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  • Central Asia’s Critical Minerals Moment: What the Reports Don’t Tell You

    Central Asia’s Critical Minerals Moment: What the Reports Don’t Tell You

    A Deep-Dive Analysis | MINEX Forum

    Download report (as pdf)

    Something significant has shifted. In the span of eighteen months, Central Asia has moved from a footnote in Washington and Brussels policy documents to a headline. The Caspian Policy Center’s new report — ‘Central Asia and the New Critical Minerals Frontier: Progress in Reshaping Global Supply Chains’ — is the latest in a wave of think-tank, government, and investor analyses arriving at the same conclusion: the region’s critical mineral resources are strategically indispensable.

    This analysis cuts through the optimism to ask the harder questions. What has actually changed on the ground? Which players are genuinely committed versus which are signing MoUs for photo opportunities? And by 2030, what will Central Asia’s real role be in the global supply of critical raw materials?

    This analysis draws on the CPC report, the EU Institute for Security Studies’ Chaillot Paper on China’s critical raw material weapon, the C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue in Astana on 10 June 2026, the Carnegie Endowment’s analysis of the Middle Corridor, the CFR’s report on leapfrogging China’s dominance, and the Forum’s accumulated perspective from running MINEX Asia, MINEX Europe, and MINEX Eurasia.

    1. The Geopolitical Wake-Up: Real, But Overdue

    The CPC report is unambiguous: critical mineral supply chains are no longer an economic issue — they are a national security and geopolitical issue. China controls approximately 90% of global rare earth refining, 60% of lithium processing, and over 70% of cobalt refining. By 2022, China controlled 100% of global graphite processing. These are not numbers that have crept up on policymakers. They have been visible for years. What has changed is the willingness to act — and the nature of Beijing’s own use of this leverage.

    The EUISS Chaillot Paper published in May 2026 makes for sober reading. Beijing’s sharp reduction of critical raw material exports in 2025 — covering germanium, gallium, antimony, bismuth, and rare earths — was not a one-off retaliation against US semiconductor restrictions. It evolved into a systematic geo-economic weapon. The paper documents how China used its export licensing regime to extract information about Western defence-industrial networks, coerce EU trade policy on electric vehicle tariffs, and deter Japan from strengthening its defence posture on Taiwan.

    What is less widely understood is how the apparent ‘détente’ of late 2025 conceals a structural tightening. The October 2025 rare earth export controls were suspended for one year as part of the Xi–Trump Busan summit deal — they are due to re-activate in November 2026. Critically, the April 2025 controls remain fully in force; only the October tranche was suspended. More consequentially, China’s export licensing architecture now includes extraterritorial provisions that allow Beijing to restrict re-exports of products containing Chinese-origin rare earth content even between third countries. The détente is not a resolution. It is a one-year suppression of symptoms while the structural disease remains untreated.

    China does not merely hold rocks in the ground. It holds the refinery, the processing plant, the magnet manufacturer, and the pricing mechanism. Owning a deposit in Central Asia without access to non-Chinese processing is like owning an oil field with no pipeline.

    This is the fundamental reality that too many Western policy documents still dance around. The CPC report is admirably direct about the midstream gap — the fact that even where Western investors enter Central Asian mining, the ore typically still travels east for processing. Closing that gap requires not just exploration investment but decades of patient capital in refining and processing infrastructure. That capital has not yet materialised at the required scale.

     

    2. The MoU Inflation Problem

    What should concern anyone serious about this sector is the following. The United States, the EU, Japan, South Korea, and Türkiye are all engaged in what the Forum terms ‘MoU inflation’ with Central Asian governments. The CPC report catalogues a remarkable number of bilateral frameworks, memoranda of understanding, and strategic partnerships signed since 2025. The C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue in Astana on 10 June produced more of the same.

    These instruments are not worthless — they establish political will and create frameworks for future action. Kazakhstan’s Minister of Industry, Yersayin Nagaspayev, rightly highlighted that Kazakhstan has adopted a new Subsoil and Subsoil Use Code, implemented a ‘first come, first served’ licensing principle, launched a unified digital subsoil platform, and fully adopted CRIRSCO international reporting standards since 2024. Investment in geological exploration has tripled since 2018, exceeding one billion dollars. Western majors including BHP (via its Xplor programme), First Quantum Minerals, Ivanhoe Mines, Teck Resources, Fortescue, and US-based Cove Capital have entered the Kazakh market. Chinese companies are moving faster and at greater scale: Zijin Mining completed a $1.2 billion acquisition of Kazakhstan’s Raygorodok gold mine in October 2025, adding to its existing operations at the Taldybulak Levoberezhny mine in Kyrgyzstan and the Jilau and Taror gold mines in Tajikistan — a three-country “Gold Triangle” across Central Asia. East Hope Group — one of China’s largest private industrial conglomerates and a top-ten global aluminium producer — is advancing a $12.6 billion fully integrated aluminium cluster in Kazakhstan’s Kostanay and Aktobe regions: bauxite mining, a two million tonne per year alumina refinery, a one million tonne per year primary aluminium smelter, and a captive one-gigawatt power plant. The project framework was signed with the Kazakh government in February 2025 and geological exploration of eleven deposits is already under way. If delivered, it would be one of the largest single foreign direct investment projects in Kazakhstan’s industrial history. China National Gold Group has signed an MoU with Uzbekistan covering geological exploration and technology transfer. These are real signals of intent — though the Western and Chinese signals point in very different directions.

    But the gap between MoU and mine is measured not in months but in decades. The CPC report states this plainly: developing a major mining project from inception to production can take twenty or more years. Processing and refining require additional capital beyond the mine gate. Political cycles — in Washington, in Brussels, and in Central Asian capitals — run on four-to-five-year horizons. China’s BRI financing runs on twenty-year horizons. This asymmetry is not a detail. It is the central challenge of Western engagement with Central Asia’s mineral sector.

    The question is not whether Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, or Tajikistan have the minerals. They do. The question is whether Western partners have the institutional patience, the risk appetite, and the financing instruments to compete with a counterparty that thinks in decades, not electoral cycles.

    The US International Development Finance Corporation’s recent approval of USD 2.5 billion in strategic investments and the C5+1 roadmap for geological exploration, mining and processing, and global value chain integration are positive steps. But the gap between announced capital and deployed capital in this region remains historically wide. The Forum has documented this cycle repeatedly: enthusiasm peaks around major geopolitical events, and then the deals stall in permitting, due diligence, or financing committees.

