal mine in Kazakhstan kills 45 people

    Fire at ArcelorMittal’s coal mine in Kazakhstan kills 45 people

    Afire at the Kostenko coal mine in the Karaganda region of Kazakhstan has killed 45 people.

    The incident took place on 28 October at the mine, which is operated by ArcelorMittal Temirtau, the local unit of steelmaker ArcelorMittal.

    It is believed there was a methane blast. At the time of the incident, 206 of 252 people at the mine were evacuated safely.

    Kazakhstan’s emergency services said on social media: “As of 3pm (09:00 GMT), the bodies of 42 people were found. The search for four miners continues.”

    Although the authorities recovered bodies of other three miners, a rescue operation is under way for the last missing miner.

    ArcelorMittal also halted operation of coal unit mines for 24 hours to undertake gas protection checks.

  • Kazakhstan becomes an attractive ‘nuclear’ player

    Kazakhstan becomes an attractive ‘nuclear’ player

    Kazakhstan will hold a referendum in the near future to decide whether to build its first nuclear power plant, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev said in his annual address to the Kazakh people in September.

    The government of Kazakhstan, which is the vastest and resource-richest Central Asian nation, has long discussed the idea, citing the need to diversify its power generation capacity, and has even identified a proposed site for the plant in the south-eastern Almaty region.

    “We have the technology, we have the resources and we have the will to develop nuclear power generation, provided that the people of Kazakhstan vote in favour of such a move in the national referendum”, Kazakhstan’s deputy Foreign Minister Roman Vassilenko told a press conference in Astana, attended by Euractiv. 

    He added that a precise date had not yet been set but would be announced “in due course.”

    According to Astana-based expert Issatay Minuarov, the referendum is likely to yield a positive answer, and open the way to the construction of the first nuclear power plant. 

    “In general, people are not against the idea,” he said, adding that some fears remain due to the country’s history with nuclear power. He referred to the nuclear test site of Semipalatinsk in northeast Kazakhstan, where the USSR conducted 456 nuclear tests from 1949 until 1989 with little regard for their effect on the local people or environment.

    Reservations on nuclear despite huge potential

    Today’s Kazakhstan is an undisputed leader in uranium mining, accounting for 42% of world production, with the Kazatomprom National Atomic Company accounting for 22%, the state fund Samruk Kazyna reported on 29 August.

    Kazatomprom is therefore the world’s largest uranium producer, with its subsidiaries, affiliates and joint ventures developing 26 deposits grouped into 14 uranium mining companies.

    But in spite of these riches, Kazakhstan abandoned nuclear energy after the Soviet era due to environmental and proliferation concerns and a desire to project a new image as a responsible and peace-loving country.

    Despite inheriting a large stockpile of nuclear weapons from the Soviet Union, Kazakhstan gave up this arsenal and joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation.

    “On 29 August, the world observed the UN International Day against Nuclear Tests, the same day Kazakhstan closed the Semipalatinsk nuclear test site in 1991 and voluntarily relinquished the world’s fourth-largest nuclear arsenal, inherited from the Soviet Union,” Vassilenko said during the press conference.

    “This action underscores our unwavering commitment to global stability and a nuclear-weapon-free world,” he added.

    Nuclear balancing act

    But the race towards strategically important minerals led the country to envision a change in its energy mix and include more nuclear in a bid to reach its carbon neutrality goals it set for 2060. 

    Today, Kazakhstan’s main source of electricity is coal, which accounts for around 70% of the country’s power generation and is among the cheapest in the world to produce. Adding nuclear power to the mix seems a logical step, but not without some delicate geopolitical considerations.

    “We’re now considering France, South Korea, Russia, and China as countries to work with us on this nuclear plant,” said expert Issatay Minuarov, adding that it will require a certain amount of political tact and balance to manage the expectations of these different actors.

    A source close to the issue confirmed to Euractiv that building the nuclear power plant is a geopolitical conundrum for Astana. 

    “On the one hand, the Kazakhs cannot risk being sanctioned by the EU, their main trading partner, by joining forces with Russia. On the other, aligning only with an EU country like France would send a very unpleasant signal to Moscow,” the source said. 

    The source recalled that the Kremlin used the perceived threat of a nuclear-capable Ukraine as one of the justifications for its invasion of the country in 2022.

    “We’re not crazy enough to develop nuclear weapons,” Minuarov said, adding that Astana’s strong opposition to nuclear weapons and diplomatic efforts in this direction speak for themselves.

    Renewed international interest

    Kazakhstan’s reserves of uranium and other strategic minerals are now being eagerly courted by other international players, as evidenced by French President Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Astana on 1-2 November.

    “I do not underestimate the geopolitical difficulties, the pressures and sometimes the jostling to which you may be subjected. France looks to you with great consideration, respect and friendship”, Macron declared in Astana.

    France is the fifth largest foreign investor in Kazakhstan, ahead of China, thanks in particular to the presence of the oil group TotalEnergies, which jointly operates the large Kachagan field in the Caspian Sea. Bilateral trade amounted to €5.3 billion in 2022, mainly in hydrocarbons, and Kazakhstan also supplies France with almost 40% of its uranium.