     

    3. Where the Real Business Opportunities Are

    The following sets out where genuine commercial opportunities are opening up, rather than where the diplomatic activity is concentrated.

    3.1  Midstream Processing — The Untapped Prize

    The CPC report’s section on closing the midstream gap is the most commercially important part of the document. Central Asia produces raw ore and exports it, largely to China, which captures the value-added margin in processing and refining. The governments in the region know this and want to change it. Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan have explicitly stated they want to develop industrial clusters that capture more of the value chain domestically.

    For investors and mining companies, this creates a specific opportunity: joint ventures in processing and refining that give Central Asian governments the industrial development they want and give Western offtake partners the supply chain security they need. This is not easy — it requires technology transfer, long-term offtake agreements, and patient capital — but it is where the alignment of interests is strongest. Companies with refining technology and Western governments with DFI instruments should be looking at this window seriously.

    3.2  The Middle Corridor — A Structural Shift in Logistics, With a Named Weak Link

    Freight along the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route has increased fivefold in seven years, reaching 4.1 million tonnes across the Caspian in 2024 alone. The war in Ukraine has accelerated this, but the trend is structural. For critical minerals, the Middle Corridor offers an alternative to Chinese-controlled logistics networks. Kazakhstan’s commitment to developing this route is serious, and the Hormuz blockade in place since February 2026 — with oil above $110 a barrel at the time of writing — is providing a live demonstration of exactly why overland alternatives to maritime choke points matter.

    But the optimism around the corridor needs to be tempered by a specific and underreported vulnerability. Georgia is currently the corridor’s only gateway to Europe. Until the TRIPP route via Armenia and Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave becomes operational, Tbilisi is structurally irreplaceable. Yet the Georgian government has just cut funding for the Anaklia deep-sea port — identified by both the World Bank and the EU’s Trans-European Transport Network as the corridor’s central infrastructure priority — from 150 million lari to 50 million lari. Georgia’s existing port capacity is already nearing exhaustion.

    The explanation for this decision is contested, but one strand is disturbing: after a Western-led consortium lost the Anaklia contract in 2020, the Georgian government selected as its preferred contractor a Chinese-Singaporean firm currently under US sanctions. There is a credible case that Beijing, which benefits from the Northern (Russian) Corridor and has no strategic interest in the Middle Corridor displacing it, is quietly applying pressure on Tbilisi to limit the western terminus’s capacity.

    Kazakhstan’s position in this corridor is more structural than is commonly appreciated: approximately 80% of all rail cargo travelling between China and Europe already passes through Kazakhstan, making it not an emerging alternative route but the existing backbone of Eurasian overland trade. The commercial opportunity in the corridor’s logistics and infrastructure layer is real — port capacity at Aktau and Kuryk, rail and intermodal connectivity through Azerbaijan and Georgia to Türkiye — but companies positioning in this space need to price in the Georgia risk. Türkiye’s role as the corridor’s westernmost reliable node therefore becomes more, not less, strategically significant if Georgia continues to under-invest.

    3.3  Uranium — The Quiet Giant

    Central Asia produces approximately 50% of global uranium. Kazakhstan alone, through Kazatomprom, dominates global supply. The US Geological Survey has added uranium to its updated list of critical minerals. As the energy security debate in Europe and the US re-centres on nuclear power as a baseload complement to renewables, and as advanced reactor programmes (SMRs in particular) gather momentum, uranium supply security from non-Russian, non-Chinese sources becomes a premium.

    The investment thesis for uranium in Kazakhstan is arguably more mature and more deliverable than for rare earths, precisely because the infrastructure already exists. The opportunity is in midstream — converting, enriching, and fabricating fuel outside of Russian-controlled supply chains — and in ensuring Western utilities have long-term offtake agreements with Kazakh producers.

    3.3a  Titanium — The Overlooked Aerospace Play

    Titanium rarely features in critical minerals analysis focused on Central Asia, yet Kazakhstan accounts for approximately 20% of the global aerospace-grade titanium market — a concrete, active commercial relationship, not a geological aspiration. This matters because aerospace titanium supply has been severely disrupted by the Russia sanctions regime: VSMPO-AVISMA, previously the dominant Western supplier accounting for roughly 30% of global aerospace titanium, became inaccessible to Western manufacturers after 2022. Boeing, Airbus, and their tier-one suppliers have been seeking alternative sources ever since. Kazakhstan’s existing market position fills part of that gap and has been doing so quietly while the policy debate concentrates on rare earths and lithium. Titanium is now on both the EU and US critical minerals lists. For investors and industrial offtake partners, the titanium story in Kazakhstan differs from the rare earth story in one crucial respect: the supply chain is already functioning. The opportunity is in expanding and securing existing capacity, not in building it from scratch.

    3.4  Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan — Early-Stage, High-Risk, Potentially High-Reward

    The CPC report and the C5+1 framework rightly include Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. Kumtor Gold in Kyrgyzstan and Zarafshon Gold in Tajikistan are the flagship projects, but the rare earth and critical mineral potential in both countries is largely unexplored. Legal frameworks are weaker, infrastructure is thinner, and political risk is higher. But for investors and juniors willing to absorb early-stage risk, the geological endowment is compelling.

    The legal reform chapter of the CPC report is a necessary reality check here. As Dr. Ruchan Kaya argues directly: No Reform, No Mining. Without clear subsoil use codes, transparent licensing, independent dispute resolution, and ESG frameworks compatible with Western capital markets, foreign investment will remain shallow. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have work to do.

    3.5  Technology Transfer and Workforce Development

    Central Asian governments are unanimous on one point: they do not want to be raw material exporters indefinitely. They want technology transfer, workforce development, and the creation of domestic industrial capacity. This creates a genuine market for mining engineering services, training, metallurgical technology, and environmental management expertise. European, Japanese, and South Korean companies with this expertise have an opening that pure extractive investors do not.

     

    4. The Six-Party Chess Board: China, Russia, USA, EU, Türkiye, Japan/South Korea

    China — The Incumbent with a Structural Advantage

    China’s position in Central Asian critical minerals is not primarily about geology. It is about infrastructure, processing capacity, financing terms, and decades of relationship-building. The BRI has locked in logistical corridors, off-take agreements, and debt obligations that are difficult to unwind quickly. Chinese firms continue to invest at scale: Zijin Mining — now the world’s fourth-largest gold producer — has assembled a “Gold Triangle” across Kazakhstan (Raygorodok, $1.2 billion acquisition completed October 2025), Kyrgyzstan (Taldybulak Levoberezhny), and Tajikistan (Jilau and Taror mines, where it is the largest gold producer accounting for over 70% of national output). East Hope Group — one of China’s largest private industrial conglomerates and a top-ten global aluminium producer — is advancing a $12.6 billion fully integrated aluminium cluster in Kazakhstan: bauxite mining, a two million tonne per year alumina refinery, a one million tonne per year primary aluminium smelter, and a captive one-gigawatt power plant across the Kostanay and Aktobe regions. The framework agreement was signed with Astana in February 2025; geological exploration of eleven bauxite and coal deposits is already under way. If delivered, it would be one of the largest single foreign direct investment projects in Kazakhstan’s industrial history — and a textbook example of the integrated industrial model China deploys while Western investors are still circling at the MoU stage. China National Gold Group is advancing into Uzbekistan via government-level MoUs on exploration and technology transfer. Chinese cumulative investment in Central Asia reached $35.9 billion by mid-2025, a 1.5-fold increase since 2020, with Kazakhstan in the first half of 2025 alone attracting an estimated $23 billion in BRI-linked commitments — making it the single largest BRI capital recipient globally in that period. Any honest assessment must acknowledge that China will remain the dominant actor in Central Asian mineral supply chains throughout the 2020s.

    The more important question is whether China’s dominance is vulnerable to a strategic discontinuity rather than gradual erosion. The CFR’s February 2026 report makes an argument that cuts against the grain of most current thinking: the United States cannot out-mine or out-process China, and attempting to do so is the wrong strategy. The correct approach is to leapfrog China’s dominance through innovation — scaling rare-earth-free magnets, mine tailings recovery, e-waste recycling, and AI-accelerated materials science. If this thesis is correct, the entire paradigm of building competing mine-to-magnet supply chains in Central Asia may be strategically secondary to the innovation race happening in US and allied laboratories. Central Asian governments and their Western partners should be alert to this possibility: the strategic premium on Central Asian deposits is real today, but it is not permanent if substitute materials technologies mature.

    Russia — The Shadow Partner

    Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has paradoxically accelerated Central Asia’s strategic importance to the West while complicating its own position in the region. Central Asian governments are navigating with care — they cannot afford to antagonise Moscow, which retains significant economic and security leverage, but they are actively diversifying. Russia’s ability to invest in and benefit from Central Asian critical mineral development is constrained by sanctions, capital flight, and the rerouting of its own economy. For the near term, Russia’s role is more that of a constraint than a competitor in the Western engagement story.

    United States — Urgency Without Sustained Patience

    Washington’s engagement since 2025 has been substantive. Project Vault (a USD 12 billion public-private reserve initiative), FORGE (the Forum on Resource Geostrategic Engagement), the Critical Minerals Ministerial with 54 countries, and the DFC’s Central Asia investment pipeline represent genuine institutional commitments. The C5+1 framework gives the US a multilateral architecture in the region.

    However, it is important to understand what FORGE actually is — and what it is not. The Atlantic Council’s analysis makes a distinction that most coverage obscures: FORGE is structurally different from its predecessor, the Minerals Security Partnership. The MSP functioned primarily as a pooled investment co-ordination vehicle. FORGE is designed as a ‘membership by trade’ model — participation conditioned on adherence to shared market rules and price floors, rather than joint capital deployment. Investment remains bilateral. This means FORGE will not produce a multilateral investment fund for Kazakhstani or Uzbekistani mining projects. It will produce a shared pricing and trade architecture that in theory de-risks bilateral deals — but the capital mobilisation burden still falls on individual governments and DFIs acting separately. For Central Asian partners watching from Astana or Tashkent, this distinction matters enormously.

    It is worth keeping the bilateral relationship in perspective: Kazakhstan has attracted more than $480 billion in cumulative foreign direct investment since independence, with gross FDI inflows reaching $20.5 billion in 2024 and investors from more than 120 countries currently active in the country. The US relationship is therefore being built onto an already diversified investment base, not into a vacuum. Kazakhstan signed USD 17 billion in new bilateral agreements with the US during President Tokayev’s November 2025 Washington visit, while Uzbekistan committed to investing up to USD 35 billion in the US over the next three years — directions of flow and deal structures that differ significantly, but which together signal that the C5+1 relationship has acquired genuine commercial weight. But commercial weight at the announcement stage and capital deployed in-country are different things.

    The European Union — Engaged But Fragmented

    The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act and the selection of 60 Strategic Projects — including Kazakhstan and Ukraine as external partner countries — represent a serious policy commitment. But the EUISS Chaillot Paper is damning on Europe’s pace of execution: American, Japanese, and particularly European diversification efforts are not on track to replace the volume or range of China-dominated production over the next decade.

    The EU’s problem goes deeper than slow bureaucracy or fragmented financing instruments. As of late 2025, despite all the summits, roadmaps, and declared billions, only five EU companies have actually invested in CRM projects in Central Asia. That is not a financing gap problem — it is a near-total absence of private sector engagement. EU policy documents treat Central Asia as five countries of strategic importance; EU commercial reality has concentrated almost entirely on Kazakhstan, which is the only fully recognised EU external strategic partner with both the resource base and the legal framework for large-scale collaboration. Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and even Uzbekistan remain largely outside the EU’s actual investment footprint despite featuring prominently in its diplomatic declarations. Brussels risks building an elaborate architecture of frameworks and roadmaps that covers five countries on paper but delivers in one.

    Türkiye — The Underappreciated Swing Player

    Türkiye’s role in Central Asian critical minerals deserves far more analytical attention than it currently receives. Ankara’s position as a NATO member, a pragmatic economic partner to both Russia and China, and the institutional convener of the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS) gives it a combination of relationships that no other actor in this space possesses.

    The OTS — which brings together Türkiye, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Azerbaijan, and observer states — is an increasingly active institutional vehicle for economic co-operation amongst Turkic-speaking nations. For critical minerals specifically, it creates a framework for Türkiye to position itself not merely as a transit corridor but as a co-investor and processing ally for Central Asian governments that want to move up the value chain.