    Following Macron’s diplomatic trip, several contracts and declarations were signed, including a joint declaration of intent between France and Kazakhstan on cooperation in the field of strategic raw materials.

    “Do we really have a choice?” commented a source close to the matter. “With the fiasco of French policy in Africa, and Niger in particular, Central Asia is going to take on more and more importance in the minds of Europeans.”

    “But we are not the only ones looking in that direction”, the source said, as China and Turkey in particular are seeking to carve out a place for themselves in Central Asia. 

  • Why France’s Emmanuel Macron is courting Central Asia

    Why France’s Emmanuel Macron is courting Central Asia

    The trip is partly an attempt to drum up business and foster links with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, but the key to understanding the presidential visit dates back to last July.

    A military coup in the West African country of Niger raised the prospect that supplies to France’s vital nuclear industry might be in jeopardy.

    In reality, the fears were overblown. Last year, Niger was only the second supplier of uranium to France. The first was the Central Asian country of Kazakhstan.

    President Macron spent Wednesday in Kazakhstan, the world’s largest producer of uranium. On Thursday, he is in Uzbekistan, like its neighbour a key producer of the fuel. Both are led by authoritarian governments.

    During a press conference in Wednesday Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev praised France as a “key and reliable partner”. Mr Macron returned the compliment, thanking Mr Tokayev for abiding by Western sanctions on Russia.

    With Russian oil exports to the EU having dropped precipitously since the invasion of Ukraine, Kazakhstan is now the EU’s third-largest petroleum supplier, after Norway and the US.

    But it is Central Asian uranium that is of particular interest to France, which relies on nuclear energy to generate more than 60% of its electricity, the highest share of any country. In return, Kazakhstan is seeking French knowhow as it seeks to develop its own engineers and domestic nuclear power industry.

    “The Kazakhs are very interested in our nuclear expertise,” said a member of the French delegation in Kazakhstan.

    France’s state-owned EDF is in the running to build Kazakhstan’s first nuclear power plant, while the government in Paris wants French universities to establish branches in Kazakhstan, the delegate said.

    France has traditionally imported a large share – though not most – of its uranium from mines operated by French companies in Niger. The future of that supply has been in doubt since a military coup brought an anti-French junta to power in July.

    At the time, Paris said the coup posed no immediate threat to its energy supply, claiming that it had enough uranium stocks to last around two years.

    But Mr Macron’s visit underlines the jitteriness felt in Paris about knock-in effects of political instability in such a vital supplier.

    The visit comes as Central Asia undergoes a profound shift in its relations with Russia, which dominated the region for over a century, says Dosym Satpayev, a political analyst based in Kazakhstan’s capital Astana.

    In the wake of the war in Ukraine, he said Russian influence there was diminishing.

    “There is less military co-operation, the perception of Russia since the war has worsened,” says Mr Satpayev. “Central Asian governments are not talking openly about it – but it is happening.”

    Accordingly, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov last week denounced attempts to pull “neighbours, friends and allies” away from Moscow.

    But there are tensions in the budding relationship too.

    The EU and US have warned that Russia is bypassing sanctions by importing goods from the West via Central Asian countries. According to an investigation by the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP), these include DJI drones and Western-built microchips, imported via Russian-owned subsidiaries in Kazakhstan.

    The goods and components are used to fuel Russia’s war effort, the OCCRP says.

    As Russia beds in for a long war and Ukraine frets about Western support eroding its ability to hold off Moscow’s forces, the issue of parallel imports could prove a stumbling block in the budding Central Asia-EU warming of relations.

    Just as significant a theme is countering China’s influence.

    While Beijing still has a relatively light military presence in the region, its economic footprint in Central Asia has increased significantly in recent years. The “Belt” section of China’s Belt and Road initiative (BRI) refers to overland routes from China to Europe via Central Asia.

    More than 100 BRI projects have been funded in Central Asia, so that new projects are colloquially described as “Chinese”, reports say.

    France and the EU can never hope to match that degree of financial clout in a region that directly borders China.

    But with his visit, Mr Macron hopes to exploit the strategic opportunity presented by the war in Ukraine to tempt some of Russia’s traditional partners to look West.

  • The suspension of the Sotk Mine has had a negative impact on Armenia’s economy

    The suspension of the Sotk Mine has had a negative impact on Armenia’s economy

    The Finance Minister of Armenia, Vahé Ovannisyan, has indicated that economic activity growth in the nation has been negatively impacted by the suspension of operations at the Sotk Gold Mine in Gegharkunik Province.

    Periodic shelling by Azerbaijani armed forces had led mine operator GeoPromining Gold to halt open-pit mining at Sotk in May. While work continued in closed sections as per the provincial governor in October, industrial sector performance suffered due to the suspension, according to the minister.

    Between January and September, Armenia’s overall economic activity increased 9.7%, though expansion slowed in September from the prior month’s rates. Exports rose 48% driven by a tripling of re-exports to Russia, even as locally produced goods shipments fell slightly.

    Tourist numbers visiting Armenia in this period grew 48.8% to 1.85 million people, over half of whom were Russian. Other positive indicators included a 17.4% increase in salaries during the first half, along with employment expanding 5.8% as unemployment declined 16%. Unemployment reached an historically low national level of 11.7% in the second quarter.