    The strategic picture that emerges from available data is striking in its specificity. Türkiye’s mineral engagement operates across four distinct partner-and-material vectors:

     

    Partner Key Materials / Vectors Türkiye’s Function
    Central Asia Boron, refined REEs, battery recyclables Co-investor and institutional processing ally via the Organisation of Turkic States (OTS)
    China Manganese, chromium, lithium, copper Supply chain alternative and competitor in REE midstream processing
    Russia & Iran Light and heavy rare earth oxides Corridor guardian; bypassing northern routes via the Middle Corridor
    Logistics vectors Transport infrastructure, regional border security Gateway and facilitator for Eurasian mineral freight flows

     

    Read together, these vectors tell a coherent story. Türkiye is positioning itself simultaneously as a co-investor with Central Asian partners in boron and REE processing (leveraging the OTS institutional framework), as a competitive alternative to China in REE midstream capacity, and as the indispensable corridor guardian for the Middle Corridor route that bypasses both Russia and Iran.

    What is new and underreported is the domestic industrial ambition underpinning this positioning. At the OECD Critical Minerals Forum in Istanbul in April 2026, Türkiye’s Energy and Natural Resources Minister Alparslan Bayraktar made a declaration that amounts to a strategic doctrine: “Having resources alone is no longer sufficient. You must be able to process them. Türkiye is building exactly that, combining extraction with deep processing capacity and high-tech industrial value creation.” The Beylikova REE project in Eskişehir province — described by Bayraktar as potentially one of the world’s largest deposits — already has a pilot facility operational, with plans for full industrial production including separation and processing of rare earth oxides for permanent magnets. A comprehensive Critical Raw Materials strategy is forthcoming from Ankara. This is not transit ambition. This is industrial policy.

    The active Iran conflict and Hormuz disruption, which Bayraktar explicitly cited at the same forum, reinforces the Middle Corridor’s necessity. The corridor’s importance is no longer merely a response to the Ukraine war and the sanctioning of Russian routes — it is now being validated in real time by a second simultaneous crisis in maritime supply chains. Türkiye’s own boron endowment — approximately 73% of the world’s reserves — and the January 2026 mining sector MoU with Uzbekistan, which carries the weight of a presidential-level strategic council endorsement rather than a routine ministerial agreement, position Ankara as a co-architect of the post-Chinese supply chain rather than a passive transit facilitator.

    The MINEX Asia Forum in Ankara on 24–25 June sits at exactly this intersection. Whether Türkiye chooses to deepen its processing and co-investment role, or remains primarily a corridor facilitator, will significantly shape the commercial geography of Central Asian mineral exports through 2030 and beyond.

    Japan and South Korea — Quiet but Serious

    Japan and South Korea have some of the most sophisticated critical mineral diversification programmes of any Western-aligned economies. Japan’s rare earth diversification after China’s 2010 export restriction was a decade-long institutional effort that produced real results. South Korea’s Korea Zinc committed USD 7.4 billion to new zinc refining in the US in 2025. Both countries are watching Central Asia closely and have existing relationships — South Korean companies are active in Kazakhstan’s energy and industrial sectors.

    The EUISS paper notes that US and Japanese stockpiling and state-sponsored diversification efforts have been more successful than Europe’s — and that this risks disrupting the level playing field between downstream industries. Japan and South Korea’s engagement in Central Asia is likely to deepen significantly through 2030, and they may prove more reliable long-term partners than the US for the Central Asians, precisely because they have demonstrated institutional continuity in minerals diplomacy.

     

    5. A 2030 Forecast: Honest Probabilities, Not Promotional Headlines

    Based on the analysis above, the Forum’s assessment of where Central Asia is likely to stand in the global critical minerals picture by 2030 is as follows.

    What Will Likely Have Happened

    Kazakhstan will have advanced several significant critical mineral projects, particularly in uranium conversion and enrichment outside Russian supply chains, and in copper with one or two major Western-backed expansions. The Middle Corridor will carry materially higher volumes of goods, including mineral concentrates, with improved port and rail infrastructure — assuming the Georgia bottleneck is resolved, either through Tbilisi reversing course on Anaklia or through the TRIPP route becoming operational.

    Uzbekistan will have attracted significant investment in gold and copper, building on its already-strong trajectory, and will have made progress on rare earth exploration, though commercial production at scale is unlikely before 2030.

    Türkiye will have deepened its institutional role through the OTS and established at least one significant co-processing or co-investment arrangement with a Central Asian partner, most likely in boron derivatives or light rare earth oxides. The Beylikova project will have moved from pilot to initial industrial scale, giving Ankara credible processing capacity for the first time.

    FORGE will have produced a shared pricing architecture and several concrete offtake agreements. However, because FORGE is a trade-rules framework rather than a pooled investment vehicle, the capital mobilisation it generates will be diffuse and bilateral rather than concentrated and strategic. The gap between FORGE’s institutional ambition and its actual investment footprint in Central Asia will remain a source of frustration.

    Processing and refining capacity in Central Asia will have increased from its current low base, but will still represent a small fraction of what is needed to be genuinely China-independent. The midstream gap will have narrowed, not closed.

    What Will Likely Not Have Happened

    Central Asia will not have become a major supplier of processed rare earth materials to Western markets by 2030. The timeline from geological survey to commercial rare earth processing facility is typically fifteen to twenty years, and the clock has not been running long enough.

    China’s dominance in processing will not have been broken. It may have been reduced at the margin — particularly for specific materials where Western-backed alternatives have been developed — but the structural advantage Beijing built over three decades cannot be unwound in five years.

    A unified, coherent Western investment approach to Central Asia will not have materialised. The EU, US, Japan, South Korea, and Türkiye will continue to operate largely in parallel rather than in co-ordination, missing the synergies that a genuinely multilateral approach could generate.

    The Wild Cards

    Innovation as disruptor. The CFR’s February 2026 analysis argues that the US and its allies cannot out-mine or out-process China — and should not try. The alternative is to leapfrog China’s dominance through disruptive technologies: rare-earth-free magnets that eliminate the most geopolitically vulnerable inputs, mine tailings recovery that yields critical minerals from existing waste streams faster and more cheaply than new extraction, and e-waste recycling at industrial scale. If these technologies mature faster than expected, the strategic premium on Central Asian deposits could diminish even as geopolitical interest in the region remains high. For Central Asian governments, this is both a warning and an opportunity: the window in which their geological endowment commands maximum strategic attention may be narrower than current diplomatic momentum implies.

    The China re-activation deadline. The October 2025 rare earth export controls suspended under the Xi–Trump deal are due to re-activate in November 2026 unless the deal is renewed. By the time of MINEX Eurasia in London on 30 November, this will be an immediate live issue. If Beijing re-activates, the urgency around alternative supply chains — including Central Asian ones — will intensify sharply. If it extends the suspension, the pressure on Western governments to maintain costly diversification programmes will ease, potentially slowing capital deployment.

    Geopolitical escalation beyond Ukraine. The Hormuz blockade has already demonstrated that disruption can arrive simultaneously from multiple directions. Central Asia’s importance as both a resource base and a logistics corridor increases with every crisis in maritime routes. But escalation can also redirect capital and political attention away from the patient, long-horizon work of building supply chains.

    Domestic political stability in Central Asia itself is not guaranteed. Kyrgyzstan in particular has experienced significant political turbulence. Investors will need to see sustained legal and regulatory reform to deploy long-term capital at scale.

    Conclusion: The Window Is Open — But Not Indefinitely

    Central Asia’s critical minerals moment is real. The geology is there. The geopolitical will is growing. The legal frameworks are improving in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The Middle Corridor is becoming a genuine alternative logistics route — though its Georgian gateway is more fragile than most analyses acknowledge. And for the first time in a generation, Central Asian governments are actively seeking to diversify away from exclusive dependence on Chinese and Russian capital and markets.

    But the picture is more complicated than the wave of optimistic policy documents suggests. FORGE is a trade-rules architecture, not a capital deployment machine — and the distinction matters for Central Asia. The EU has five companies on the ground despite its ambitious declarations. China’s export control détente has a hard expiry date in November 2026. And the CFR’s innovation thesis raises a genuinely uncomfortable question: what if the West’s best path to supply chain security runs through the laboratory rather than the mine shaft?

    Türkiye’s OTS-anchored positioning adds a genuinely new dimension to this picture. An Ankara that is actively building REE processing capacity at Beylikova, institutionalising economic co-operation through the OTS, and serving as the corridor’s most reliable western terminus is not a passive transit hub. It is a co-architect of the post-Chinese critical mineral supply chain — if it chooses to be.

    The businesses and investors who will win in this space are not those signing MoUs at ministerial summits. They are those who are currently doing the detailed geological work, building the processing partnerships, securing the offtake agreements, and positioning in the Middle Corridor logistics chain. They are thinking in fifteen-year horizons, not fifteen-month ones.

    At MINEX Asia in Ankara, MINEX Europe in Ireland, and MINEX Eurasia in London, the Forum is convening these conversations — not about what Central Asia might become, but about what concrete steps, in what sequence, with what capital and what institutions, will make the difference between another wave of declarations and a genuine reorientation of global critical mineral supply chains.

    The rocks are there. The question is whether the will, the capital, and the institutions are there too — and whether they will arrive before the window closes.

     

    Sources: Caspian Policy Center, ‘Central Asia and the New Critical Minerals Frontier: Progress in Reshaping Global Supply Chains (June 2026); EU Institute for Security Studies Chaillot Paper 189, ‘Beijing’s Critical Raw Material Weapon’ (May 2026); C5+1 Critical Minerals Dialogue, Astana (10 June 2026); Carnegie Endowment, ‘The Much-Touted Middle Corridor Transport Route Could Prove a Dead End’ (April 2026); CFR, ‘Leapfrogging China’s Critical Minerals Dominance’ (February 2026); Atlantic Council, ‘US Critical Minerals Policy Goes Collaborative with FORGE’ (February 2026); CSIS, ‘Rare Earth Export Restrictions One Year Later’ (May 2026); Daily Sabah, OECD Critical Minerals Forum coverage (April 2026); Caspian Post, ‘How Critical Minerals Are Reshaping Türkiye–Uzbekistan Ties’ (January 2026); TRENDS Research, ‘EU–Central Asia Cooperation on Critical Minerals’ (October 2025); OECD Regional Note on Critical Minerals in Central Asia (April 2026); Türkiye strategic minerals vector analysis (2026).

     

  • Ukraine’s Titanium Comeback: A Strategic Blueprint for Rebuilding Europe’s Titanium Industry

    Ukraine’s Titanium Comeback: A Strategic Blueprint for Rebuilding Europe’s Titanium Industry

    For decades, titanium has been a cornerstone of aerospace, defense, and high-tech manufacturing — prized for its strength, lightness, and resistance to corrosion. Yet behind this strategic metal lies a highly concentrated global industry, where only a handful of nations control production of titanium sponge, the raw metallic form of the element.

    Among them, Ukraine once stood as a global leader, the industrial backbone of the Soviet titanium complex and one of the few countries that mastered the Kroll process — the key technology for sponge production. Ukraine uniquely combined chemical, metallurgical, and scientific expertise, hosting its own Institute of Titanium and advanced hydrometallurgical facilities capable of extracting not only titanium but also zirconium and hafnium.

    Today, that legacy stands disrupted. The Russian invasion has fractured Ukraine’s heavy industry and halted sponge production since 2021. But it also opened a potential path forward: the chance for Ukraine to reclaim a central role in Western titanium supply chains, as the world scrambles to reduce dependence on Russia and China.

    Global Titanium Landscape

    According to the US Geological Survey, global titanium sponge capacity reached 410,000 tons in 2024, with production steady at around 320,000 tons. The market is heavily consolidated:

    • China accounts for nearly 69% of global output, producing mainly industrial-grade sponge for domestic use.

    • Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Kazakhstan supply almost all of the aerospace-grade sponge imported by the United States and the European Union.

    • Russia remains integrated in its own defense value chain, but sanctions have eroded margins and logistics competitiveness.

    • Ukraine, a former key player, has recorded zero production since 2021.

    While China dominates the midstream segment with state-backed clusters, low-cost energy, and full integration, it lacks certification pathways to access Western aerospace markets. By contrast, Japan and Saudi Arabia occupy the high-quality premium segment, selling sponge at $11,000–13,000 per ton, compared with China’s $7,000 average price.

    The United States and EU remain the largest consumers and stockpilers, offering the most stable and profitable end markets — but they are also the most supply-constrained.

    Why Ukraine Matters

    Ukraine is the only European nation with both a high-grade mineral base and the industrial legacy to re-enter titanium sponge production. Its ilmenite and rutile deposits can support chloride-route Kroll processing, the same route used for aerospace-quality sponge.

    Even a 10,000–15,000 tpa facility could anchor a new Titanium Cluster serving Western markets. The cluster could later expand into VAR smelting (Vacuum Arc Remelting) to produce ingots and billets, especially for Ti-6Al-4V alloys used in aviation and defense.

    Strategically, this would fill a critical gap in the non-Chinese, non-Russian titanium segment, providing Europe with a certified domestic source of titanium metal for the first time in decades.

    Key Enablers and Investment Model

    Rebuilding Ukraine’s titanium metallurgy requires three foundational pillars:

    1. Energy Efficiency and Security:
      Titanium sponge production is power-intensive, with electricity costs accounting for 20–30% of total cash costs. Stable, affordable power — ideally renewable or nuclear — is crucial.

    2. Integrated Clustering:
      A vertically integrated industrial cluster combining mining, sponge, smelting, and by-product recovery (zirconium, hafnium, germanium) would minimize costs and maximize value retention.

    3. Strategic Financing:
      A $400–700 million CAPEX is needed for a 10,000–15,000 tpa sponge facility, with an additional $350–400 million for smelting capacity. Financing could come through long-term offtake contracts with Western aerospace and defense OEMs, supported by instruments such as the U.S.–Ukraine Reconstruction Investment Fund.

    Advanced payments and consortium-based equity could unlock broader project financing, while ensuring certification alignment with Western standards.

    Outlook and Feasibility

    Global titanium sponge output is forecast to reach 400,000–440,000 tons by 2035, driven by:

    • Rising aerospace demand (notably from Airbus A320 and Boeing 737 MAX programs).

    • Global rearmament and stockpiling.

    • Ongoing supply diversification efforts by Western governments.

    Within this framework, Ukraine and India are viewed as the two most promising re-entry markets. Ukraine could restore 5,000–10,000 tons per year of production by 2035, scaling to 15,000 tons under favorable conditions.

    Even modest early-stage output would offer strategic returns: it would anchor a European titanium hub, reduce Western supply risk, and cement Ukraine’s industrial role in the critical minerals value chain.

    Conclusion

    Ukraine possesses the minerals, know-how, and geographic advantage to rebuild a titanium industry that serves Europe’s long-term strategic interests.

    If paired with targeted investment, certification partnerships, and energy reforms, Ukraine could re-establish itself as a core supplier of aerospace-grade titanium, bridging the gap between resource-rich producers and high-tech Western consumers.

    Far from a nostalgic revival, this would mark a new strategic chapter — positioning Ukraine not just as a raw material exporter, but as Europe’s titanium powerhouse.

  • US Delegation Explores Ukrainian Titanium and Zirconium Mines Under New Minerals Pact

    US Delegation Explores Ukrainian Titanium and Zirconium Mines Under New Minerals Pact

    A United States delegation has visited central Ukraine to assess titanium, zirconium, and hafnium mining opportunities, marking the first steps in a new minerals agreement between Kyiv and Washington.

    Representatives from the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), accompanied by Ukraine’s Minister of Economy, Environment and Agriculture Oleksiy Sobolev, toured the Birzulivskiy mining and processing complex and the Likarivske deposit in the Kirovohrad region. Both sites are operated by Ukrainian titanium producer Velta, which has mined in the area for more than 14 years.

    Velta’s expansion plans include producing zircon and hafnium—metals essential to the nuclear industry—in addition to titanium, while also generating by-products such as clay and sand for construction. “Our ability to provide an alternative source of critical raw materials outside of China is important to our American partners, while our additional products will be essential for the reconstruction of Ukraine,” said Velta director Andriy Brodsky.

    Titanium is one of the 34 critical raw materials on the European Union’s list, with applications across defense, aerospace, and technology sectors. Its global market value is forecast to exceed $53 billion by 2034, with demand rising amid supply disruptions caused by Russia’s war in Ukraine and Western sanctions. Before the conflict, Russia supplied nearly one-third of US titanium by-products, a gap Washington now seeks to fill through new partnerships.

    The April 30 minerals agreement grants the US preferential access to Ukrainian investment projects spanning natural resources, infrastructure, and defense programs. The site visits by the DFC and Ukrainian officials mark an early move to accelerate joint ventures under this framework.

  • Kazakhstan’s Critical Minerals in Focus at the BKS webinar

    Kazakhstan’s Critical Minerals in Focus at the BKS webinar

    Kazakhstan’s ambition to transform itself into a linchpin of the global critical minerals supply was in sharp focus at the British-Kazakh Society’s (BKS) latest webinar, “Critical Minerals – A Closer Look at Kazakhstan and the Resource Base.”

    Hosted online on 16 September, the event brought together government representatives, leading analysts, and industry insiders to scrutinise the nation’s mineral endowment, discuss its strategy for long-term sustainability, and evaluate opportunities for international partnership and investment.

    Geological Promise and Policy Drive
    In his welcome address, Yerlan Zeineshev, Economic Counsellor at the Kazakhstan Embassy in the UK, underscored the nation’s geological riches—including rare earths, lithium, copper, uranium, titanium, and vanadium—and signalled Kazakhstan’s determination to become “a key supplier for global critical mineral needs.” The country already produces 17 of the 34 critical minerals on the UK’s essential list, with potential to expand further given the right investment and technology.

    Mr Zeineshev highlighted March 2024’s UK-Kazakhstan critical minerals roadmap, emphasising mutual aims for research, private investment, and technology transfer. He pledged continued reform to ensure an open, investor-friendly environment—citing adoption of international best practice in mining codes, long-term investment agreements, and digitalisation of geological data.

    Supply Chain Resilience and Global Partnerships
    Speakers and panellists closely examined how Kazakhstan’s neutral geopolitical stance and its position on the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route position the country as a reliable partner for nations seeking to diversify supply chains. As Enzo Grazella, Senior Analyst at the Critical Minerals Association, noted, this offers both Europe and the UK an alternative source to mitigate risk and reduce overreliance on a handful of global producers.

    The UK government’s updated critical minerals strategy and increased focus on supply chain security were cited as drivers for stepped-up bilateral engagement, particularly in mining, refining, recycling, and advanced manufacturing. Initiatives backed by UK export finance, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), and local reforms are fostering a more attractive investment climate.

    Resource Development and Value Addition
    Arkhat Kurmanbekov, Deputy Director General of Kazakhstan’s National Center for Technology Foresight, outlined the scale of Kazakhstan’s geological survey initiatives, with record levels of exploration funding and ambitious targets to increase the area surveyed to over 2.2 million km² by 2026. The nation aims not only to expand extraction but also to move up the value chain through domestic processing, production of battery materials, heat-resistant alloys, semiconductor materials, and recycling technologies. Industry success stories—such as providing titanium to Boeing and Airbus, or pioneering full-cycle beryllium plants—underline local expertise.

    Market Dynamics, Price Volatility, and Sustainability Challenges
    Caroline Messecar, Strategic Markets Editor at Fastmarkets Metals and Mining, discussed acute market vulnerability arising from concentrated global production—particularly for rare earth magnets vital to electric vehicles and wind turbines. China commands up to 89% of global magnet supply, and recent export controls have forced international markets to scramble for alternative sources, underscoring the strategic importance of new suppliers like Kazakhstan.

    The panel noted that establishing downstream industries (such as magnet manufacturing) requires more than raw materials: it needs multidisciplinary technical skills, transparent and sustainable production, and robust ESG standards. Both Kazakh and UK speakers reaffirmed their commitments to high environmental and social standards, clarifying that responsible development can coexist with commercial viability.

    Whatch the webinar recoding
    Video provided for the MINEX Forum readers by the British-Kazakh Society

  • Ust-Kamenogorsk Titanium-Magnesium Plant Sees Net Profit Plunge Threefold in 2024 Despite Revenue Growth

    Ust-Kamenogorsk Titanium-Magnesium Plant Sees Net Profit Plunge Threefold in 2024 Despite Revenue Growth

    Kazakhstan’s Ust-Kamenogorsk Titanium-Magnesium Plant (UKTMP) ended 2024 with a net profit of 1.3 billion tenge, marking a threefold decline from 4.1 billion tenge in 2023, according to the company’s consolidated financial statements.

    While revenues surged by 15.3% year-on-year to 94.3 billion tenge, boosted by higher sales of titanium and magnesium products, this gain was offset by a 24.5% increase in cost of sales, which jumped by 14.6 billion tenge. As a result, gross profit for the year fell to 20 billion tenge, down from 22 billion tenge in 2023.

    The steep decline in net profit was further worsened by a significant spike in corporate income tax (CIT) payments. Despite a 21% drop in pre-tax profit (from 6.2 to 4.9 billion tenge), CIT obligations rose by 66.7%, from 2.1 to 3.5 billion tenge.

    UKTMP’s total assets grew by 27.4% year-on-year, reaching 253.1 billion tenge, while liabilities increased by 31.3% to 195 billion tenge. The plant’s ultimate controlling party is Johan Dumont, managing director of Specialty Metals Holding Company.

    UKTMP specializes in producing titanium sponge, titanium ingots, and magnesium, primarily for the aerospace industry.

    The plant’s strategic importance was underscored by remarks from Kazakhstan’s Minister of Industry Ersain Nagaspayev, who confirmed that French aerospace supplier Aubert & Duval, which serves Airbus, procures titanium sponge and ingots from UKTMP. These materials are used by UKAD, a Franco-Kazakh joint venture in which UKTMP holds a stake. UKAD, in partnership with the French government and Crédit Agricole, operates a major forging facility in France.

  • US-Ukraine Investment Agreement Faces Long Road to Mining and Energy Sector Boost

    US-Ukraine Investment Agreement Faces Long Road to Mining and Energy Sector Boost

    The recently ratified investment agreement between Ukraine and the United States, championed by US President Donald Trump, is not anticipated to deliver tangible results for at least a decade, experts told the Financial Times.

    The agreement, approved by Ukraine’s parliament on May 8, outlines the establishment of a joint “reconstruction investment fund” to support future mining and energy projects. Despite optimism, industry leaders warn that substantial challenges lie ahead, including Russia’s ongoing war on Ukraine, heavily damaged infrastructure, restricted Soviet-era geological data, corruption risks, and unexploded ordnance contamination.

    According to Eric Rasmussen, former head of natural resources at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, “It could be 10-15 years — that’s the sort of timeline we talk about.” Peter Bryant of the advisory group Clareo echoed these sentiments, stating that the deal “does little to de-risk the supply chain in the next 10 years.”

    Ukraine boasts significant natural resources, including iron ore, coal, lithium, graphite, and titanium-bearing ores. It is also Europe’s third-largest gas producer. While oil and gas fields may be quicker to develop, mining projects are expected to face lengthy geological exploration before reaching feasibility.

    Ukrainian Minister Yulia Svyrydenko mentioned that the reconstruction fund would be operational “within a few weeks,” although profits are expected to be reinvested for the first decade.

    US-backed TechMet, which aims to secure Ukrainian lithium, called the agreement promising but noted the long-term commitment required. DTEK, Ukraine’s largest private energy firm, expressed optimism, signaling that Ukraine was “open for business.”

    However, not all are convinced. One mining executive remarked skeptically, “This romantic idea that there’s lakes of lithium to be tapped is just not the case.”

  • Ukraine’s Mineral Wealth Attracts Global Interest, Valued at $26 Trillion

    Ukraine’s Mineral Wealth Attracts Global Interest, Valued at $26 Trillion

    Ukraine’s vast mineral resources, estimated to be worth $26 trillion, have drawn significant international attention. The country’s subsoil holds approximately 5% of the world’s total mineral resources, including rare earth metals, which have sparked particular interest from the new US president.

    Ukraine boasts over 20,000 mineral deposits of at least 20 types, making it a key player in the global mining industry. Among its most valuable resources are iron ore, titanium, manganese, uranium, rare earth metals, graphite, lithium, gallium, copper, and zinc.

    The Kryvyi Rih Basin is home to Ukraine’s largest iron ore reserves, estimated at 27.4 billion tons, accounting for over 90% of the country’s production. Ukraine also holds the largest titanium reservesin Europe, representing about 7% of the global total, a critical resource for industries like aerospaceand medical equipment.

    In addition, Ukraine is a global leader in manganese reserves, with significant deposits in the Nikopol Basin. The country also possesses 2.3% of the world’s uranium reserves and a variety of rare earth metals essential for nuclear energy and advanced technologies.

    Ukraine ranks among the top five countries globally for natural graphite reserves, with 18 million tonsof confirmed deposits and 100 million tons of potential resources. The country is also a major supplier of lithium, with estimated reserves of 500,000 tons, crucial for battery production.

    Furthermore, Ukraine is the fifth-largest producer of gallium, a vital component in semiconductor manufacturing, and a significant producer of copper (4th in Europe) and zinc (6th in Europe).

  • Zelenskiy Freezes US Mineral Deal, Seeks Middle Eastern Investors

    Zelenskiy Freezes US Mineral Deal, Seeks Middle Eastern Investors

    Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has suspended a proposed deal to exploit Ukraine’s vast mineral resources, estimated to be worth trillions of dollars, after the US provided little in return. Zelenskiy is now seeking new investors in the Middle East.

    The agreement, reached with US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent last week, remains unsigned as it “does not adequately protect the country’s interests,” according to Zelenskiy. US President Donald Trump demanded access to $500 billion worth of Ukrainian minerals as compensation for US support during the three-year war, but failed to offer the crucial security guarantees Zelenskiy seeks in any deal.

    Zelenskiy insists that any minerals agreement must include not only subsoil resources but also security guarantees and foreign investment in Ukraine, all legally formalized. However, it is increasingly apparent that none of Ukraine’s allies are willing to provide a genuine security deal.

    The relationship between Zelenskiy and Trump has deteriorated, particularly after the US announced Europe’s exclusion from Ukraine ceasefire talks that began in Riyadh on February 18. Retired Lieutenant General Keith Kellogg, special envoy to Ukraine, had stated Ukraine would be at the table, but no Ukrainian representatives were present when Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov started talks with US Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

    In light of these developments, Zelenskiy has turned to the Middle East for new partnerships. During a visit to the UAE, he announced the signing of a bilateral trade agreement, the first of its kind between Ukraine and a Gulf nation. The agreement opens the UAE market to almost all Ukrainian goods and is expected to boost Ukraine’s GDP growth.

    Zelenskiy was scheduled to visit Saudi Arabia but canceled his plans as President Trump began US-Russia bilateral negotiations in Riyadh aimed at stopping Russia’s war against Ukraine. Prior to this, a Ukrainian delegation had already started discussions with Saudi Arabian entrepreneurs, presenting investment opportunities worth $500 million in various sectors including energy, agriculture, and infrastructure.

    As negotiations continue, the value of Ukraine’s mineral deposits has been estimated at up to $11.5 trillion, including significant reserves of critical minerals such as lithium and titanium. The outcome of these discussions could have significant implications for Ukraine’s economic future and its relationships with global powers.

  • Trump Suggests Ukraine Pay US Aid with Rare Earth Minerals

    Trump Suggests Ukraine Pay US Aid with Rare Earth Minerals

    President Donald Trump proposed on Monday that Ukraine compensate the United States for its substantial financial support in the ongoing conflict with Russia by supplying rare earth minerals, a critical resource for advanced technologies.

    Speaking to reporters at the White House, Trump emphasized the potential for an “equalisation” deal, referencing the nearly $300 billion in aid the United States has provided to Ukraine. “We’re telling Ukraine they have very valuable rare earths,” Trump stated. “We’re looking to do a deal with Ukraine where they’re going to secure what we’re giving them with their rare earths and other things.”

    The proposal highlights the strategic importance of rare earth minerals, a group of 17 metals essential for manufacturing electronics, electric vehicles, and other high-tech products. These minerals are crucial for power generation and motion technologies, with no known substitutes.

    While Trump did not specify exactly which minerals he was referencing, Ukraine does possess significant deposits of uranium, lithium, and titanium. However, the country is not considered a top-five global producer of these resources.

    The United States currently has limited rare earth mineral production, with only one operating mine and minimal processing capacity. In contrast, China dominates the global market for these critical minerals.

    The US Geological Survey identifies 50 minerals as critical for the country’s economic and national defense interests, including various rare earths, nickel, and lithium.

    The feasibility and potential diplomatic implications of Trump’s proposed mineral-for-aid exchange remain unclear, and further details have not been provided.

  • Europe’s Aerospace Industry Faces Titanium Dependency Challenge Amid Sanctions

    Europe’s Aerospace Industry Faces Titanium Dependency Challenge Amid Sanctions

    Fans of Apple’s titanium-cased iPhones need not worry about a material shortage. Although Russian President Vladimir Putin has suggested capping exports of titanium in response to Western sanctions, China remains Apple’smain supplier, ensuring that the company will not need to switch back to stainless steel. However, the European aerospace sector faces more significant challenges. VSMPO-AVISMA, the world’s largest titanium producer, supplies a considerable portion of the European market, and while Europe has restricted imports of many Russian metals, titaniumhas remained largely unaffected by these sanctions.

    In February, when Canada imposed sanctions on VSMPO-AVISMA, French President Emmanuel Macronpersonally intervened to secure waivers for Airbus and other aerospace companies, illustrating the deep reliance on Russian titanium. This dependency is difficult to break because titanium is a critical component in aircraft manufacturing due to its strength, light weight, and corrosion resistance.

    Europe’s problem is compounded by the fact that it lacks significant domestic capacity for producing aviation-grade titanium, which requires extremely high purity levels and specialized accreditation from aircraft manufacturers like Airbus and Boeing. As a result, Europe risks replacing its dependence on Russia with a reliance on U.S. titanium suppliers, especially since the U.S. receives nearly 70% of Europe’s titanium scrap.

    Breaking this transatlantic loop is crucial as the European Union’s Critical Raw Materials Act sets ambitious goals for domestic extraction and recycling by 2030. While Ukraine may offer a potential future supply of titanium, European recycling capabilities must be expanded to meet the short-term demand. Government-level negotiations between Europeand the U.S. are likely needed to reshape the titanium supply chain.